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ABSTRACT
CONTESTED SUBJECTS: BIOPOLITICS & THE MORAL STAKES OF SOCIAL
COHESION IN POST-WELFARE ITALY
SEPTEMBER 2013
MILENA MARCHESI, B.A., UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO AT BOULDER
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Elizabeth L. Krause
The requirements of European Unification, along with broader processes of
globalization, including immigration, are reshaping economic and welfare priorities and
reconfiguring the relationship between citizens and the state in Italy. The reorganization
of the Italian welfare state around the principle of subsidiarity combines neoliberal
restructuring with a commitment to social solidarity and cohesion and privileges the
family as the social formation best suited to mediate between state, market, and citizens.
As the state retreats from some of its former social welfare responsibilities, it
simultaneously extends its reach into matters of reproduction and family-making.
Biopolitics in the time of subsidiarity encompasses concerns over birth rates, the
population, the rights of the unborn, and the proper composition of the family.
This dissertation examines the terms of social cohesion in post-welfare Italy and
the central role that matters of reproduction and the family play in its reformulation as a
moral and cultural problem. I focus on three discursive sites: the politics of life; the
assertion of the heteronormative family as an urgent and legitimate site of political
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intervention; and the parameters for the “appropriate” integration of migrants into Italian
society. I draw on ethnographic inquiry with associations and individuals engaged in
reproductive and migrant health and politics in Milan. Tracing the policies, practices, and
discourses that seek to govern in the name of social cohesion sheds light on new
citizenship projects and logics of inclusion/exclusion in the post-welfare moment and
underscores the continued salience of gender, sexuality, and reproduction to processes of
state building.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION: THE POLITICS OF LIFE AND SOCIAL COHESION
“Il futuro non è più quello di una volta”
“The future is no longer what it used to be”1
graffiti on wall in Milan, 2007
“Io sono proprio dispiaciuta per i giovani, perché
non è più come una volta”
“I am really sorry for the youth because things are not
like they used to be”
Carla,2 November 29, 2006
Introduction
In this dissertation I examine the terms of social cohesion in post-welfare Italy and
the central role that matters of reproduction and the family play in its reformulation as a
moral and cultural problem. I focus on three sites, each of which generates significant
contestation: the politics of life, particularly the anticipation of subjecthood from birth to
conception; the “explosion” of the family onto the political stage as a legitimate site of
political intervention; and the terms by which migrants are to be integrated into Italian
society. Taken together, these three facets of the way social reproduction is problematized
and governed shed light on transformations in social citizenship in the post-welfare
moment.
The sense that things in Italy have changed fundamentally around the turn of the
millennium is widespread. Beginning in the early 1990s, Italian politics was upended by the

1

Variations of the English version of this quote have been attributed to everyone from Arthur C. Clarke to
Yogi Berra, though its earliest usage can be traced back to French writer Paul Valéry (Regards sur le monde
actuel, Oeuvres II, 1931: 1062) (see http://pinobruno.globalist.it/2008/07/perche-il-futuro-non-e-piu-quellodi-una-volta/). In 2009, the quote was used as the title of a song by the Italian group Aram Quartet in an
album titled “Il pericolo di essere liberi,” (The Danger of Being Free).
2 The names of research subjects and associations have been changed into pseudonyms, with the exception of
politicians or official figures speaking in public settings.
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Mani pulite (Clean Hands) scandal, making way for new political parties, politicians, and
politics. The fiscal requirements of European Unification and the macro-economic
processes of globalization reshaped the economic and welfare priorities of the Italian state
and the experiences of its citizens. The loosening of some labor protections and the
increasing privatization of social services (Della Sala 2004) have contributed to a
widespread sense of precarietà (precarity) among Italians (Molé 2010; Muehlebach 2007).
A growing immigrant population, which tripled in size in the decade between 2001 and
2011 (Istat 2012),3 is affected by these processes, as well as by significant added structural
challenges: lack of political rights, a difficult path to citizenship, and racism. Other
vulnerabilities mark the ongoing transformation of the relationship between citizens and the
state; for Italian feminists, the future has taken an unexpected turn away from the gains of
the women’s movement in the 1970s as the Catholic Church has consolidated political
power.
Politicians, demographers, and Popes warn about a future threatened by the
“persistent very low fertility levels” (Caltabiano et al. 2009: 681, emphasis in original) of
Italian-origin women, decrying its implications for economic prosperity, welfare
entitlements, and Italian culture and values (Krause 2006; Krause and Marchesi 2007;
Marchesi 2012). The meaning of the graffiti on the passing of the future that was is open to
interpretation: Is it a reference to widespread sense of economic insecurity among Italians,
particularly among the younger generations? Is it inspired by nostalgia for a very recent
past when Milan was not yet the multicultural city it is today? The latter was the past
bemoaned by Carla, a woman in her early sixties who was the self-appointed manager of

3

As of 2012, Italy’s official migrant population is 4.029.145, while Italy’s total population is 59.433.744
(Istat 2012).
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the apartment building in which I lived during fieldwork. Having cornered me on the stairs
of our building early on in my stay, Carla launched into a wide-ranging lament over the
moral and cultural decline of Italian society. Her monologue included condemnation of the
lack of discipline of today’s children, mapped out the recent history of break-ins in our
building and in neighboring ones, and warned of the dangers posed by Muslim immigrants
in the neighborhood and of the coming “wave” of Romanians. Gone were the days when
“we would leave the door unlocked,” she sighed. I was to be sure to lock all doors at all
times.4
These concerns over a vulnerable present and future call forth different responses
that include, among other interventions, the criminalization of undocumented status, the
empowering of citizen surveillance and policing, and the tightening of borders. They also
play out in a different kind of politics of security, which implicates state and non-state
actors in the fostering of social cohesion and integration in the post-welfare and multicultural moment. Interventions in the name of social cohesion encompass a wide range of
projects examined in this dissertation: the reorganizing of the welfare state, the assertion of
embryos as precarious subjects to be protected by the state, the politics of the family and
the “common good,” the training and employing of cultural mediators in social services and
grassroots intercultural projects. In examining these different manifestations of the
governing of social cohesion I ask: How are ideas of personhood, subjecthood, and
citizenship reconfigured by discourses, policies, and practices governing in the name of

4

Pasts and futures, of course, are selective and mobilized for different purposes. The very building and
staircase in which Carla trapped me with her long disquisitions was rebuilt on the site where her mother’s
house had been destroyed by heavy Allied bombardments during WWII of this neighborhood in the northwest
periphery of the city, which at the time was surrounded by heavy industries. The ruins of Carla’s mother’s
house probably rested not far from us in the Monte Stella (Star Mountain) park, an artificial hill built out of
the rubble from those bombardments, the only change in the otherwise endlessly flat topography of Milan.
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social solidarity and cohesion? What does inquiry into the terms and forms of engagement
and contestation of these moral transformations in social citizenship reveal about the
possibility for alternative politics?
Ethnographic Research
The Setting
I conducted dissertation fieldwork research in the northern city of Milan, Lombardy, a
location that provided the perfect setting for examining the emergence of new terms of
social cohesion and social citizenship (see also Muehlebach 2012). Geographer John Foot
notes that
Milan has always played a key role in Italian history. It invented fascism and urban
reformist socialism. It was host to the end of Mussolini’s regime and the birth of a
new democracy. The city’s economy pulled Italy into the world economy in the
1960s and again dominated key sectors in the 1980s and 1990s. The left first
experimented with post-socialist ideas in Milan, and northern regionalism first took
power in this city. Finally, Milan produced the first post-political movement to take
power in Europe, Forza Italia! [led by Silvio Berlusconi] (Foot 2001: 183).
Over the past decade, the city and its region of Lombardy have also been the site of
significant decentralization of public administration and services. Since 1995, the region
has been governed by a Catholic and conservative coalition, which has applied the principle
of subsidiarity. Subsidiarity, a Catholic-derived principle of governance, holds that
governing should be exercised at the closest possible level to the governed and has become
the dominant principle of governance in Italy. Lombardy, however, has implemented it
particularly aggressively, especially in the administration of health care and social services,
with the region dubbing itself “the region of subsidiarity” (Consiglio regionale della
Lombardia 2002: 7). The Region opened up public funding formerly reserved for health and
social services to non-state entities, often ones with ties to the Catholic Church. These
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reforms have had profound implication for the quality of services and for reproductive
rights; they have also engendered widespread corruption.
Fieldsites
Following pre-dissertation research on a 2004 law restricting assisted reproductive
technologies in Italy, my dissertation research aimed to examine subjectivities and practices
in the family planning clinic against a backdrop of demographic alarmism and nationalism
(Krause 2001; 2006). Through participant observation and interviews I had hoped to
document how the biopolitics of the population translate into practices. I had picked
consultori familiari, family planning clinics established in the 1970s, as my primary field
site; I was particularly interested in the encounter between service providers and clients,
both Italian and migrant.
From my earliest days in the field I started to realize that the politics of biological
and social reproduction, including of migration and integration, saturated daily life, the
discourse of political and religious authorities and of demographic and sociological experts,
and through them, the media. At the same time, I was finding the family clinics walls
difficult to cross.5 I hovered near those enclosed clinical spaces, joining a training course
for cultural mediators because I knew that many mediators were employed in women’s
health settings, and volunteering at least one day a week in the reception area of an
independent feminist clinic.
The reception of the family planning clinic was a social space in which patients and
the different figures required by law to be associated with the clinic—a gynecologist, a
lawyer, a psychologist/social worker, and a psychiatrist—intersected with clients and
5

Late in my fieldwork I was told by a politician and sociologist of the family and by the head of a cultural
mediation association in Milan that conducting research in public health settings in Italy is very difficult
without political connections. Personal communications, May 25, 2007 and April 23, 2007.
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visitors, and joined ongoing conversations among the two receptionists and the
anthropologist. In the afternoon the space was dominated by Nilde. In her early 80s, she
was a formidable presence. Nilde had a lifetime of political engagement, ranging from her
participation in the resistance against fascism and Nazism, when she smuggled weapons to
partisans in the hills of Tuscany, to her communist militancy, and to her feminist politics,
which included being one of the founding members of the clinic. Nilde loved to tell stories
about the condition in which the women who had started the clinic had found the space,
which they leased from the city of Milan: the floors had been covered in layers of pigeon
droppings that had to be scrubbed away and the “furniture” initially consisted of just a
single cot.
The clinic had since added a second apartment in the same original building, which
provides one side to Milan’s famous galleria Vittorio Emanuele. The clinic was accessed
through one apartment, which included a foyer with a table covered in flyers and
pamphlets, a bathroom, a short hallway crowded by the photocopier, a coffee machine, and
a small fridge stocked with mineral water. The reception area was furnished with
mismatched desks, chests of drawers, chairs, and filing cabinets. Behind the large wooden
desk at which Nilde sat hung two posters, prized possessions of hers. One was a poster for a
successful march in defense of reproductive rights held in January 2006; the other was a
reprint of a poster from the 1970s bearing the slogan: “There is no revolution without
women’s liberation. There is no women’s liberation without revolution.” Patients set on an
old couch, replaced by one from Ikea early in my fieldwork, or on wooden chairs organized
around a coffee table. The main room off the reception area was better furnished, with
inviting couches and chairs, a nice desk and art on the walls. It was used for appointments

6

with a family lawyer, who was also the head of the clinic, a psychiatrist or psychologist, or
for staff meetings. Climbing out of the window behind the desk was a treat that Nilde
encouraged me to partake in once in a while. The window offered access to a narrow
balcony which afforded amazing views high up in the galleria. The exam room was in a
different apartment, on the same floor. After checking in at the desk, patients had to exit the
reception area and go into a separate waiting room. The small exam room included a desk,
an exam table, an ultrasound machine, and cabinets with instruments. I spent most of my
time in the reception room, helping with projects, sometimes translating for English
speakers, chatting with patients, answering phones, running errands, and mostly talking
with Nilde and Laura, the other receptionist on duty. I draw on these conversations
throughout the chapters that follow.
My association with the clinic led me to another key fieldsite: the feminist network
Donne, Diritti, Salute, an informal group that started after the assisted reproduction
legislation referendum of 2005 by Daniela, a politically active woman in her early thirties,
and by Franca, a woman in her 50s who was active in the Partito della Rifondazione
Comunista (Communist Refoundation Party). Laura, a woman in her late 40s who
sometimes worked as a counselor at the clinic had since become a regular and reliable
member. Less frequently, Carolina, a cultural mediator, originally from Ecuador, also
participated. The meetings were held in the clinic after it closed at 7pm. Through Donne,
Diritti, Salute and its careful focus not only on reproductive politics like abortion and the
assisted reproduction law, but also regional health care policies, I began to understand the
implications of the restructuring of health care for reproductive rights. It was in the first

7

meeting of Donne, Diritti, Salute that I attended that I heard the word “subsidiarity” for the
first time.
In turn, through Donne, Diritti, Salute I started to attend the meetings of the
umbrella association Usciamo dal silenzio (which can be translated as either “We Are
Coming Out of Silence” or, “Let’s Come Out of Silence”), a group that also formed in
response to the assisted reproduction legislation. Usciamo dal Silenzio (UdS) had gained
prominence and visibility after organizing a march for reproductive rights in Milan in
January of 2006 in which tens of thousands of women, Nilde included, marched. The
organization’s leadership included leaders in Italy’s biggest trade union, journalists,
lawyers, politicians, and “historic feminists,” veterans of the struggles of the 1970s.
Through my participant observation at hours-long meetings of UdS and Donne, Diritti,
Salute I gained a sense of the struggles and challenges of feminist politics in contemporary
Italy, of the difficulty in defining an alternative to the consolidation of a moral politics that
delimits women’s reproductive and political rights.
Through my participation in the cultural mediation course I was able to
ethnographically document the pedagogical articulation of an alternative model of
integration, the model of intercultura, and to document the experiences and perspective of a
group of long-term immigrants in Milan. I show how migrants, especially migrant women,
are tasked with fostering integration, and thus social cohesion, through their roles as
cultural mediators. I also draw on class lecture and discussions, conversations, and
interviews, as well as on my participation in a grassroots intercultura project that aimed to
bring together Muslim and Italian women, to show the central relevance of gender and
family-making to the project of integration.

8

The politics of reproduction and the family were active political issues throughout
my time in the field. Within my first week in the field I attended a protest in front of a
Milanese hospital contesting plans to consolidate family planning clinics into hospitals and
the continued penetration of right-to-life organizations and volunteers into family planning
and abortion services. A few months into my research, a new regional norm mandated the
burial of fetal parts and feminist groups organized and re-energized in response to this and
other new attacks on reproductive rights. At the same time, the center-left government led
by Romano Prodi introduced a watered down civil union legislation. The center-right and
the Vatican seized the issue and the value and form of the family became a key issue in
public and political discourse. This debate reached its peak with a hugely successful
“Family Day” protest that took over Rome in May of 2007. The government organized the
first National Conference on the Family, a three-day conference held in May.
The terms of social reproduction and cohesion that were so heavily debated in the
context of the family were also in play in the context of migration. While the migrant
population in Italy as a whole was still lower than that of the main migration-receiving
countries in Europe, constituting around 5% of the total population at the time of my
research compared to, for example, 9% of the total population in Germany, the city of
Milan and the region of Lombardy had higher rates than the national average (Caritas 2005:
4). In 2007, the percentage of migrants residing in Milan was around 10% of the city’s
residents. Now that a center-left government was in charge, there was talk of a new
immigration law that would address the limitations of the restrictive Bossi-Fini law of 2002
and even introduce a new citizenship law that would shift away from the descent-based jus
sanguinis model to the territory-based jus soli model. The Minister of Migration took a
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weeklong trip throughout the country to listen to various immigrant constituencies, hoping
to put together recommendations for immigration reforms that would be based more on
what was needed on the ground than on politics. At the same time, the Prodi government
had to manage a shift in the immigration bureaucracy initiated by the center-right coalition
of Silvio Berlusconi. Residency permits and most matters of immigration applications were
shifted from police stations to the post office. Chaos ensued, forms were not available and
people whose permits were about to expire had no means to renew them and thus to prevent
lapsing into undocumented status. During that winter a regional law targeted immigrant
phone and internet café businesses with a host of new regulations, driving a large portion of
them to close. Another set of regulations aimed directly at the Chinese business community
led to a violent confrontation in Milan’s “Chinatown.” By the spring, different immigrant
communities came together in a network, calling themselves cittadini di fatto, (de-facto
citizens). Another grassroots group, which called themselves Incontriamoci (Let’s Get
Together) aimed to bring together Italian and Muslim women to counteract stereotypes and
misinformation. Through all this, an endless number of conferences on migration and
integration were held in Milan.
Thus a project envisioned as being organized around the core site of the family
planning clinic became instead a highly multi-sited ethnographic project (Marcus 1995) that
tracked policies, discourses, practices, and forms of contestation and resistance across the
city of Milan. Participant observation at these sites yielded about 400 pages of fieldnotes,
digital recordings of interviews with twenty-one participants, and sixty audio and video
recordings of meetings, conferences, cultural mediation trainings, debates, parades, and
protests. Additionally, I collected over 100 policy documents concerning family,
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immigration, integration, and reproductive policy in Italy and in the European Union. This
dimension of research was not limited to my time in Milan but has been ongoing as new
policies, and updated reports have been published.
Theoretical Framings
Governing the Population & Society
Conceptually linking the different threads of my dissertation field research,
reproductive, family, and migration politics, was the politics of the population. From the
development of my dissertation question, through a good portion of my fieldwork,
biopolitics framed my project. Based on Foucault’s influential insights on the nature of
modern power as biopower, biopolitics emerges alongside the modern state. In the
introduction to the History of Sexuality, Foucault writes that “at the beginning of the
modern era, natural life begins to be included in the mechanisms and calculations of State
power, and politics turns into biopolitics” (1978: 3). Biopower describes a form of power
distinct from the repressive, oppressive, and death-wielding power of the sovereign. Unlike
sovereign power, biopower harnesses and governs biological life as it addresses “man-asbody” (Foucault 2003: 243).
Biopower encompasses two different forms of power, which Foucault envisions as
two poles: on one end are disciplinary techniques aimed at the individual body and often
contained in the spaces and knowledges of institutions like the clinic and the prison
(“anatomo-politics”) (Foucault 1978: 139). On the other, a complementary form of power,
“a biopolitics of the population, focuses “the species body” by which Foucault means “the
body imbued with the mechanics of life and serving as the basis of the biological processes:
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propagation, births and mortality, the level of health, life expectancy and longevity”
(Foucault 1978: 139).
Biopolitics harnesses knowledge about life in order to foster it; the center of gravity
of modern power shifts form the juridical realm to the biological, from the law to the norm
and regulation (Prozorov 2007). The management of life through power “situated and
exercised at the level of life” (Foucault 1978: 137) is at once insidious, penetrating,
generative, and simultaneously diffused through internalized norms (individual disciplinary
power) and managed “through an entire series of interventions and regulatory controls”
(Foucault 1978: 139). With the deployment of biopolitical power/knowledge, “at stake is
the biological existence of the population” (Foucault 1978: 137). Scholars have built on
Foucault’s theorization of biopolitics, extending it, for example, to analyze the
biologization of mental illness and its treatment (Rabinow and Rose 2003), developments in
genetic engineering (Novas and Rose 2000), reproductive politics and technologies
(Franklin 1997; Hartouni 1997; Kaufman and Morgan: 2005), and biological claims to
citizenship (Petryna 2002). Driving this scholarship is the understanding that what
characterizes the biopolitics of our era is a politics “concerned with our growing capacities
to control, manage, engineer, reshape, and modulate the very vital capacities of human
beings as living creatures” (Rose 2007: 3). Another literature seeks to push the concept
beyond Foucault’s original articulation, particularly as it concerns “negative biopolitics”
(Balibar 2002: 38; see also Agamben 1998; Biehl 2005; Fassin 2009; Mbembe 2003).
Biopolitics has been “good to think with” in matters of reproduction, and
reproductive politics, particularly as new technologies and forms of knowledge and
expertise have come to bear on reproductive experiences, shaping subjectivities and even
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constituting new subjects at the intersections of political and medical technologies (Casper
1998; Casper and Morgan 2004; Holc 2004; Kaufman and Morgan 2005; Petchesky 1987;
Rapp 1999; Taylor 1992). Scholarship in critical demography has drawn on biopolitics to
examined the deployment of knowledges in problematizations related to birth rates, family
planning, and other population politics (see Ali 2002; Greenhalgh 2003; Kanaaneh 2001;
Krause 2001).
One of the theoretical challenges I faced as my fieldwork progressed and during
data analysis concerned how to conceptualize two aspects of my research that did not seem
to be to fully captured by the field of the biopolitical: the politics of life waged by the
Catholic Church and the whole array of discourses and interventions into social and familial
relationships that characterize the post-welfare moment in Italy. Some of these
interventions, such as those aimed at strengthening the family in the name of increasing
birth rates, were clearly biopolitical. Other discourses, however, such as the assertion of the
family as the basic source of social solidarity and building block of social cohesion, the
Catholic Church’s doctrinal insistence of life as a gift from god and of its non-availability
to intervention and manipulation (see, for example, the 1995 Encyclical Letter “Evangelium
Vitae”)6, or the discourse on reciprocal “contamination” of the intercultura model of
integration seemed to be addressing social and moral subjects outside of biopolitical
rationalities.

6

The Italian version of the Encyclical uses the notion of indisponibilità, which I translate as “the nonavailability of life to intervention”
(http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_25031995_evangeliumvitae_it.html). The English version refers to the “absolute sacredness of life” instead
(http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_25031995_evangeliumvitae_en.html). The concept of non-availability more clearly contrasts with the biopolitical project and the
ethopolitical empowerment and responsibilization of individuals.
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Governmentality
Foucault’s concept of governmentality, defined most minimally as governing
through “the conduct of conduct,” provides a broader perspective that foregrounds the
biopolitical, but also includes "the forms of knowledge and techniques of the human and
social sciences" (Dean 1999: 19; Foucault 2003: 81, in Nadesan 2008: 9). Studies that take
a governmental approach are attentive to the framing of “governance’s problem-solution”
and to “how problems and technologies of governance are formulated and addressed”
(Nadesan 2008: 6). The “government” in governmentality draws from older meanings of
the term that are not centered on the state (see Lemke 2001; Dean 1999: 209).
Governmentality refers to the rationalities of government that work through state and nongovernmental entities and agencies “employing a variety of techniques and forms of
knowledge, that seek to shape our conduct by working through our desires, aspirations,
interests and beliefs, for definite but shifting ends and with a diverse set of relatively
unpredictable consequences, effects, and outcomes (Dean 1999: 209). The literature on
neoliberal and advanced capitalist governmentality, as Dean’s definition exemplifies, tends
to emphasize self-government and responsibilization of subjects (see for example Rose
2007 and Rabinow and Rose 2003).7 However, other scholars theorize governmentality as
encompassing more coercive forms of power too. Majia Nadesan, for example, reminds
“that sovereignty remains an important technology of control” (Nadesan 2008: 11),
especially for subjects not deemed responsible enough to be self-governing.

7

However, see Dean’s definition of “advanced liberalism” which recognizes that these “forms of
government can also include paternalistic and coercive measures for those deemed not to display the
capacities of responsible and prudential autonomy” (Dean 1999: 209).
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Neoliberalism
The neoliberal rationalities reshaping government and reconfiguring the
relationship between citizens and the state in Italy hold a number of implications for
reproductive and family politics and services, which I describe below. I draw on the
literature on neoliberalism and neoliberal governmentality to make sense of these
transformations and to probe the links between the moral politics of life and family and
discourses of social cohesion. Neoliberalism, according to David Harvey’s widely used
definition, is characterized by “deregulation, privatization, and withdrawal of the state from
many areas of social provisions” (2007: 3). How to understand “neoliberalism,” however,
is a matter of scholarly debate. Kingfisher and Maskovsky (2008) map out three main
theoretical approaches to the scope and nature of neoliberalism: a Marxist analysis, most
closely associated with David Harvey, which presents neoliberalism as a cohesive project
functional to “the restoration of a dominant class power” (Harvey 2005: 83); the neoliberal
governmentality literature, which builds on Foucault’s concept of governmentality and
biopower and which focuses on the way subjects are “optimized” to govern themselves
(Rose 2007; Rabinow and Rose 2003); and Aiwha Ong’s “neoliberalism as exception”
approach (2006), which Kingfisher and Maskovksy see as distinct because of its emphasis
on assemblages and transnational citizenship (2008: 119). While critical of Ong on a
number of counts, Kingfisher and Maskovsky share her emphasis on “contingency,
ambiguity and instability” (2008: 119; see also Comaroff & Comaroff 2001). I draw on all
three of these approaches to probe “the limits of neoliberalism” (Kingfisher and
Maskovsky 2008) that emerge from my data. In addition to finding it useful to break
“neoliberalism” down into local manifestations, practices, and meanings and to not assume
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determined outcomes, I find Ong’s linking of Schmitt’s “state of exception” and
neoliberalism as revealing of the way the politics of life and the embryo-subject represent
an “exception to neoliberalism” (2006: 6). In contrast to the ideal neoliberal active citizen,
the embryo acquires new state rights and protection from the market.
Informed by works that challenge the ideal type, one-size-fits-all neoliberalism that
has been theorized from the British and American contexts, I find neoliberalism “with a
small n” (Ong 2006: 4) and more localized understandings of neoliberalism (Hoffman et al.
2006: 10) useful in thinking about the post-welfare moment in Italy in terms that recognizes
the articulation and negotiation of neoliberal logics with other cultural, social, political and
moral contexts. In so doing I locate my work in a growing literature that seeks to probe
ethnographically, rather than assume, “new forms of governing and being governed and
new notions of what it means to be human [that] are at the edge of emergence” (Ong
2006:4; Kingfisher and Maskovsky 2008; see also Hemment 2012; Molé 2010; Muehlebach
2009, 2012; Yazc 2012).
Taking an anthropological, grounded, and feminist approach to the transformations
wrought by neoliberal reforms and logics, following Kingfisher and Maskovsky, I treat
“neoliberalism as a cultural formation (Comaroff and Comaroff, 2000; Kingfisher 2002), a
set of cultural meanings and practices related to the constitution of proper personhood,
markets and the state that are emergent in a contested cultural field” (2008: 120). In order to
go beyond the “monolithic” (Kanna 2010: 102) and “automatic unity” (Ferguson 2009:
183) model of neoliberalism in favor of “learn[ing] to see a field of specific governmental
techniques” (Ferguson 2009: 183), I focus on governing practices as they emerge in policy
documents, laws, political and expert conferences, authoritative discourses, pedagogical
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programs, health care reforms, and the reorganization and reconceptualization of welfare
and society.
Italian “moral neoliberalism” (Muehlebach 2012) differs from the ideal type,
“Anglo-Foucauldian” (Ferguson 2009: 173) of neoliberal governmentality as a technique of
governing that “activates” rational, entrepreneurial, “autonomous” individuals (Rose 2007;
Lemke 2001: 203). The “‘withdrawal of the state’” that is often attributed to neoliberalism
is more properly understood “as a technique for government” that does not automatically
lead “to the state losing powers of regulation and control” but rather to the “reorganization
or restructuring of government techniques” (Lemke 2001: 2001). My analysis of the politics
of reproduction and the family, however, departs from the notion that neoliberal
governmentality necessarily works by “shifting the regulatory competence of the state onto
‘responsible’ and ‘rational’ individuals” (Lemke 2001: 201-02). The kinds of
“responsibilized citizen-subjects” (Ferguson 2009: 172) sought by the Italian neoliberal
project are not conceived as individually responsible and rational. They are moralized as
relational and altruistic citizens embedded in family relationships of mutual responsibility
that translate into broader forms of social reciprocity. Additionally, in the discourse on
reproduction, both as it concerns the “problem” of low fertility and the moral discourses of
abortion and reproductive technologies, women are not recognized as “responsible” and
“rational” individuals. In the post-welfare moment in Italy, matters of life and family
morality are increasingly governed by moral principles, whether in the name of social
cohesion or Catholic doctrine, set aside from neoliberal and market logics, a moral
“exception to neoliberalism” (Ong 2006). The politics of reproduction, then, provide a
particularly useful prism through which to examine the way neoliberalism “is reconfiguring
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relationships between governing and the governed, power and knowledge, and sovereignty
and territoriality” (Ong 2006: 3). Vice versa, the assertion of moral politics of “life” and
family, often accompanies neoliberal reforms and logics in a number of settings, including
the US (see Harvey 2005: 82-84; Comaroff 2007; Gal and Kligman 2000; Holc 2005;
Mishtal 2012; Yazc 2012).
In Italy, the contradiction between unfettered individualism and the demands of
social solidarity (Harvey 2005) is negotiated through the principle of subsidiarity, which
provides a moral ideology, derived from Catholic social doctrine, and an architecture for
the reorganization of the governance of the welfare state. This principle, which is also
central to the organization of power and competencies at the level of the European Union
(see Holmes 2000), holds that power should be decentered from the State and that
whenever possible “matters should be handled by the lowest, or closest possible level to
where they will have their effect” (Colombo 2008: 182). Unlike other neoliberal
reorganizations of welfare responsibilities that shift the burden of care to the individual in
the name of freedom and efficiency, subsidiarity retains a role for the State to intervene
whenever lower social formations cannot resolve a need. Moreover, by virtue of its focus
on social formations, the principle of subsidiarity takes as its central object of
responsibilization not the individual, but the heteronormative family, understood as the
natural foundation of society, the most basic cell out of which society and its cohesion are
constituted. This reorganization is not simply rhetorical: the principle of subsidiarity is now
enshrined in the Italian Constitution and has been aggressively implemented by the
conservative Catholic coalition that has governed the Region of Lombardy and Milan since
1995. In the name of subsidiarity, public funds for social and health services in Lombardy
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have been redirected to hybrid public-private entities, often with ties to the Catholic
Church, with important consequences for the provision of reproductive services (see
chapter 2).
In emphasizing the principle of subsidiarity, political authorities and experts in Italy
self-consciously aim for a third way between, on the one hand, the individualistic homo
oeconomicus and unfettered market ideal of the Chicago School style of neoliberalism, and,
on the other, the solidarity of the welfare State. Under the moral neoliberalism governed by
subsidiarity, solidarity remains an important aim, though one that has shifted to the cultural
and moral dimension of “social cohesion.” In this reconfiguring of welfare and social
citizenship, the protection of life from conception and of the heteronormative family figures
prominently in discourses and in official documents, such as position papers on welfare.
The legitimation and further penetration of the state into matters of reproduction and
family-making suggests that the metaphor of a shrinking, retreating state does not capture
the ongoing reorganization of welfare (see Kingfisher and Makovksy 2008; Lemke 2001;
Nadesan 2008). If anything, in matters of reproduction and the family the State is
advancing, not retreating. The literature on reproductive politics can be understood as a
corrective to the ungendered illusion of a freed and “optimized” subject under neoliberalism
(see Gal and Kligman 2000). The convergence of medical, moral, and political technologies
and discourses on women’s bodies and the attenuation of women’s citizenship in the name
of the competing rights of the embryos bring into relief the contradictions and tensions of
discourses of rights, freedom, and choice under neoliberalism.
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The Chapters
I examine the concept of subsidiarity, its genealogy in Catholic social philosophy,
and its influence on the reshaping of welfare services in Lombardy in chapter 2, "’More
Society, Less State’: Subsidiarity and Italy’s New Social Model.” I show how neoliberal
reforms of welfare are justified and legitimated by concerns with “social cohesion.” Tracing
the rationalities and effects of the restructuring of health care services along the principle of
subsidiarity, I show how neoliberal reforms in Lombardy are inextricable from the moral
regulation of reproduction and the family. I examine national and regional policies and
documents that link a new welfare model to relational solidarity and ground social cohesion
in the protection of the heteronormative family and of “life.”
Drawing on fieldwork with two feminist groups in Milan I document the terms and
forms of their political engagement with changes in reproductive services and other social
rights. I show how subsidiarity, the mechanisms through which much of the restructuring of
reproductive services has been enacted, is experienced as a potential means to empowered
political and social engagement. The neoliberal rationalities of “choice” and the
responsibilization of individuals in relation to health were highly contested moves. Faced
by the “emptying of reproductive rights from within” enabled by the intertwining of
neoliberal rationalities and the moral politics of the church, feminist actors in Milan
revaluated their critiques of the state and of institutional engagement.
Chapter 3, “’The Embryo Is One of Us’: Making Reproductive Subjects Under
Moral Neoliberalism” traces three key moments in the politics of reproduction in
contemporary Italy: the decriminalization of abortion in the 1970s, the approval of a
restricted assisted reproduction legislation that awarded subjecthood to the embryo in the
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mid-2000s, and the under-the-radar amendment of the regulation of the burial of biological
remains in the region of Lombardy. The chapter examines the much-contested emergence
of the embryo as a subject, the political reassertion of the Catholic Church over matters of
life and family, and “the neoliberal exception” that extends the reach of the state into
reproduction at the very time that the state is supposed to be retreating. The “exception” of
the embryo as a weak and deserving subject that calls forth more rather than less regulation
resolves the contradiction of the restriction of choice in matters of reproduction and health
at the very time that those values are rhetorically championed. I show how the struggle
against the erosion of reproductive services centered around the reassertion of women as
subjects, an assertion made harder to negotiate in the midst of the reconfiguration of the
relationship between citizens and the post-welfare state.
Chapter 4, "’The Family Grows, Italy Grows’: Family & the Common Good,”
examines the rise and legitimacy of pronatalist and pro-family politics in Italy and the way
they are intertwined with the re-articulation of the terms of social welfare and with the
emerging terms of a new social contract. What do the politics of the family reveal about
emerging citizenship projects in Italy, and more broadly, in the Eurozone? I draw on
ethnographic research at the First Government Conference on the Family, held in May
2007, to document the way the family “blows up” onto the center of the political stage and
the celebration of the “cultural leap” that enables a new politics of the family. I juxtapose
these institutional politics with discussions at meetings in which feminist and lesbian
activists sought to articulate an answer to the question “what do we think about the
family?” I show that the stakes of recognition of which relationships constitute “the family”
have intensified as the family becomes increasingly both object and subject of welfare. My
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analysis highlights the struggles for articulating alternative positions on sociality because of
the difficulty in disentangling the moral discourse on social solidarity and welfare from
moral neoliberal notions of relational citizenship and, ultimately, from the assertion of the
heteronormative family as the source of solidarity and the basis of social cohesion.
Chapter 5, “Demographic Discourses and Reproductive Encounters” draws on ethnographic
research with migrant advocates and cultural mediators to address the question: How do
intensifying expert and political discourses on the population and reproduction translate
into experiences, subjectivities, and practices on the ground? I argue that demographic
discourses that juxtapose low fertility among Italian women with hyper-fertility among
migrant women, even warning of the disappearance of Italians, do not directly translate into
systemic policies and practices aimed at reducing migrant women’s fertility. Instead,
demographic anxieties are distilled through other political projects and commitments,
which include the politics of life and the institutional presence of feminist reproductive
health providers in clinics and hospitals. Moreover, demographic warnings over the future
of the nation are amenable to reinterpretation. I show how migrant and Italian women
reappropriated and redeployed warnings over their problematic fertility, turning them into
biopolitical claims for citizenship and a less precarious life.
Chapter 6, “Integrating Subjects, Engendering Coherence: Cultural Contamination
& the Limits of Integration” examines discourses and practices of integration in Italy.
Drawing on participant observation at a cultural mediation training course and an informal
group bringing together Muslim and Italian women, among other sites, I examine the way
integration is conceived and enacted. What are the terms under which immigrants are
expected to integrate into Italian society, and conversely, the terms that justify their
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exclusion: What are the expectations and practices of immigrant-receiving countries
concerning the integration of Others? On what terms is integration into Italian society being
demarcated? I show that the “moral regulation” of the family in the name of fostering social
cohesion extends to debates over how to successfully integrate a substantial and diverse
immigrant population and delineates the limits of integration.
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CHAPTER 2
“MORE SOCIETY, LESS STATE”: SUBSIDIARITY AS MORAL
NEOLIBERALISM
By restoring the question of society at the centre of
the scholarship on the EU we can begin to formulate
analyses that do justice to the stunning
transformations unfolding across Europe.
(Holmes 2000: 112)
Introduction
In the past decade the anthropology of Europe has been concerned with the broad
transformations taking place on the continent: the expanding process of European
unification, with its implications for citizenship and the role of the nation-state (Soysal
1994, Tambini 2001) and for cultural identity (Shore 2000, Soysal 1998); the post-socialist
transition (Berdhal 1999; Gal and Kligman 2000, Hemment 2007); and the emergence of an
increasingly multicultural Europe (Modood and Werbner 1997). An equally important
process is taking place at the level of European governance as the vaunted European social
model characterized by the “dual focus on economic and social principles” (Eurofund
2009)1 is increasingly at odds with the neoliberal restructuring requirements placed on
member states. Neoliberal economic processes, like the economic austerity demanded by
European monetary unification and a shift toward global market logics, are altering the
social contract on which the EU is based (Holmes 2000; Storey 2004). The ongoing
transformations in governance, culture, and citizenship in Europe, including the
reorganization of the social state, have profound anthropological and social implications
1

According to Habermas and Derrida, for example, "Europeans have a relatively large amount of trust in the
organisational and steering capacities of the state, while remaining sceptical towards the achievements of
markets... They maintain a preference for the welfare state's guarantees of social security and for regulations
on the basis of solidarity" (2003: 295, cited in Storey 2004: 3).
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(Holmes 2000). In Italy, government officials and sociological experts frame the
development of a new welfare model as a cultural project (see for example Rossi 2005: 97)
aimed at transforming social relations, altering the social contract between citizens and the
State and shifting the balance of the rights and responsibilities associated with citizenship.
In this chapter I examine how a particularly reflexive set of “informants”— feminist
intellectuals and activists whose political and intellectual practice included a long view of
their relationship to the State—negotiated and experienced transformations in social
services, especially health care and understood their implications for reproductive services.
Their reflections belong to a broader political and scholarly conversation on the question of
society and its cohesion. I trace this conversation through policy documents and Italian
Catholic sociological literature on the welfare state. As new social models are proposed,
sociological questions have acquired new relevance for politicians and scholars alike: What
are the new bases of solidarity as the social state is decentralized and organized around new
logics? In a time in which labor protections are loosened and social services increasingly
privatized, how can cohesion and integration be fostered and anomie and dis-integration
avoided? These concerns over social integration and social cohesion clearly echo the
concerns of Durkheimian sociology with forms of solidarity that would hold together
modern, industrial societies.
The “deep preoccupation with society” that anthropologist Douglas Holmes
identifies in the European project (2000: 93) is evident both at the national and European
Union levels. The emergence of “social cohesion” as a social and political problem, for
example, is pervasive in European Union speak, where it is has been mostly associated with
concerns over social inequality, social exclusion, employment, and population decline
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(European Commission 2007). The project of European Unification has engaged and given
new relevance to the question of society, social solidarity, as well as to the terms of local,
regional, national, and supra-national belonging. In Italy, the “problem” of social cohesion
also refers to problems of inclusion/exclusion, social inequality, immigration,2 and low
fertility. A strong emphasis on culture and values, particularly in relation to anxieties over
the reproduction of the nation, characterizes the framing of social cohesion (Krause and
Marchesi 2007). Increasingly, as the role of the state in fostering the welfare of its citizens
is reconfigured in the name of efficiency, leaner budgets, more tailored services, and active
citizenship, the issue of social cohesion emerges as a “problem-solution” (Nadesan 2008).
I examine the discourse on social cohesion and solidarity that accompanies the
transformations in the social state. I trace the emergence of a moral model of governance in
Italy, the model of subsidiarity, which offers a moralized framework for the
decentralization of the state. Subsidiarity is central to the politics of reproduction in Italy
and to the transformations taking place in public services, particularly health care. The
effects on the restructuring of health care according to the logics of subsidiarity are
particularly evident in the region of Lombardy. Governed since 1995 by a conservative
Catholic administration, the region is known for its enthusiastic and aggressive
implementation of subsidiarity, particularly in the reform of health care. Tracing the logics
and effects of the model of subsidiarity sheds light on the moral and gendered politics that it
has enabled, particularly in the area of reproductive rights. This chapter is informed by the
following questions: What are the terms of the new social model emerging in Italy? What
political subjects and subjectivities are engendered by the project of remaking Italian

2

See Lægaard 2010 for a discussion of how immigration and cultural diversity are often framed as being
inversely related to social cohesion.
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society? How do politically engaged subjects and social service providers negotiate,
contest, and engage this emerging social model? What alternative politics are possible?3
To answer these questions I draw on my participation in the meetings of two
feminist groups, Donne, Diritti, Salute (DoDiSa), and the larger ‘umbrella’ feminist
organization, Usciamo dal silenzio (UdS); weekly participant observation in an independent
feminist family planning clinic; and analysis of government documents and expert literature
on the changing regional and national welfare model. Data collected consist of digital
recordings and written notes of discussions and informal ‘speeches’ at meetings;
conversations and interviews; texts of policy proposals published by the government; and
sociological literature on subsidiarity, mostly Catholic in orientation. Through these
government documents and expert literature I trace the history and deployment of the
subsidiarity model of governance, its effect on the funding of social services, particularly
health care, and the central role played by the Catholic association Compagnia delle Opere
(CdO) in the moral restructuring of health care in Lombardy. Ethnographic research allows
me to examine how feminist activists negotiated the limitations and opportunities of the
deep social transformations taking place in Italy, how they articulated an alternative model
of social solidarity, and a new relationship to the State.4 Conscious of the pitfalls of

3

I am grateful to Jackie Urla for raising this question in the context of a discussion on governmentality in
June 2010.
4
I owe my understanding of the importance of Italy’s new welfare model for the politics of reproduction to
the thoughtful reflections of the small feminist network Donne, Diritti, Salute, which I joined soon after
entering the field. At the time I was conducting research, I did not conceive of these activists as informants. I
was still conceptualizing my research in terms of the politics of migration and reproduction and I saw my
participation in this group as a way to gain more understanding of these politics on the ground and to find
opportunities for accessing consultori familiari, the family planning clinics that were my original proposed
fieldwork site. In the long run, this network of women engaged in feminist activism in the area of women’s
health and reproductive rights helped me understand the shifting stakes of Italian society and the means
through which these politics were enacted. Thus, my argument in this chapter owes much to the analysis of
activists like Daniela and Laura from Donne, Diritti, Salute, even as I bring my own anthropological analysis
to the issue of subsidiarity.
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describing everything as neoliberal, to the detriment of recognizing “other rationalities” and
“previously existing mentalities of rule” (O’Malley 2001: 18), I highlight the contradictions
and particularities of the unfolding of Italy’s moralized social model. The new welfare
model proposed by the center-right government of Berlusconi reveals a complex picture.
The adoption of the principle of subsidiarity as the philosophy informing these changes
enables the restructuring of the state, which retains its role as the ultimate guarantor of
social solidarity, redefined here as its responsibility to protect life and the family. In fact,
Catholic morality and the political influence of the Vatican play an important role in the
moralization of post-welfare Italian society. The focus on the family as the ultimate root
and source of the social often overshadows the individual as the privileged interlocutor of
the State or the market. The cold bureaucratic state and the uncaring unfettered market are
contrasted to the warmth of social relations and the moral economy of “the gift” (see, for
example, Portanova 2009, and Sacconi 2010: 44). The role of the State is reduced in the
name of the rediscovery of moral social formations, which begin with the family as the
basis of society and social solidarity, and then extend out to associations and non-state
forms of aggregation and solidarity. Thus, the remaking of the Italian welfare system is a
political, social, and economic project that enables the unmaking of the state as it replaces it
with a moral vision of a better society built on solidarity and the moral and relational ties of
family and associationism.
When I arrived in the field to research the politics of the population in Italy I wanted
to examine the articulations of increasingly alarmist discourses on low fertility and on
rising immigration rates. Italy’s birth rates reached the status of lowest in the world in the
mid-1990s and Elizabeth Krause’s ethnographic research in Tuscany during that time
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revealed a “sneaky pronatalism” permeating expert discourses (2001, 2005). By the earlyto-mid 2000s, this mostly careful demographic discourse had morphed into increasingly
explicit political discourses and interventions aimed at raising birthrates (Krause and
Marchesi 2007). In my dissertation research I wanted to track how this alarmism over the
fertility of Italian women intersected with the restriction of reproductive rights and anxieties
over immigration. As my research progressed, however, I started to see that the anxieties
over the future of Italian society were articulated through discourses and practices that
escaped the original framing of my dissertation research project. The restriction of abortion,
for example, was less often justified in terms of the need for more Italian babies and for the
reproduction of the nation (in fact, abortion rates are higher among immigrant women than
Italian women) and more often argued in the moral terms of the politics of life. The
rollback of reproductive access via the assisted reproduction legislation of 2004, which
introduced strict limitations to fertility treatment in Italy, or the attempts to make
emergency contraception and RU486, the so-called abortion pill, difficult to obtain, are
informed and influenced by a resurgence of the Vatican’s political power and its strong
emphasis on the protection of life and the family.
Politicians, religious figures, and experts often frame abortion and other
interventions in reproductive matters as a threat to social cohesion because they undermine
the family. In other words, while a discourse on the threat posed by immigration and low
birth rates to national reproduction is certainly at play, even in the work of mainstream
demographers, another, and seemingly apolitical discourse that privileges concerns over
social reproduction, cohesion, and solidarity animates the politics and policies of
reproduction. This discourse foregrounds the family and the protection of life as the roots of

29

a solidaristic society. Combined with the reorganization of power and public funding
enabled by the adoption of the Catholic principle of subsidiarity, this discourse manifests in
various policies that hold profound implications for reproductive and gender and sexual
rights in Italy.
This rosy vision of a moral, solidaristic, market-based society has its critics, though
they tend to be at the left margins of the political spectrum. Center-left political parties and
figures have adopted, with some criticism, a variant of the right’s subsidiarity and family
model for a new welfare. The feminist activists whose work I followed in Milan,
particularly the members of Donne, Diritti, Salute, brought a gendered lens to their reading
of these shifts in welfare. To them it was clear that the containment of the role of the state
in the provision of health services in particular had serious implications for reproductive
rights as well as for women’s health more generally. These political actors, however, did
not necessarily identify the shift to the subsidiarity model of governance as the cause of the
erosion of health care services and the undermining of reproductive services many of them
had fought for in the 1970s. The increasing influence of the Vatican, the lack of women’s
political power, and the encroaching of market and Catholic logics in health care were seen
as the problem. They saw the potential for subsidiarity to open up the field to non-profit
associations as a mechanism for an alternative politic in which their organization could
hope to participate. Thus, while I owe much of my understanding of the reorganization of
health and social service funding to the organizers of DoDiSa, the analysis of subsidiarity
does not necessarily reflect their perspectives.
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Neoliberalism & the Problem Social Cohesion
Welfare, Gender, & the Family
The dominant discourse on the transformation of Italy’s welfare State and the
emergence of a new social model presents them as “apparently ungendered processes” (Gal
and Kligman 2000: 3). In fact, Italy’s new social model has profound gendered
implications, which are strongly contested by both new and old feminists (or femministe
storiche, as I often heard feminists from the 1970s being described). Research on the
division of domestic labor continues to show a significant gender gap (Mencarini 2012;
Ranaldi and Romano 2008: 10-11, 22-29), while Italian women’s participation in the labor
market is low at 46.3% (vs. 70.5% for men)5 (Ranaldi and Romano 2008: 15-22; Samek
Lodovici and Semenza 2008: 160). Whether they work outside the home or not, Italian
women are responsible for most of the family care work, including that of elderly parents.
Italy’s welfare system always relied upon women’s care work in the family as it
assumed that men would be the breadwinner and women the home-makers (Ranaldi and
Romano 2008). Scholars already characterized Italy’s welfare system as “familistic” (see
for example Saraceno 2002; Vicarelli and Bronzini 2009). Neoliberal reforms in Italy are
further eroding this already weak welfare system and explicitly identifying the family as its
replacement. The notion that a cohesive society is a society built on heteronormative
families justifies devolving even more responsibility to the family, and thus to women.
Another gendered implication of the new welfare model is the way it has enabled
new, and less visible ways of restricting reproductive rights like abortion, which on paper
are still guaranteed by national legislations. The devolution of social services, like family
5

The most recent World Economic Forum “gender gap index” ranks Italy as 72nd out of 134 countries overall,
88th out of 134 for “labour force participation,” and 45th in terms of political empowerment (Zahidi and Ibarra
2010: 62).
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planning clinics, to non-governmental associations and private entities has opened up the
field to the Catholic Church. Combined with the increasing emphasis on the family, which
invests public family planning clinics through various political interventions described
below, these shifts in funding threaten access to reproductive services.
Neoliberalism & Moral Authority
Global processes of economic and political restructuring combined, in the 1990s,
with fiscal requirements for inclusion in the European Union’s common currency, the Euro,
contributed to the restructuring of the social state according to neoliberal logics (see
Muehlebach 2009, 2012; Molé 2010). Neoliberalism is generally understood to be
characterized by a combination of “deregulation, privatization, and withdrawal of the state
from many areas of social provision” (Harvey 2005: 3). In Italy these transformations in the
role of the state, though far from an ideal neoliberal type especially as it concerns
deregulation (see Della Sala 2004), have ranged from health care and social services (the
focus of this chapter) to the loosening of labor protections. The particularities of postwelfare Italian moral neoliberalism (Muehlebach 2012), however, problematize the notion
that neoliberal governmentality always “activates” rational, entrepreneurial, “autonomous”
individuals (Rose 2007; Lemke 2001: 203). In emphasizing the principle of subsidiarity and
the moral basis of the family, political authorities and experts in Italy self-consciously aim
for a third way between the individualistic homo oeconomicus and unfettered market ideal
of the Chicago school style neoliberalism and the solidarity of the welfare State. Under the
moral neo-liberalism governed by subsidiarity, solidarity remains an important aim, though
one that has shifted to the cultural and moral dimension of “social cohesion,” a discourse
which in turn draws on the social sciences, particularly on Durkheim but also on Maussian
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notions of role of reciprocal obligations of the gift in holding society together. Individuals
are relocated in a more “natural” and organic social formation, that of the family rather than
the State. In this reconfiguring of welfare and social citizenship, the protection of life from
conception and of the heteronormative family figures prominently in discourses and in
official documents, such as position papers on welfare.
These “anti-choice” political interventions engender resistance on numerous
grounds, including their seeming contradiction with the rhetoric of individual
responsibilization deployed in other settings, particularly in the reorganization of welfare.
Yet, rather than exceptions and contradictions of neoliberalism, these manifestations of
disciplinary and sovereign power may well be intrinsic to neoliberal governmentality. The
moral regulation of “free individuals, loose of all but the necessary constraint by the state”
(Greenhouse 2010: 8) offers a “solution to the contradictions of neoliberalism” (Harvey
2005: 86) whereby unchecked individualism risks bordering on the “ungovernable” and
“may even lead to the breakdown of all bonds of solidarity and a condition verging on
social anarchy and nihilism” (82). The ideology of neoliberalism, which views the state as
inefficient and a burden on the market and which seeks to engender independent individuals
who take on the risks and responsibilities of welfare, generates the problem of social
cohesion. For this reason, as Harvey’s argument shows, a view of neoliberalism as amoral
or immoral ignores the fact “that the gospel of laissez-faire is always already accompanied
by hypermoralization” (Muehlebach 2012: 6). This approach to neoliberal governmentality
builds on but departs from analyses that emphasize ethopolitics (Rose 2007), or the selftechniques of empowered and responsible subjects who govern themselves through
“desires, aspirations, and interests” (Dean 1999: 209) homologous with rationalities of
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government (Nadesan 2008: 1) by recognizing the continued relevance of moral authority
(Muehlebach 2012) and even “direct coercion” (see Morgan and Roberts 2012: 243).
The recognition of a “neoliberal moral authoritarianism” (Muehlebach 2012: 6) is
part of a reconception of neoliberalism as constituting a “retreat” of the state rather than a
reconfiguration of government (Kingfisher and Makovksy 2008; Nadesan 2008) that shifts
risks to individuals while consolidating moral authority in the name of social security, or
social cohesion. Andrea Muehlebach work on volunteerism and the emergence of ethical
citizenship in Milan probes an important facet of what she terms “moral neoliberalism,” the
mobilization of affect and relational citizenship among volunteers (2009, 2012). Through
ethnographic research with elderly volunteers she demonstrates that neoliberal
governmentality does not simply rely on an economic view of the subject as self-interested,
maximizing homo oeconomicus, but that a relational and solidaristic ethic of care
experienced as being oppositional to the values of the market is also both enabling and
legitimating of neoliberal reforms. In this chapter, and in the dissertation as a whole, I
stretch this original framing of the concept of “moral neoliberalism” to include the
biopolitics and vitapolitics of reproduction and the family, which I show are a central object
in the reorganization of welfare and social citizenship.
Remaking Welfare
Beginning in the 1990s both center-left and center-right governments introduced
policies and legislations that profoundly altered the architecture of the Italian social state.
Labor law, pensions, and health care services have been transformed by a series of
legislations (Graziano 2009). The social contract between citizens and the Italian State has
been altered in significant ways: legislation opened up the provision of social services to
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non-state entities, both non-profit, and hybrid combinations of profit/nonprofit; the division
of power between the national and regional and local governments was reformulated so that
many responsibilities of the State were devolved to the regions, leading many observers to
comment on the resulting heterogeneity of practices and outcomes on the peninsula; the
Italian Constitution was amended to include a new architecture for the administration of the
State based on the concept of subsidiarity. “Flexibility” of terms of employment for
workers entering the labor market was introduced in the late 1997 and expanded in 20036
(Della Sala 2004: 1051-1054; Graziano 2009: 605). These reforms led to a split labor
market in which older workers retained older protections while newer ones faced an
unregulated market in which temporary contracts became a (precarious) way of life (Molé
2010, Muehlebach 2007). “Flexible” employment reforms translated into short-term
contracts without benefits and into a generalized sense of precarietà (precariousness)
among Italians (Molé 2010).
The Italian Sistema sanitario nazionale (National Health System) was instituted in
1978 to provide publicly funded health care throughout the Italian territory. The levels and
quality of health care offered, however, was never homogenous in Italy with a particularly
significant gap between services available in the wealthier north compared to a relative lack
of services in the south (Ginsborg 2001: 227). The reform of the health care system dates to
the 1990s and it can be categorized into two main changes: one, the accreditation of private
health care entities by the State and second, the devolution of the management of health
care from the national government to Italy’s 20 Italian regions (Graziano 2009: 611). As a
consequence of this decentralization of the health care system, “there is no national health-

6

Law 196/1997, approved by a center-left government, initially opened up the labor market, which was then
further deregulated by the Berlusconi government in 2003 with law 30 (Graziano 2009: 605).
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care system but different regional health-care systems co-funded nationally” (Graziano
2009: 611).7 The added effect of these reforms is that the Italian model of the social state is
in the process of being significantly altered, with profound implications and effects for its
citizens.
Social Cohesion
With the devolution and diffusion of the responsibilities of the welfare state and the
erosion of the protections of labor with reforms in labor laws in the 1990s, experiences and
practices of solidarity and social relations are also reconfigured. The pervasive emphasis of
concerns with social cohesion, from the supranational level of the EU to the regional and
city level, can be understood as a “problem-solution” (Nadesan 2008) of neoliberal
government. Social science concerns with the basis of solidarity have their roots in
Durkheimian theorizing about the profound shift from mechanical to organic solidarity in
modern society (Durkheim 1984 [1933]). As with the social upheavals of the industrial
revolution, social cohesion generates “the greatest interest … in times of fundamental
economic, social and political change” (Hulse and Stone 2007: 109).
The meaning of “social cohesion,” however, remains somewhat loosely
defined (Friedkin 2004; Hulse and Stone 2007; Vergolini 2011). In Canada, the term
“social cohesion” re-emerged in the 1990s in a similar context as the European one,
namely “as a means of thinking about some of the social stresses and strains being
experienced as a result of several factors, including the effects of neoliberal, promarket policies on aspects of wellbeing such as poverty and health, the challenges
associated with high levels of immigration, and some loss of confidence in public
7

According to Graziano, “the decentralization process of welfare services (in particular with respect to
employment and health care) is opening new differentiated forms of ‘choice’ welfare, thus endangering the
future development of a coherent and comprehensive national welfare state in Italy” (2009: 613).
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institutions (2007: 110). In Canada, social cohesion was tied to “the ongoing process
of developing a community of shared values, shared challenges and equal opportunity
within Canada based on a sense of trust, hope and reciprocity amongst all Canadians”
(Jenson 1998: 4, cited in Hulse and Stone 2007: 110). This framing was ultimately
tied to the demise of the concept, precisely because of the problematic assertion of
“shared values” in a multicultural society and its potential for eliding issues of social
justice under the framework of values (Hulse and Stone 2007: 111). A related
discourse in the United States coalesced around the notion of “social capital,” most
visibly championed by political scientist Robert Putnam (1995; Hulse and Stone
2007: 111).8
The terms of social cohesion in Italy are contested, with conservative
Catholics locating it in the respect for life and in the heteronormative family and
leftists emphasizing social justice and insisting on the role of the state in generating
social solidarity. An analysis informed by governmentality can hold together different
facets of the political project shaping up in the wake of the social state, a project that
includes the rise of the biopolitics of the embryo, increasing moral regulation of
reproduction and the family, and attempts at a definition of the terms for the
integration or exclusion of newcomers into Italian society. This approach, in turn,
brings into relief the way gender and family ideologies are the glue of the cultural and
moral reconfiguring of old, centralized state forms of social solidarity into cultural
and moral problems of social cohesion in a post-welfare, neoliberal regime.
8

Putnam developed his concept of social capital in his 1994 book Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions
in Modern Italy, Princeton University Press, in which he argued that Northern Italian regions had effective
and creative governments because of the rich civic life of their citizens, in contrast to the corruption and
inefficiency of Southern regions where such social capital was lacking. Putnam was criticized for his lack of
attention to conflict and Italian history (see for example Boix and Posner 1996).
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A Lexis-Nexis search of the instances of the term “coesione sociale” (“social
cohesion”) and “solidarietà sociale” (“social solidarity”) in the Italian media shows a
significant increase in the circulation of these terms through the first decade of the 2000s.
My sense during fieldwork that both terms were quite pervasive in Italian discourse was
confirmed by a basic search in the Lexis-Nexis database of Italian newspapers and press
releases (see Table 1). The use of the terms “coesione sociale” and “solidarietà sociale”
clearly intensifies in 2004 increasing in frequency in the second half of the first decade of
the 2000s. Interestingly, the frequency of “social solidarity” peaks in 2006 and 2007, a
period that coincides with my fieldwork, and then declines. References to “social
cohesion,” on the other hand, continue to increase.
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Table 1. Instances of the terms “coesione sociale” and “solidarietà sociale” in the
Italian media.1
Year(s)

Coesione sociale

Solidarietà sociale

1980-1990

0

0

1991-1995

44

184

1996-2000

162

775

2000

56

192

2001

58

96

2002

70

90

2003

48

60

2004

363

263

2005

516

263

2006

464

1824

2007

428

> 30002

2008

348

1085

2009

1766

924

2010

2303

649

2011

2434

618

2012

2398

542

The increased currency of “social solidarity” and “social cohesion” emerges at a
time when neoliberal reforms are reconfiguring the old welfare guarantees and putting the

1
2

Lexis-Nexis search August 5, 2010, updated June 27, 2013.
The maximum count for articles found by the Lexis-Nexis search engine is 3000.
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meaning of the social into question. Just as reforms in areas like labor and health care of the
late 1990s-early 2000s undermine the historical bases of social solidarity, the terms are
invoked more frequently. This increase in these terms’ circulation reflects a political project
seeking to redefine the bases of social solidarity and social cohesion away from the state as
provider and guarantor and toward voluntaristic and non-governmental solutions. The shift
toward civil society makes non-governmental associations and the family into the
protagonists of this new welfare. The family in particular emerges from documents and
Catholic sociological literature as the ultimate and morally appropriate source of social
security. At the same time that individuals are called upon to shoulder more responsibility
for themselves in areas such as employment (see Molé 2010) and social services, social
solidarity is relocated in social and affective relations. The family is asserted as the ultimate
model and originator for these solidary relationships, which in turn form the natural basis of
social cohesion in contrast to the artificial solidarity of the welfare state.
The rewriting of the social contract in Italy has been accompanied by a discourse
on the need to strengthen social bonds rather than by a celebration of individual choice and
freedom usually associated with neoliberalism. The shift from the social state to other forms
of social cohesion is not antithetical to the neoliberal project, of course. In the mid-1990s
Nikolas Rose identified a shift away from an emphasis on “the social” and toward
“community” in the British context (1996: 331). According to Rose, the notion of
community replaces “the social” “as a new territory for the administration of individual and
collective existence, a new plane or surface upon which micro-moral relations among
persons are conceptualized and administered” (Rose 1996: 331).
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The moral discourse on social cohesion in Italy does not view it as simply the
outcome of responsible, empowered, autonomous neoliberal subjects acting in their best
interest. Social cohesion is also not just generated by responsible volunteers engaging in
affective labor (Muehlebach 2012). Analyses of neoliberalism, such as Rose’s and
Muehlebach, which identify a shift to a generalized sphere of civil society and community
gloss over the central importance of moralized discourses on the family as the basis of
relational citizenship (see Donati 2007) and of a form of solidarity that is at once “natural,”
suffused with morality, and compatible with the shift from the welfare state to a state that
has devolved its responsibilities to the private sector, non-governmental entities, and,
ultimately, the family. The logic of this emerging social model extend to the articulation of
the terms of integration of immigrants. Increasingly integration requires abiding to a
heteronormative model of the family and a particular gender ideology (see Ministry of
Interior 2007), while even leftist politicians and immigrant social service providers often
frame the need for family reunification for immigrants in terms of security.3
The foregrounding of the role of the family in discourses of social cohesion is
accompanied by structural reforms that have enabled the channeling of public money away
from public services, such as family planning clinics, and toward private, public-private

3

Rosy Bindi, the Catholic center-left Minister of Family Policies, for example, used this framing to argue for
the importance of family reunification to integration in her speech at the first national Conference on the
Family in May of 2007. Minister Bindi argued that it is easier to integrate immigrants who are in Italy as part
of a family rather than as individuals:
I believe that the family is precisely the site where the integration of different cultural models
is possible. The relationship between a Chinese and an Italian, between an Italian and a person
from the Maghreb can represent a challenge; but the relationship between a Chinese family
and an Italian one, or between an Italian family and one from the Maghreb brings into play
more possibilities of encounter and exchange… We have to acknowledge, however, that
multiculturalism raises also issues of security … But it is precisely integration that is the
principal policy for security (Bindi 2007).
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hybrids, and non-governmental entities, many of which are Catholic in orientation. De
facto, Catholic social doctrine and vitapolics play an increasing role in Italian society.
Subsidiarity
The frame undergirding the remaking of the welfare State is that of the Catholic
principle of subsidiarity, the idea that decision-making and power should be located at the
lowest possible social formation—a principle quite compatible with neoliberalism—but
which also calls upon the higher social formation, in this case the state, to step in as
subsidium, or aid, if the need cannot be met. Unfamiliar to most American readers, though
fairly common in Europe, the concept of subsidiarity is usually associated with the
allocation of powers between the supranational European Union and its member States. The
Europa Glossary, the official online glossary of the European Commission, defines
subsidiarity as “the principle whereby the Union does not take action (except in the areas
which fall within its exclusive competence) unless it is more effective than action taken at
national, regional or local level.”4 According to the principle of subsidiarity, governing
should occur at the political/administrative level closest to the citizen: “Subsidiarity is the
idea that matters should be handled by the lowest, or closest possible level to where they
will have their effect" (Colombo 2008: 182). Anthropologist Douglas Holmes recognizes
the Catholic roots of subsidiarity, describing it as "the key principle of Catholic discourse
on political power and social justice” (Holmes 2000: 96), while also identifying it as the
central concept that shaped the architecture of the EU. In this section I build on Holmes’s
insight that the concept of subsidiarity represents “a comprehensive social theory” (Holmes
2000: 96) to make sense of its deployment in Italy and to the new model of society it

4

Europa Glossary, http://europa.eu/scadplus/glossary/subsidiarity_en.htm.
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represents. Far from being just an obscure model of governance, subsidiarity speaks to
“core struggles facing the EU” and “evokes the classic sociological and anthropological
problematic: what are the terms and conditions by which the individual is related to various
renderings of collectivity in the new Europe?” (Holmes 2000: 111). Whether at the level of
the EU, or at the national or regional levels, the remaking of society according to the model
of subsidiarity speaks to these key questions, to the terms of belonging and the nature of
society. Most of the Italian literature on subsidiarity identifies and foregrounds the family
as the lowest and most basic social formation. Non-governmental associations appear at the
next level of preferred social formations as sites of governance.
Outside of the context of the EU and of Italy, the concept of subsidiarity has been
tied to the British Third Way model, which locates the mediation between market and state,
in the “voluntary sector” (Turner 2001: 201). Subsidiarity, from an Anglophone perspective,
“would be achieved through a process of devolution of state functions, authority and
funding to a network of voluntary associations” (Turner 2001: 201). While the concept is
very similar, the Italian model is distinguished by its focus on the heteronormative family as
the ideal and moral locus of this devolution and by the heavy presence and power of
Catholic associations. Despite the championing of the individual usually associated with
neoliberalism, in the subsidiarity model it is families and associations that are identified as
the most important constituting elements of Italian society: “From the perspective of
subsidiarity, small and intermediate-sized communities or institutions – like the family, the
church and voluntary associations – are mediating structures which empower individual
action and link the individual to society as a whole” (Colombo 2008: 184).
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The concept of subsidiarity gained a foothold in the organization of government in
late 1990s in Italy. The reorganization of governance from a centralized model to one based
on subsidiarity was made possible by a 2000 amendment to the Italian Constitution.5 This
constitutional amendment enabled two central reforms: “1. the strengthening of the political
autonomy of county governments, not merely with respect to their legislative powers, but
also more generally; and 2. the introduction of the principle of subsidiarity in both its
vertical and horizontal dimensions” (Maltoni 2002). With the transition of welfare
responsibilities (and funding streams) away from state agencies and toward non-profit or
profit/non-profit hybrid associations, the realm of the social became available to new
political and social interventions. The social, cultural, and political effects of the
transformation of social services enacted by these reforms are still unfolding.
In Catholic thought the concept of subsidiarity has two dimensions, horizontal and
vertical, and these have carried over to its policy deployment. Vertical subsidiarity refers to
the principle that power is best deployed at the lowest possible level of administration, with
5

The concept of subsidiarity was added to the constitution through a 2000 amendment, which was approved
via a popular referendum the following year. Amended Article 118 of the Italian Constitution reads: "States,
Regions, Urban cities, Provinces and Communes favor the autonomous initiative of citizens, singly or in
association, for the development of activities of general interest, based on the principles of subsidiarity"
(“Stato, Regioni, Città metropolitane, Province e Comuni favoriscono l'autonoma iniziativa dei cittadini,
singoli e associati, per lo svolgimento di attività di interesse generale, sulla base del principio di
sussidiarietà.”) http://www.governo.it/Governo/Costituzione/CostituzioneRepubblicaItaliana.pdf, pg. 22.
Colombo summarizes the changes introduced by this amendment by arguing that “The formal (constitutional)
hierarchical superiority of the ‘state’ over local authorities was abolished” (2008: 179). In the new division of
power and responsibilities the State retained control over
foreign and EU affairs; immigration; religious affairs; defence; state institutions and administration;
the currency; saving; state taxes; security; the judiciary; ‘basic civil and social rights’ to be
guaranteed throughout the national territory; social security; national, provincial and communal
electoral law; safeguarding the environment; and culture (Colombo 2008: 179).
An area of shared competence (between State and regions) was carved out as well, and this one includes:
“international relations of the regions, foreign trade, the labour market, education, research, health, food,
sport, civil defence, land use planning, ports and airports, major transport infrastructures, energy,
communication, environment and culture promotion” (Colombo 2008: 180). The rest, including the
administration of healthcare and social services, is left to the region. With the demise of centralized power,
regions acquire new autonomy, with the possibility that even the above areas of shared governance might in
the future devolve more to the regions (Colombo 2008: 180).
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the central State taking on a subsidiary role, only stepping in if the entity lower in the
hierarchy cannot fulfill its duties. Horizontal subsidiarity describes the delegation of
administrative powers from local government authorities to non-governmental associations
and families and is the principle enabling the dispersal of governing across the social
terrain. Horizontal subsidiarity is also the principle that governs the dispersal of funds to
hybrid public/private agencies, including a large contingent of Catholic-oriented entities
(Fiorentini 2005; Maltoni 2002; Rinella n.d.).
Proponents of subsidiarity, particularly those of Catholic orientation, emphasize its
horizontal dimension. Italian sociologist Giovanna Rossi, for example, argues that vertical
subsidiarity is not so different from the old welfare model because of its hierarchical nature,
its privileging of the institutional level, and its reliance on the state as the ultimate
guarantor. Horizontal subsidiarity, on the other hand, is “an ethico-social principle that
orients relations among subjects who operate in the social and who recognize the
fundamental contributions offered by less structured entities toward making society more
itself (rendere la società più se stessa)” (Rossi 2005: 92). Vertical subsidiarity reorganizes
the relationship between State institutions, while horizontal subsidiarity is the realm of
moralized social relations and of a new framing of society.6 In other words, horizontal
subsidiarity is more than “a mere organizational criterion;” it is “a culture” (Rossi 2005:
97).
This model of governance is based on a different philosophical premise than freemarket neoliberalism, of which it is often critical. Subsidiarity privileges autonomy, the
devolution of power at the local level, and the development of a solidaristic civil society,

6

Another way of distinguishing between vertical and horizontal subsidiarity is to say that the former refers to
institutional and public actors, while horizontal subsidiarity refers to private actors (Fiorentini 2005).
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but it also calls upon the state to play a subsidiary role, to step in if and when the lower
social formation is not able to meet the social need. The Catholic origins of the principle of
subsidiarity differentiate the social model that subsidiarity engenders from other neoliberal
communitarian approaches, such as the British “Third Way.” Both models lead to the
scaling back of the social state in favor of empowering non-governmental entities. What
distinguishes the Italian subsidiarity-informed third sector model from the British Third
Way “quangos” model (quasi-autonomous non-governmental organizations) is the fact that
in Italy “the ‘third sector’ (social enterprise) has an ‘explicit ethical mission’” (Lippi and
Morisi 2005: 74, cited in Colombo 2008: 185). Thus, although both neoliberal reform and
the devolution of governance along the logics of subsidiarity result in decentralization, the
underlying theory of society that informs this process is not the same: “while its
[subsidiarity’s] praxis has involved the privatization of public services, the policy has been
derived from a fundamentally different and more complex vision of the nature and purpose
of social organization than contemporary neo-liberalism.” (Colombo 2008:186). The
subject of subsidiarity is called upon to reorient to a different moral universe, one in which
solidarity is dispersed through the social body in the form of the normative family and its
affective forms of caretaking. Subsidiarity can be read as a theory of social relations that is
neither capitalist nor socialist, but rather more akin to relations and responsibilities woven
through social reciprocity (Colombo 2008: 187). Although philosophically different from
the “Third Way,” which emphasizes the market, subsidiarity is conceptualized as a third
way nonetheless: “in the Lombard political debate of the last decade, subsidiarity has
emerged as a philosophy of social organization promising a genuine alternative to the
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stalemated trench war between liberal anti-interventionism (based on the market) and
socialist interventionism (relying on the state)” (Colombo 2008: 187).
Positive readings of subsidiarity outside of the scholarship sympathetic to its
Catholic orientation claim that it enables a plural rendering of society (Holmes 2000 argues
this for the case of Europe; see also Maltoni 2002),7 and that it may hold yet unfulfilled
radical potential (Cotturri 2003). The ambivalence among those on the left or center-left
toward subsidiarity speaks to its seductiveness. For example, former Communist Italian
journalist Antonio Polito (2006) argues that subsidiarity
is not (just) an ethical choice. It is also a necessity. In modern societies, the State is
no longer able to handle first hand all that the community needs. First of all it is a
matter of resources. … Yet, the necessity is not just a matter of money. It is the
quality of the services that the State is no longer able to guarantee, when they are
services to the person. Between a badante (care-worker) and a state employee there
is an abyss of humanity and flexibility that the State is not able to fill. … It is better
that the State refrain from doing all that can be accomplished by the individual.
Italian political and legal sociologist Giuseppe Cotturri argues that the way the
concept of subsidiarity was finally articulated and included in the Italian Constitution was a
result of resistance by the left and by associations to a first draft that placed much more
emphasis on reducing the role of the state in favor of the free market. The way the concept
was developed actually brings the state back in the picture in the role of supporter and
enabler of active citizenship (Cotturri 2003). According to Cotturri, the consequences and
implications of subsidiarity are "radical," may not have been foreseen by the politicians
who enacted them, and are yet to be fully exploited by associations: "the fact is that the
space that was opened is ... vertigo-inducing" (Cotturri 2003: 4). This potential is what
7

“The principle of horizontal subsidiarity implies that society in all its various forms (as a community of
persons at the sub-state, state and international level) places itself at the service of the individual human
being. The individual is thus considered as both a single entity of social expression and as being within a
social pattern in which his/her personality can unfold (in accordance to the maxim: civitas propter cives, non
cives propter civitatem). In such a context, one can fully grasp the connection between subsidiarity and the
principle of social pluralism, as it is expressed in article 2 of the Italian Constitution” (Maltoni 2002).
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makes subsidiarity an attractive model across the spectrum. How it actually plays out on the
ground, at least in the region of Lombardy, suggests that there may be a significant gap
between its potential and its enactment.
The Green Paper on Welfare: “The Good Life in the Active Society”
The moral coordinates of Italy’s new social model are laid out in the government’s
policy proposal, the Green Paper. The 2008 Green Paper on Welfare, titled, La vita buona
nella società attiva (The Good Life in the Active Society) lays out a clear roadmap for a
new Italian society. The presentation of the Green Paper on the government’s website
identifies the main reasons why welfare reform is necessary: “Demographic trends, …
unregulated globalization and economic growth that remains below potential are
progressively eroding the network of old securities” (Governo Italiano 2008). Foregrounded
as one of the central problems with the social State are the country’s “demographic
tendencies,” a reference to the shifts in population due to low fertility rates and increased
immigration. The solution for this undoing of “old security safety nets” is the new welfare
proposed by the Berlusconi government. This intervention is framed as being cultural and
social: “The challenge to which we are called is not solely economic in nature, but, most of
all, it is a cultural and programming challenge. We want to repropose the centrality of the
person, in itself and its relational projections, beginning with the family” (Sacconi 2008: 3).
The cultural nature of this project and the centrality of the family and life to its orientation
are repeated throughout the document: “The crisis of the Italian social model is, first and
foremost, a cultural crisis, a crisis of values, beginning with the failure to acknowledge the
centrality of the person, the insufficient attention to the fundamental defense of life, the
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recurrent negation of the role of the family” (Ministero del Lavoro, della Salute e delle
Politiche Sociali 2008: 10).
The project of constructing a new model of society runs through the remaking of
Italian citizens from “passive” subjects and recipient of state welfare, to active, relational
subjects located in “traditional” families.8
The time has come to build the foundations of a new Welfare, which, in order to
guarantee to all components of society equal opportunities and rights that are
sustainable through the entire cycle of life, avails itself in a logic of full
subsidiarity, of the contribution of responsibly active subjects (Ministero del
Lavoro, della Salute e delle Politiche Sociali 2008:15).
The government’s proposal for a new social model replaces publicly managed social
services with a relational, moralized, and “diffused” network of social relations:
The capacity to make community … is fundamental, beginning with its essential
projections, which are the family, volunteerism, associationism and the work
environment, and through the rediscovery of relational and service spaces, such as
the parish, the pharmacy, the family doctor, the post office, the police station. It is
only in this way that it seems possible to build a diffused and capillary network of
services and new securities integrating the action of the public actor (Ministero del
Lavoro, della Salute e delle Politiche Sociali 2008: 16).

8

The irony of the Berlusconi’s government championing of Catholic family values as Berlusconi himself
engaged in behavior at the opposite end of the moral spectrum underlies the instrumental nature of this moral
discourse. The embracing of family values and morals as the basis of a new welfare, on the one hand secures
the political of the Vatican, and on the other enables the neoliberal, market reforms sought by Berlusconi’s
party. Even the supposedly very Catholic governor of Lombardy, Roberto Formigoni, has defended
Berlusconi despite allegations of underage prostitution and orgies at Berlusconi’s mansion
(http://milano.repubblica.it/dettaglio-news/milano-11:44/3666).
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A prominent feature of this new welfare project is its foregrounding of “life” as a
central objective. The new model is linked and moralized in part through the charge of
safeguarding “the entire cycle of life – from conception to natural death” (Ministero del
Lavoro, della Salute e delle Politiche Sociali 2008: 3). This call for the protection of “life”
recurs throughout the document and links subsidiarity, social cohesion, and associationism
with the politics of life:
Only through the full application of the principle of subsidiarity has it been
possible to aid civil society in realizing a path of self-organization and selfdetermination founded on community values of solidarity, social cohesion,
respect for life, and for the common good (Ministero del Lavoro, della Salute e
delle Politiche Sociali 2008: 16)9
The Green Paper for the new welfare model was drafted in 2008, but more recent
articulations of the model reprise its main characteristics. In a letter to Italy’s daily Il
Corriere della Sera, the Minister of Welfare Maurizio Sacconi summarized the Berlusconi
government’s orientation for “Italy’s future social model” with the phrase: “meno Stato, più
società” (“Less State, more society”):10
Less State means less rules, less structures, less public spending, less politicalinstitutional intermediaries. As a result, more society means more market, more
subsidiarity, more private spending for the common good, more responsibility on
the part of social and community actors, including the family. … It is a matter of
making virtue of necessity, developing on the one hand the authority of the State as
regulator oriented toward results for the common good and, on the other, the
historic proclivity of our community toward the culture of the gift and of our social
organizations for managing services… The same welfare service has a different
effect if it is rendered by a cold public administration or through the warmth and
solidarity of the gift (Sacconi 2010: 44).11

9

“Ministero del Lavoro, della Salute e delle Politiche Sociali 2008: 16.
“Perché ci vuole meno Stato e più società” (Sacconi 2010: 44).
http://www.ilsussidiario.net/News/Economia-e-Finanza/2010/6/17/CORRIERE-DELLA-SERA-SacconiWelfare-ecco-perche-ci-vuole-meno-Stato-e-piu-societa/93738/
or: http://www.adnkronos.com/IGN/Lavoro/Welfare/Sacconi-nel-welfare-ci-vuole-meno-Stato-e-piusocieta_554301681.html
11
For a critique of the historical antecedents of this discourse, see Bimbi 1993.
10
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The Society of Good Works
“More society, less State” was also the slogan of a powerful Catholic organization
deeply invested in the economic and moral restructuring of the Lombard Welfare system,
the Compagnia delle Opere (The Society of Good Works) or CdO. The CdO, which has
been described as a “sort of Catholic Rotary” (Paris 2000), is an international association
with its roots in Lombardy. Over 34,000 small-to-medium size firms, including non-profit
social service firms, are members of the CdO. According to information formerly available
on its website, the
CdO was established in 1986 within the experience of the Catholic Movement
Comunione e Liberazione [Communion and Liberation], which aims to “promote
and defend the dignity of the individual in the society and work environment, as
well as promoting the creation of social works and companies, characterized by a
culture of economy and trade, able to entirely understand and respect the person in
all aspects and expressions.12
The Compagnia delle Opere takes credit for introducing the concept of subsidiarity into the
broader political discourse with a conference on welfare reform held at Milan’s Palalido
arena in 1999.13 At the conference, the “key word was subsidiarity” (Vecchi 1999).14 In
2007, the company’s gross revenue was 45 billion euros, with 450,000 employees.15 With
the company’s headquarters in Milan, and with one of the politicians the company supports,
Formigoni, as the governor of the region of Lombardy, it is not surprising that the CdO
obtains a huge slice of the regional budget of public funds for non-profit/private health
12

Art. 1 of the Incorporation Certificate, electronic document,
http://www.cdo.it/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=63Ftc2iWzvE%3D&tabid=464&mid=1412 last access August
18, 2008..
13
Vittadini quoted in Fontolan 1998
http://www.tracce.it/det_Articoli.asp?Sezione=aprile+1998&ID=19980403
14
The remaking of welfare along the principle of subsidiarity relies on expert and academic knowledge, which
contributes a gloss of neutrality and factuality. Out of the Compagnia delle Opere, for example, emerged in
2002 the Fondazione per la Sussidiarietà (Foundation for Subsidiarity), a research foundation made up of
academics and other “experts.” Their first publication was titled “Liberi di scegliere. Dal welfare state alla
welfare society,” (“Free to choose. From the welfare State to the welfare society” (Fondazione Sussidiarietà,
http://www.sussidiarieta.net/it/storiafps).
15
http://www.cdo.it/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=63Ftc2iWzvE%3D&tabid=464&mid=1412.: 5
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services. The analysis of regional representative Mario Agostinelli, speaker for the leftist
coalition Sinistra – Un’altra Lombardia [The Left-Another Lombardy], highlights the
centrality of this Catholic organization in the redirecting of public funds: “In the Lombardy
system, the Compagnia delle Opere is a formidable invention because it interposes itself
between the needs of citizens and a considerable mass of ethico-social firms: welfare,
education, training… In this way the element of privatization is glossed over and that of
volunteerism, of ‘the gift’ is highlighted” (Portanova 2009).16 The Maussian references to
the gift deployed in politicians’ discourse (Sacconi 2010: 44) and in the writings of
sociologists suggest an interest in proposing an alternative to the welfare state. However,
while the also common Durkheimian references to social cohesion and social solidarity
reflect Durkheim’s concerns with the integration of modern, industrialized, state societies,
the Maussian references to the gift seem to suggest an interest in non-state forms of social
obligation and responsibility.17
In the introduction to an edited volume titled Welfare Community and Subsidiarity,
Italian sociologist Sergio Belardinelli argues for a move away from the welfare state, not
toward “individualism” or “cultural relativism,” but rather to a society based on subsidiarity
that values and attends to “social relations” (2000: 21). These social relations, however,
must take a particular form, that of the normative family. The author provides two examples
to support his claim that individual rights are problematic for society: the “demand” for gay
marriage and for the “right” for assisted reproduction for a woman in her sixties. Such
demands, according to the Italian sociologist, instead of “promoting a more liberal society”

16

Agostinelli edited a book on the Lombard welfare model, titled, La corsa è finita (The Race is Over)
(Unaltralombardia 2007).
17
Mauss, however, saw continuity between the solidarity of the gift and the “returning to a group morality”
(1990: 68) in the establishment of the social state.
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end up “instead undermining the normative order and the social capital necessary to its
subsistence” (Belardinelli 2000: 20). As with many other elaborations of the concept of
subsidiarity, the author identifies the heterosexual, married, reproductive family as the
correct basis of and model for society. The family should have its own “social subjectivity”
(Belardinelli 2000: 22), displacing the idea of individual rights as abstracted from social
relations. Belardinelli calls for “a new citizenship of the family, according to which there
are rights that individuals acquire by virtue of being members of a family,” concluding that
“from the perspective of society as a whole we can then say that the more the family is
family, the more it is useful to society” (2000: 22). Another contributor argues that in the
“new orientation [of Italian society] guided by the principle of subsidiarity… the value rests
in the fact that renewed attention is given to interpersonal relationships” (Giuffrè 2000: 70),
particularly those in the family:
The implicit model of values is that of the family as civil community with
inalienable responsibilities of procreation, of education of children, and of
generating those internal and external ties of association that generate those
informal and formal networks in which the primary and secondary social capital of
society is formed (Giuffrè 2000: 75).
The relevance to the provision of social services from a perspective of subsidiarity is
immediately evident, but the author even provides a practical example of the difference in
the provision of services informed by subsidiarity at the consultori. While a liberal or
welfare approach would offer a pregnant woman “who is refusing the pregnancy” an
abortion in the institutional health setting, in
the subsidiarity-informed approach the woman will not only be helped to
understand the meaning of pregnancy and the rights of the nascituro [to-be
born], but she will also be supported in accessing the means necessary to
welcome the new life and to sustain the burden of support and education of
the child (Giuffrè 2000: 76).
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The restructuring of welfare and the remaking of reproductive politics and services is
enabled by political and administrative reforms in accordance with the principle of
subsidiarity. Subsidiarity is thus both a theory of proper government and a moral theory of
society that foregrounds the family and the protection of life through numerous techniques
of management.
Lombardy: the Laboratory of Subsidiarity
The region of Lombardy, with its more than a decade of center-right governing,
offers some insights into how the space opened up by the devolution of State
responsibilities for social services may be partitioned in the name of subsidiarity.
Referenced as the laboratory of subsidiarity,18 or the Region of subsidiarity (Consiglio
regionale della Lombardia 2002: 7), the Lombard welfare model emphasizes the so-called
privato sociale (private social services), a hybrid of nonprofit and for-profit entities. The
reorganizing of funding and administrative power has reshaped the political landscape at all
levels, making available forms of, and funds for, organizations that did not exist a decade
earlier. The dispersion of public moneys and of governance, including moral governance,
through non-governmental organizations has changed the way health care and social
services are accessed and provided.
Lombardy, where the welfare state is giving way to a diffused moral network of
associations and private (Catholic-oriented) health and social service clinics, offers a

18

See for example, a conference co-organized with the John Hopkins’ Institute in Milan in June 2009:
"Beyond the welfare state, towards subsidiarity". Formigoni’s speech about subsidiarity as “a new model of
government”:
http://www.arifl.regione.lombardia.it/cs/Satellite?c=News&childpagename=Regione%2FDetail&cid=121329
9977930&p=1213273365520&packedargs=locale%3D1194453881584%26menu-torender%3D1213273365520&pagename=RGNWrapper
and conference program:
http://www.unimib.it/open/eventi/Oltre-il-welfare-state_-la-Sussidiarieta/8779442473511847479
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particularly striking example of the articulation of neoliberal and Catholic politics. The
neoliberal celebration of choice and individual responsibility has been qualified by the
Vatican’s hard line against individual rights in matters of life (and death). Much of what
Donne, Diritti, Salute and other feminist groups were contesting in the restructuring of the
Italian welfare state was the result of the pairing of Catholic morality and neoliberal
ideology. This pairing has shaped the restructuring of health care in the region of Lombardy
under a conservative Catholic administration. In Lombardy the welfare state is in the
process of being increasingly replaced by a diffused moral network of associations and
private (Catholic-oriented) health and social service clinics. As its social and moral doctrine
increasingly permeates social services previously provided by the state, the Vatican’s stance
on issues of “life” and death holds important implications for health and reproductive
services. A moralized discourse that celebrates the respect for “life” and the centrality of
family relations and associations to social cohesion enables the privatization of health by
introducing an alternative model of solidarity and justice. These reforms, in turn, have
engendered resistance and criticism on the ground, particularly among feminist activists. In
the next section I explore the politics of reproduction as they played out among feminist
actors in Milan.
Negotiating Subsidiarity on the Ground
During the early days of my field research I returned to the independent feminist
clinic in downtown Milan where, during pre-dissertation exploratory research in June 2005,
I had met Nilde and received her blessing to conduct research on site. Nilde was in her early
eighties and one of the founders of the clinic in the 1980s. Part receptionist, part
administrator, and part political inciter, Nilde held forth at her wooden desk in the reception
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area of the clinic, a poster from the 1970s bearing the slogan: “there is no revolution
without women’s revolution” hanging on the wall behind her. When something triggered
her fiery temper, Nilde would threaten to quit, and to take the prized poster with her.
Nilde was happy to have me help out in the reception area. Long afternoons and
evenings at the clinics, especially when the patient flow was not too intense, would turn
into opportunities for Nilde to talk about the history she had lived: her participation in
partisan actions in the second world war; following the war, the missed opportunity for a
communist revolution; feminism; and current politics. In part spurred by my questions and
my topic of research, but just as often by comments or current events, Nilde was an
indefatigable and heated orator.
Soon after I began to conduct research at the clinic I found out that a feminist group
focused on women’s health issues met at the clinic after hours and I began to participate in
their meetings. The clinic closed at 7pm and the use of the reception required the hand-off
of the clinic key from Nilde to Daniela, a thirty-something activist, journalist, and cofounder of the group. At the end of the meeting, the key had to be dropped off to an elderly
lady who lived in the apartment building in which the clinic was located and who held onto
it until the morning, when it would be retrieved by the morning receptionist. At the first
meeting I attended, however, Nilde could not find the key and the group had to find an
impromptu meeting place. Not wanting to spend money anywhere, we headed for the
Feltrinelli bookstore in downtown Milan. Undaunted by the public and unorthodox
arrangement, Daniela and Laura, the two main conveners and facilitators of the DoDiSa
group, launched into a fast-paced update on the most recent health policy proposals in the
region of Lombardy. Although I did not know it, this was my introduction to subsidiarity
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and the importance of the reorganization of health care to the issues I had come to research:
reproductive politics.
Other participants in the group that night included a young woman from an
association for the disabled, a local politician with the communist party Rifondazione
Comunista (who co-founded the group with Daniela19) and Livia, a cultural mediator from
Peru. Laura and Daniela updated the group on the health policy proposals recently unveiled
by Roberto Formigoni, Lombardy’s center-right governor. Central to the politics of
Formigoni was the issue of health vouchers as a means for accessing health care in
Lombardy. The group was critical of the idea of “consumer freedom” that informs the
concept of vouchers. Laura argued that the idea of “freedom” actually places a burden on
citizens to advocate for services that should be their right, making citizens increasingly
responsible, under the guise of freedom, for figuring out how and where to obtain services.
The regional deregulation plan for health care was sending a very clear message that “you,
the citizen, are responsible for your health.”20 Laura and Daniela’s frustration extended to
the national center-left government in power at the time, which also seemed to adopt a
similar ideology of health. Laura complained about a recent statement by the Minister of
Health, Livia Turco: “Livia Turco: if you smoke you have to pay a higher copay because
you are a cost to society!” Laura’s critiques echo the analysis of scholars of neoliberalism
and governmentality who argue that
the strategy of rendering individual subjects “responsible” (and also collectives,
such as families, associations, etc.) entails shifting the responsibility for social risks
such as illness, unemployment, poverty, etc. and for life in society into the domain
for which the individual is responsible and transforming it into a problem of “selfcare” (Lemke 2001: 201).

19
20

Daniela interview, July 19, 2007
Fieldnote, Donne, Diritti, Salute meeting, December 18, 2006.
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While the critique of neoliberalism, including the push to individual
responsibilization, was very familiar to me, I struggled to keep up with the conversation
because of Laura and Daniela’s rapid-fire references to various legislations and names of
regional politicians with which I was not yet familiar. An excerpt of that conversation from
my fieldnotes21 reveals my difficulty in keeping up at this initial meeting: “The Region’s
legislative proposal is full of problems. First of all it negates law 328/78 [which established
the National Health System]. … It abolishes two laws [one from 1986 and one from 2000]
and law 328/78, but without being a unified text [testo unico], which it should be…” The
notes trail off at this point in the conversation as I gave up trying to write down numbers of
legislations and changes to health plan proposals. The group’s intense focus on regional
health care policy was disorienting to me. I had expected a different conversation, one that
focused on the state of reproductive politics in Italy.
Yet it was in this conversation that I first heard the term sussidiarietà (subsidiarity),
a concept whose meaning was unfamiliar to me, but that has since become central to my
analysis. In my hurriedly jotted down fieldnotes, I noted that one of Laura’s criticisms of
regional health care reform was that it would “interrupt vertical and horizontal
subsidiarity.”22 Although I recorded this phrase in my notes, I did not understand it until
after I returned from the field and started to research subsidiarity beyond the context of
European Union governance. In retrospect, I realize that Laura’s comment was a criticism
of the consolidation of health care in hospitals being proposed by the regional
administration. Laura argued that this consolidation would lead to the closure of clinics,
21

My request to record the meetings was politely denied by Daniela who felt that it would unnecessarily
expose the group. This concern reflects the intensity of the politics of reproduction in Italy as a whole, but
also, I believe, the struggles among various other feminist groups. As a result of her request, all my data from
Donne, Diritti, Salute meetings comes from field notes.
22
Fieldnote, Laura, December 18, 2006.
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including family planning clinics, and reduce access to the most vulnerable. Laura’s
criticism was deploying subsidiarity to point to a contradiction in this policy of an
administration so vocally supportive of the principle of subsidiarity in government: the
folding of family clinics into hospitals was a move toward centralization rather than decentralization.
My initial confusion on the focus of Donne, Diritti, Salute’s activism reflected my
lack of understanding of the relationship between health care policy and the way the politics
of “life” were deployed on the ground. Daniela, Laura, and Franca, on the other hand, were
keenly conscious of the effects of the reorganization of health care to reproductive and
women’s issues. Laura’s passion about this topic was at least in part an outcome of personal
and familial experience with illness, as well as the result of her feminist politics. Daniela
had become interested in assisted reproduction while at university and had become engaged
as a public intellectual in the debates over the moral restriction of assisted reproduction
approved by the Italian parliament in 2004. Daniela described the path of Donne, Diritti,
Salute in an interview, locating its beginning in a working group on women’s health issues
constituted within Usciamo dal silenzio in response to the approval of the assisted
reproduction legislation in 2004 and the failure of a referendum to amend it in 2005. From
the beginning, the focus of the group was on health care services as they impacted women’s
health.
All three core members of Donne, Diritti, Salute shared a concern with issues of
access, both financial and geographical, which they expressed with consistent references to
the need to “defend the territory,” or of statements about Donne, Diritti, Salute being “for
the territory.” Donne, Diritti, Salute was very critical of the restructuring of welfare and the
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privatization of “the public.” Laura, for example, was concerned by the increasing
administrative equivalency of public and private companies and complained that today
“when you enter in a hospital you don’t enter a hospital, you enter into an azienda di
servizi23 (service firm).”24 Other feminist activists, particularly ones of Laura’s generation,
expressed similar concerns. For them health care is and should remain a right, a public
service guaranteed by the state. Speaking of health care in the language of the market
represented a loss of the public, as well as a threat to women’s health.25
Laura’s comments on the transformation of hospitals into health care corporations
points to the tight coupling that Donne, Diritti, Salute members saw between the
privatization of health care and the moral politics of reproduction. The politics of the
public/state vis-à-vis the market and the Church were very much in the process of being
rethought and renegotiated at the numerous meetings of feminist networks that I attended.
Following her critique of the corporatization of health care, Laura had asked, “how do we
rethink ourselves as persons who don’t want to be redefined by either the State … or the
Church?”26 Feminist activists held a complex view of the State, informed in no small
measure from recent and less recent history; most activists argued that public services,
particularly health care, should be provided by the State, and should be outside of capitalist
logics and Catholic doctrine. At another Donne, Diritti, Salute meeting, Franca articulated

23

Aziendalizzazione (corporatization) was instituted through legislative decrees (D. lgs.) 502/92 and 517/93.
Regionalizzazione (regionalization) emerges out of the 2001 reform of Title V of the Italian Constitution
(titolo V della Costituzione) del 2001 (Maciocco 2006: 96).
24
Fieldnotes, Donne, Diritti, Salute meetings on December 18, 2006 and February 13, 2007.
25
The commitment to public service distinguished Donne, Diritti, Salute participants and other feminist
activists from other visible political champions of reproductive rights, particularly the Partito Radicale, whose
defense of individual freedom, scientific research, abortion, and other social issues was informed by a liberallibertarian, individual rights perspective. The tension was palpable and coalition-building tricky in the
instances in which I witnessed attempts at cooperation across these ideological divides or participated in
projects that included the Radicali in Milan.
26
Fieldnote, Donne, Diritti, Salute meeting, February 13, 2007.
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the group’s political project as a defense of the public: “we are for the public consultori.
What we are doing is politics, helping politics stand back up, the public, not because we are
statalists, but because health is a public good.”27
Our Welfare Is Required
For many feminist activists, negotiating a position vis-à-vis the State, and producing
an alternative politics, was both a necessity and a work in progress. The proliferation of
meetings, laboratori (workshops), and conferences reflected both the need to gather
information about what was happening in an increasingly fragmented social terrain and an
opportunity to articulate alternative positions. To this end, early in 2007 Donne, Diritti,
Salute decided to organize a day conference that would bring together activists, politicians,
and providers from Lombardy, Piedmont, and beyond. The conference, titled, Occorre il
nostro benestare (Our welfare is required) was an opportunity for all involved to fare rete,
to network, and find out from each other what was happening on the ground to women’s
health and reproductive services. The conference took place on a Saturday in early May
2007 in the basement room of the Unione femminile association, founded in the early 1900s
as a meeting space for women.28 The association is located on the ground floor of one of
Milan’s old, stately buildings. In early May, the many flowering plants in the courtyard
were in bloom, providing a lush backdrop to informal conversations during breaks. The
working part of the conference took place in the “small room” of the association, where
rows of red brick columns held up a vaulted ceiling.

27

Fieldnote, Donne, Diritti, Salute meeting, May 22, 2007. The discourse on the new social model based on
subsidiarity offers an opposite reading, one in which the State is oppressive and patronizing, as well as
inefficient. Non-State entities are the ones that escape the limitations of the state and moralize the market by
providing a personalized service infused with solidarity.
28
http://www.unionefemminile.it
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Participants and speakers seated at a large table included regional politicians,
feminist activists, and reproductive service providers, including gynecologists. A major
thread running through the talks was the issue of the role of the state in providing health
services and the implications for women’s health. In her opening comments Laura argued
for “public services, private ones can be additional, but not a replacement. The State is a
guarantee for women, even if … with difficulty, but it’s a guarantee against slavery and
servitude, … and for health.”29 After the introduction, speakers took to the floor to describe
the situation of reproductive health services in their region. A regional politician in the
Rifondazione comunista party, Nicoletta Parotta, argued that “In the region of Lombardy
there is no longer a distinction between public and private subject, any subject that engages
in public activity is considered public and funded as such. What do we mean by public? We
have to clarify that for ourselves.” Echoing Laura’s comments at an Donne, Diritti, Salute
meeting, Parrotta described the “devastation” of welfare and health care and the
“aziendalizzazione [privatization] of the health system” whereby “today we don’t have
hospitals anymore but hospital firms. Once [we had] beds, now we have procedures… [We
need to] discuss the concept of the public. There is no longer a distinction between public
and private entity.” She also called for attention to issues of the body, a traditional feminist
concern, but in the context of the relationship between one’s body and the welfare system:
“First question is our embodiment, but then also what services. Keep public services.”
Artemia Oriani, another regional politician, noted that the issue of health “founded on [the
idea of] freedom of choice wanted by Formigoni [Governor of Lombardy] doesn’t give
women much freedom.” Instead, it is a model that has undermined health care over the past
ten years and that has “split the socio-sanitario (social-health care dimension) from the
29
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social” with the system of accreditation of consultori leading to a decrease in public
consultori. These comments mark a shift in the relationship between women and the State
since the 1970s, when feminists debated the value of engaging the state and its inescapably
patriarchal politics.
The politics of rights, particularly women’s rights, requires engaging state, market,
and Church.30 This need for rethinking feminist political engagement, and developing new
political projects, was articulated by a long-time activist in both feminist and lesbian
movements:
We need to propose our ethics, our morality, it’s in the studies, in feminist thought,
it also has to do with the economy, economic restructuring affects women. Next to
the economic needs, the values of the angel of the hearth is rediscovered. Selfdetermination is not ok anymore. They cut funds for the consultori… women’s
centers. We need places of gathering … We need to give an example on the ground.
The need to “fare rete,” to network and reconnect, as well as to defend women’s spaces,
points to a widespread sense that sociality, in this case women’s spaces, are being eroded
by changes in Italian society.
“Emptying Reproductive Rights from Within”
Donne, Diritti, Salute’s focus on the deregulation of health care in Lombardy coexisted
with their activism around more immediate threats to reproductive rights. Prior to my
arrival in the field they had participated in the mobilization against the planned closing of a
public consultorio familiare (family planning clinic). Consultori familiari were public
spaces created in the 1970s when feminist activists sought to establish places to discuss
sexuality, contraception and, in some case, even to provide clandestine abortions. Older
feminists often reasserted the original understanding of consultori as spazi d’ascolto
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(listening spaces) and bemoaned their institutionalization into sites of medicalization.31
While their incorporation into law, like the abortion legislation, was seen by feminists as a
compromise, the consultorio familiare still retains a holistic and social approach to health,
which includes not only medical, but also legal and psychological services. The importance,
and even uniqueness of these spaces, was evident to me on a warm May day when I was at
the consultorio helping out while Nilde was out for the day after a fall in the subway
station. In the middle of a busy day of scheduled appointments, a young woman came to the
reception area saying that she had a friend standing outside who was having panic attacks
and was suicidal. “We didn’t know where else to go, and then we thought that maybe
here…”32 Despite her full schedule the psychologist made time for an impromptu session.
In addition to holistic services, family planning clinics provide over a third
(38.2%)33 of the medical certifications required by Italian law to obtain an abortion at an
Italian hospital (Ministero della Salute 2010b: 5). In recent years, they also provide the bulk
of reproductive services to migrant women, while middle-class Italian women tend to
obtain these services from their general practitioner or gynecologist.34 Donne, Diritti, Salute
devoted a significant amount of attention and activism to the struggle to protect public
consultori familiari from numerous threats: closure; incorporation into hospitals; and even
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Law 405/1975 established that consultori familiari should be available to Italians throughout the national
territory.
32
Fieldnote, May 9, 2007.
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This number varies greatly by region in Italy. In the northern region of Piedmont, for example, the rate of
abortion certifications provided at consultori familiari reached 63.8% in 2008 as opposed to a low of 8.3% in
the southern region of Abruzzo (Ministero della Salute 2010b: table 16). In the region of Lombardy, 42.2% of
women obtained certifications at consultori familiari, versus 26.7% from their general practitioner, and 28.4
from an Ob/Gyn (Ministero della Salute 2010b: table 16). These statistics reflect the availability of consultori
familiari and the degree of conscientious objection of its providers, which varies greatly across the territory.
34
According to the most recent government survey of abortion practices in Italy, 31.3% Italian women obtain
certification for abortion at consultori familiari as opposed to 52.4% of migrant women (Ministero della
Salute 2010a: 5). At the national level (including both Italian and migrant women) 38.2% obtain certification
at a consultorio, 27.4% from their general practitioner, and 32.4% from an Ob/Gyn (Ministero della Salute
2010b: table 16).
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takeover by pro-life groups and by the government’s interest in turning them into sites for
the promotion of the family. Consultori, originally conceived as sites of radical feminist
consciousness-raising, are being undermined and transformed, mostly through shifting
funding streams away from them and toward private, often Catholic clinics. With the
deregulation of public health care, consultori familiari are at risk of being closed,
reoriented, or constrained through the process of accreditation, which is required to obtain
public funding.
National and regional politics, administrative legislation, the Catholic politics of
life, and the privatization of health care are all factors contributing to the transformation of
reproductive services in Lombardy. With the implementation of subsidiarity, public
financing was opened up to private and non-profit clinics in 2001. Of these clinics, 60-70%
of which were Catholic in orientation,35 which in practice means that they are exempted
from having to provide the reproductive services related to abortion and contraception that
the public family clinics are required by law to offer. Between 2003 and 2006 there was a
steep decrease in staffing at public clinics and an even steeper increase in the staffing of
private ones.36 Of the 364 public family planning clinics operating in Lombardy in 1996,
only half survived to 2004.37 Meanwhile, private family planning clinics almost doubled (to
58) between 2003 and 2006.38 These changes are part of why Donne, Diritti, Salute
activists, politicians, and other reproductive service providers were critical of the
35

“In Lombardia +53% in tre anni, con incassi cresciuti del 132%. Le strutture pubbliche cresciute solo del
18%. Operatori in calo,” http://lombardia.indymedia.org/?q=node/3136
36 Rapporto sull’attività dei consultori familiari accreditati 2003/2006 - Assessorato Famiglia e Solidarietà
Sociale, Regione Lombardia37 Il Piano Socio Sanitario della Lombardia 2006 – 2008: analisi, evidenziazioni delle criticità e proposte
http://64.233.169.104/search?q=cache:2zf7fGojJFsJ:www.unaltralombardia.it/materiali/Unaltralombardia%25
20sanita.doc+lombardia+legislazione+socio+sanitaria+fondi+a+cliniche+private&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=7&gl=
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38 “ In Lombardia +53% in tre anni, con incassi cresciuti del 132%. Le strutture pubbliche cresciute solo del
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reorganization and de-funding of public family planning clinics and the related
encroachment of Catholic morality in reproductive services. Donne, Diritti, Salute
participants described on more than one occasion this erosion of reproductive services as an
“emptying of reproductive rights from within.”39 This emptying refers to the process of
undermining reproductive rights through its funding, without the need to touch the
legislative façade of abortion. For the women involved in Donne, Diritti, Salute and other
activists the process of restructuring health care in Lombardy was inseparable from the
erosion of reproductive rights and services.
In the early summer of 2007, Laura’s question of “how is health managed?” had
become even more central to the group’s political work. Donne, Diritti, Salute wanted to
obtain access to the regional data on funding of health service organizations. Laura,
Daniela, Franca, and Cristina, a lawyer, wanted to trace the funding of family planning
clinics. They had become particularly concerned with the fact that Catholic clinics receive
public funding without having to abide by the requirements applied to public clinics,
namely that of offering abortion certifications and contraception. This was an issue, both
because of its effects on the availability of reproductive services, but also because it
provided a financial advantage to private clinics. Yet, tracing the streams of funding was
not possible as the information was available to the public only as an aggregate. After
brainstorming some possibilities, including the option of having me as the “American
researcher” seek to obtain the data from the region, a few phone calls with a sympathetic
regional official convinced the group of the futility of this approach. Tracking the flow of
public funding to private clinics turned out to be impossible even for reasonably connected
activists. This despite the rhetoric that the new welfare model represented a more efficient
39
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and rational model oriented toward the individual citizen as compared to the bureaucratic,
impenetrable welfare state.
Becoming an Interlocutor
The opening up of the social enabled by subsidiarity offers the potential for opportunities
for intervention and funding to a number of associations and groups. Even Donne, Diritti,
Salute started to talk about becoming a registered association. The beginning of a
conversation about putting together an association from the informal network of Donne,
Diritti, Salute started as I was on my way out of the field. Becoming an association meant
that Donne, Diritti, Salute “would show up as a political entity and have some political
recognition.”40 Yet, it would inevitably also define the parameters of the organization’s
work as the associations, projects need to be fit into the requirements of grants, often
through the region. At the early meetings in which the shift to an association was discussed,
some of the concerns of participants included whether Donne, Diritti, Salute would still be
able to do lavoro di rete (networking) once it became an institutionally recognized entity
and whether, in becoming an association, it would lose flexibility. The appeal of such a
move was the eligibility to qualify for funds, which could then be used to do research on the
situation of consultori familiari, for example. Becoming an association would enable
Donne, Diritti, Salute “to be recognized as an interlocutor”: “if we become an association, it
will allow us to become a subject, [to participate] in consultations with Livia-Turco [then
Minister of Health] and other commissions.”41 Later in the year, the group became a
registered association. Its transition from informal feminist network to registered
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association speaks to the draw of being a recognized subject able to tap into emerging
political and funding opportunities.
Conclusion
In this chapter I have argued that the politics of reproduction are inseparable from
the moral neoliberalization of welfare in Italy. The neoliberal and moral restructuring of
society along the principle of subsidiarity is at once a political project able to redirect
public funds to private and religious entities and a moral project aiming to assert the family
as the social formation that holding society together in the post-welfare moment. Even the
language in the government’s policy proposal seemingly borrows from Foucault,
celebrating the fact that new welfare would be “stimulating responsible behaviors and life
styles, conduct useful to oneself and others” (Ministero del Lavoro, della Salute e delle
Politiche Sociali 2008: 3).
The principle of subsidiarity undergirds a new model of the social that promises to
maintain social cohesion and solidarity even as the state shifts its administrative and welfare
responsibilities onto non-governmental entities and to families. Governing through
subsidiarity requires and engenders “moralized individuals” that will engage in “active
solidarity,” beginning with the family and expanding to other forms of association, as the
state remains in the background in the role of “facilitator” (Holmes 2001: 96). Subsidiarity
provides the architecture for enacting the moralization of society as a sphere of social
relations separate from the state. The terms of this moralization are spelled out in various
policies and legislations where they inevitably coalesce around the heteronormative,
reproductive family as the natural basis of society and source of social solidarity and the
protection of life from conception. In this discourse, explicitly laid out in government
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proposals as well as in sympathetic sociological literature, the “artificiality” of the social
state is contrasted with “natural” forms of social relations, epitomized by the
heteronormative family. Ethnography with groups engaged in counteracting the implications
of these transformations for women’s health and reproductive rights reveals different
ideologies of the public and the state, but also the seductiveness and potential of subsidiarity
to enable alternative politics and new opportunities for resistance. In the next chapter I delve
deeper into the politics of “life” that are interwoven in the social transformations taking
place in Italy.
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CHAPTER 3
"THE EMBRYO IS ONE OF US”: FROM ASSISTED CONCEPTION TO FETAL
BURIALS
“The embryo is one of us”
National Bioethics Committee1
“We have lost the courage to say that the embryo is
not a person”
Intercultural psychologist2
Introduction
On International Woman’s Day 2007, I joined a group of women from a Milanese
feminist collective, resistenti (resistant) as they were setting up for a protest in front of the
headquarters of Lombardy’s regional health administration offices. Two women unfolded a
cardboard coffin, soon to be filled by a 3-foot sanitary pad stained a deep, bloody red.
Tampons that had been dipped in red dye hung over the coffin’s sides. Nearby two women
used spray-paint to blacken the bright yellow mimosa flowers that are the ubiquitous
symbol of Women’s Day in Italy. Some participants had saved their used pads, tampons,
and condoms which they deposited at the door of the health administration’s building. The
police blocked off half the street for the protest. The funeral marching band’s warmed its
horns up behind us as we finished preparing to march. As I covered my head with a black
veil and prepared to step off the sidewalk and into the street, I was handed one of the ropes
on the sides of the coffin; I became one of the four pallbearers in a funeral for the
“unfertilized egg.”

1

1996 Comitato nazionale per la bioetica. I pareri del Comitato identità e statuto dell'embrione umano, 22
giugno, available online http://www.governo.it/bioetica/testi/220696.html
2
Fieldnote, February 13, 2007.
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The resistenti collective was protesting a recent regional amendment to burial
regulations that had changed the status of embryos and fetuses for purposes of biological
waste procedures. Whereas prior to this amendment only fetuses of over 20 weeks were
eligible for burial, now all “products of conception” required burial by the health
authorities, or could be claimed by the “parents” for a private burial. Women scheduled for
an abortion or suffering a miscarriage were presented with a form on which to indicate their
“choice” of burial. In response, feminist networks in the Milan area came together to
discuss how to counter this blatant, though almost invisible, attempt to recognize the
personhood of the unborn. After all, as Viola, the organizer of the protest, put it at a
feminist meeting centered on this issue, “a funeral means that the fetus is a person.”3
With the procession of about 50 women making its way through downtown Milan,
followed by the marching band’s funerary music, the women of resistenti4 sought to make
visible and at the same time deride the elevation of biological functions to personhood and
subjecthood. Viola led the march, carrying what looked like a religious staff, except that its
contoured top traced the shape of a woman’s uterus and ovaries. She took turns with
another collective member at shouting through a malfunctioning megaphone that made their
words unintelligible. Others handed out flyers and spoke to people watching from the
sidewalk. Almost no one had heard of the obscure regulatory changes we were protesting
despite some coverage in the newspapers. Most passersby and those gazing down on the
bloody pad from their seats in the trams, looked perplexed, surprised, or amused.
As we approached the piazza del Duomo and I felt my arm starting to get sore from
my role as pallbearer, I pondered the absurdity of the whole thing, the burial regulation, the
3
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4
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rooster-like sound emerging from the megaphone which effectively silenced the protestors’
arguments, and the amused and confused reaction of people in the streets. However, in
looking back at the pictures and video of this ironic and irreverent critique of the
sacralization of the embryo, I also see something else: The funeral for the unfertilized egg
manifested both the outrage and creativity of Italy’s numerous feminist collectives and
groups, and a sense of loss and mourning among women engaged in feminist politics. At
stake for them were the gains the feminist movement had seemingly secured in the 1970s
and which now seemed at risk of ending up in a coffin of their own. The traditional funeral
attire, including the dark veil over our heads, harkened back to an older Italy, the Italy of
my grandmother, which many of these women had fought to change. The blackening of
mimose, the yellow flowers that mark the celebration of Women’s Day, resonated with a
mourning that was palpable at the feminist meetings I attended.
The mock funeral march was one way of contesting the latest attempt at
undermining reproductive rights. At the cusp of the millennium, the politics of life have
become a site of intense political and moral struggle in Italy, most visibly through debates
over how to regulate medically assisted reproduction. Linking various politics and policies
of reproduction is a vigorous, if at times indirect, assertion of the unborn as a person and as
a “rights-bearing subject” (Morgan and Roberts 2012).5 Confronted by this political project,
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A commonly referenced human rights document in the debates over the embryo and the politics of life in
Italy is Article 2 of the European Union Convention for Human Rights, titled “Right to Life,” which states
that “Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law.” Another European reference is the “Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union” (Official Journal of the European Communities 2000), an
expression of the European Union’s commitment to “a future based on common values” (8). The Charter
states in its second article that: “Everyone has the right to life” (Official Journal of the European Communities
2000: 9)
OTHER EU CASES: http://www.lawandreligionuk.com/2013/03/06/human-embryos-the-beginning-of-lifeand-eu-citizens/
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feminist actors in Milan struggled with “how to respond.”6 Looming large over the politics
of reproduction and the discussions at feminist meetings was the legal introduction of the
embryo’s subjecthood in a 2004 national law regulating assisted reproduction.
In this chapter I trace the contours of the politics of reproduction and the embryo in
Italy over the past two decades, most visibly through the 2004 regulation of assisted
reproductive technologies (ARTs). I draw on policies and on political and religious
discourses as well as on participant observation with a network of feminist groups in Milan
to examine the terms and means by which the assertion of embryo subjecthood is justified
and contested. My analysis is framed against the broader contexts in which the rise of the
subject-embryo gathers its meaning, urgency, and specificity. The politics of reproduction
in Italy play out against anxieties over low fertility rates among Italian women and a steep
increase in immigration in the 1990s and 2000s. However, against a backdrop of
demographic alarmism fertility-enhancing technologies have not found more support from
the state, as they have, for example, in Israel, where interrelated concerns over the
differential reproduction, the legacy of genocide, and religious accommodations of these
technologies have led to widespread access to ARTs, but not to contraception and abortion
(Kahn 2000). In Italy, however, the inverse is true: Abortion and contraception are legal
and, at least on paper, accessible and free for all women; assisted reproductive technologies,
on the other hand, have been tightly regulated since 2004. At the center of this contradiction
is the embryo, which is recognized in the ART legislation as a subject with rights
equivalent to those of the other parties to assisted reproduction, which de facto means to
those of the woman undergoing in-vitro fertilization.
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I examine the embryo’s path to subjecthood through policies and political debates
and in the moral pronouncements of the Catholic Church. I draw on ethnographic research
with feminist networks in Milan to document the terms and forms of opposition to this
moral project. Discussions at feminist meetings, personal conversations and interviews with
reflexive and politically engaged actors shaped my understanding of the complex stakes,
meanings, and relevant contexts of the struggle over subjecthood and subjectivity in which
the unborn is the undisputed protagonist. The historical context of the regulation of abortion
in the 1970s resonates in these debates, both as the impetus of the decades-long politics of
life of the Catholic Church, but also for making sense of the terms and forms of
contestation of the restriction of reproductive rights in the name of the embryo.
The biopolitics of the Catholic Church successfully entwine biology and theology in
a cultural project of life at the same time that the Church’s influence on Italian politics has
grown over the past two decades. This increased political power and intensified salience of
matters of life and family explains some of the contradictions around reproductive politics
in contemporary Italy: the approval of a restrictive law governing fertility technologies at a
time of demographic anxiety over the low birth rates of Italian-origin women (see Krause
2001; 2006) and its coexistence with abortion legislation, approved in a different political
era almost three decades prior, that guarantees free abortions to all women in Italy.
I also argue that the terms by which the recognition of the embryo-subject is
justified also suggest that that the Church has been able to harness a politically transversal
distrust of neoliberal rationalities in contemporary Italy. Restrictions introduced by the
ART legislation have delineated a moral barrier around the embryo and the “natural family”
to protect against the market’s penetration. This barrier constitutes a moral “exception to
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neoliberalism” (Ong 2006: 4). In turn, this exception delineates deserving subjects of state
protection from undeserving ones, reconfigures subjects and rights, and extends the reach of
the state at the same that the state pulls back from other areas of safeguarding and welfare.
This suggests that political-economic process of neoliberalization may be an important
dimension of the politics of life, and vice versa, that the politics of life and family are a key
dimension of moral neoliberalism in Italy, if not beyond. The restrictions of reproductive
technologies in the name of the protection of the embryo as a vulnerable subject delineates
a space for the state’s legitimate moral containment of the market at the same that it
legitimates broader neoliberal transformations in social welfare that generate vulnerability
among already-born citizens in Italy.7
The Embryo at the Intersections of Medical and Political Technologies of
Reproduction
A broad anthropological literature explores the cultural, political and moral
articulations and implications of reproductive technologies. Anthropologists studying
reproduction have been interested in the ways the meanings of pregnancy, the fetus, and
even children vary cross-culturally and in how these meanings and practices are shaped by
complex intersections of power, political economy, and culture (Michaels and Morgan
1999; Sheper-Hughes 1992). Different threads in this research examine policies and
discourses governing reproduction (Hartouni 1997; Oaks 2001; Petchesky 1984; Ginsburg
1998), the subjectivities of men and women undergoing fertility treatments (Becker 2000;
Gribaldi 2005), the subject-making power of medical technologies, visual and otherwise
7

The reorganization of welfare, particularly of health care, from a universal model instituted in the late 1970s
to a model structured on the principle of subsidiarity is also characterized by a significant role of the Catholic
Church in social and health care services. In Lombardy, the devolution of health care has taken the form of
partnerships with the Catholic Church, mostly because of a conservative Catholic regional coalition that has
ruled since 1995 (see chapter 2).
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(Petchesky 1987; Taylor 1992; Casper 2004; Layne 2003; Petchesky 1987; Morgan 1998),
the articulations of religion and reproductive technologies (Kahn 2000; Inhorn 2003;
Roberts 2006), and the relationship between reproductive technologies and kinship
(Hartouni 1997; Kahn 2000). In this literature, the status of the unborn figures prominently,
especially as it is brought into relief by visual reproductive technologies. Through
ethnographic research and analysis of its scientific construction, the unborn emerges as a
privileged entity upon which are projected social meanings and political aspirations
(Morgan 2003). In the 1980s, Rosalynd Petchesky, for example, identified the resonances
between the emerging disembodied, seemingly independent fetus imaged through
ultrasound and the “self-made,” independent, neoliberal subject of the Reagan era (1987).
More recently, the constitution of the unborn as a political subject and citizen has been
examined as an artifact of political and legal technologies (Holc 2004; Casper and Morgan
2004; Sperling 2004). Janine Holc (2004) describes the 1997 decision by Poland’s highest
court to deny a right to abortion and to award the embryo political rights in post-socialist
Poland. Italy’s assisted reproductive law put the country on the map in the Anglophone
literature (Bonaccorso 2006; Hanafin 2007; Fenton 2006) adding to research on gender,
Italian feminism, abortion, and critical demography (Andall 1994, 2000; Krause 2001,
2005, 2006; Plesset 2006). Italian sociological and anthropological studies of assisted
reproduction date back to the 1980s, though the approval of legislation has engendered new
scholarship on the topic (Bimbi 1989; Gribaldi 2005; Lombardi and Pizzini 1994; Lombardi
and De Zordo 2013).
The literature that most closely examines the political constitution of the unborn is
informed by Foucault’s concept of biopolitics, a theorization of modern power that
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reconfigures the sovereign power to mete out death into the power to know, regulate, and
foster life at the level of the population (Foucault 1990 [1978]; Kaufman and Morgan
2005). This form of power, which Foucault terms “biopower” has a dual, or “bipolar,”
nature: one pole concerns the individual “anatomo-political” disciplining of bodies while
the other, biopolitics, takes up “life” in the aggregate of the population. Having discovered
patterns and properties at the level of the population, biopolitics “exerts a positive influence
on life that endeavors to administer, optimize, and multiply it, subjecting it to precise
controls and comprehensive regulations” (Foucault 1990 [1978]: 137, cited in Krause and
De Zordo 2012: 139). In the modern state, “politics now addresses the vital processes of
human existence: the size and quality of the population; reproduction and human sexuality;
conjugal, parental and familial relations; health and disease; birth and death” (Rose 2001:
1).
Vitapolitics
With the neoliberal state’s increasing devolution of its welfare responsibilities to
non-state entities, the stakes of the politics of life shift. The role of the state in fostering
health or protecting the biologically constituted nation gives way to a vital politics that “is
concerned with our growing capacities to control, manage, engineer, reshape, and modulate
the very vital capacities of human beings as living creatures. It is, as I suggest, a politics of
‘life itself’” (Rose 2001: 3). The shift from welfare as centralized in the State to the
individualization of responsibility and risk characterizes neoliberal rationalities of
government. According to Rose, “this complex of marketization, autonomization, and
responsibilization gives a particular character to the contemporary politics of life in
advanced liberal democracies” (Rose 2001: 4), which emphasizes internalized techniques of
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government. This shift, for Rose, constitutes a different kind of politics, which he terms
“ethopolitics” and defines as all those “attempts to shape the conduct of human beings by
acting upon their sentiments, beliefs, and values—in short by acting on ethics” (2007: 27).
It is through affect and values, according to Rose, that enables the linking up of
“autonomous individuals … with the imperatives of good government” (Rose 2007: 27).
If ‘discipline’ individualizes and normalizes, and ‘biopolitics’ collectivizes and
socializes, ‘ethopolitics’ concerns itself with the self-techniques by which human
beings should judge and act upon themselves to make themselves better than they
are. While ethopolitical concerns range from those of life-style to community, they
coalesce around a kind of vitalism, disputes over the value accorded to life itself:
‘quality of life,’ ‘the right to life’ or the ‘the right to choose,’ euthanasia, gene
therapy, human cloning, and the like. This biological ethopolitics—the politics of
how we should conduct ourselves appropriately in relation to ourselves, and in our
responsibilities for the future—forms the milieu within which novel forms of
authority are taking shape (Rose 2007: 27).
While this emphasis may very well be appropriate in the context of the individualization of
choices about quality of life or in the responsibilization of health, the “disputes over the
value accorded to life itself” in the context of the politics of reproduction is governed by a
range of interventions. Among them, the power of the law remains important alongside
“the immanent power of the norm,” as Foucauldian scholar Sergei Prozorov writes (2007:
59). Rose’s assertion that ethopolitics characterize the neoliberal, post-welfare moment
does not fully account for the moral politics of reproduction taking hold in Italy. In the
Italian case, disciplinary techniques in matters of “life” coexist with, and sometimes
eclipse, techniques of the self. The political influence of Catholic doctrine limits the
empowerment of individuals in matters of life, which for the Church is explicitly off-limits
to direct intervention. Catholic doctrine denies individuals the right to self-determination in
matters of life and death. The ethopolitical empowerment of individuals to manage and
intervene in “life itself,” then, is not the only game in town.
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The Church’s insistence that at the moment of conception a unique potential human
being is formed entwines biological expertise with moral doctrine on reproduction and the
family.8 The establishment of the Papal Academy for Life (Pontificia Academia per la Vita,
PAV) by Pope John Paul II in the early 1990s marks the Vatican’s engagement with and
foray into embryology. Since 1994 the PAV has held conferences and produced papers on
the status of the embryo and on the beginning of life. 9 A sample of the titles of the
conferences over the span of a decade reveals the Papal Academy for Life’s focus on
reproduction and the status of the embryo: “Rational foundations of the sacredness of life in
all its phases of existence” (1994); “Identity and statute of the human embryo” (1997);
“Human genome. Human personhood and the society of the future” (1998); “The culture of
life: foundations and dimensions” (2001); “Nature and dignity of the human person and
foundation of the right to life. The challenges of the contemporary cultural context” (2002);
“The dignity of human reproduction and the reproductive technologies: anthropological and
ethical aspects” (2004); and “The human embryo in the pre-implantation phase,”
International Conference, February (2006).10 Catholic vitapolitics insist that individuals are

8

Catholic doctrine on the status of the embryo itself is historical and not absolute. The Aristotelian theory of
ensoulment, which held that it occurred on the 40th day after conception, was influential until it was
reconsidered at the turn of the 18th century in light of early visualizations of follicles, spermatozoa, and
embryos. These new developments brought about “a reconsideration of animation and the beginning of life, as
well as the lot of unredeemed souls” (Filippini 1993: 160).
9
Writings from the Pontificia Academia per la Vita (PAV), established by Pope John Paul II with the purpose
to engage in research on human life and its dissemination.
http://www.academiavita.org/template.jsp?sez=Pubblicazioni&pag=testo/ident_embr/serra_colombo/serra_col
ombo
10
Listed at: http://www.academiavita.org/template.jsp?sez=AssembleaGenerale&pag=assgen
An example of the work produced at these conferences comes from an undated publication available
on the Academy of Life’s website:
We can summarize the principal concepts of the Christian tradition in the following points:
the embryo is a human being. On this point tradition is unanimous. In fact, it is not even an
issue to be discussed. ... We are talking of a futurus homo in the way that today we would
speak of a future adult or a future citizen. The well-known expression by Tertullian,
anticipated murder, means that the destruction of the unborn is equivalent to the premature
murder of a citizen.
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not empowered to dispose of their biological lives, which belong to God. Yet, the Church’s
position is not absolute. Despite its opposition to any “artificial” interventions into
reproduction, 11 the Church actively supported Italian legislation on in-vitro fertilization for
married couples.
Writing about the Italian ART legislation, legal scholar Patrick Hanafin argues that
Italian vitapolitics cannot be described as ethopolitical because they are “not a politics of
empowerment but a politics of entrapment in an imagined natural order” defined by the
Catholic Church (Hanafin 2007: 5). Instead, the politics of life in contemporary Italy
represent “a rigid top down vitapolitics. In this politics the embryo has been constructed by
conservative lobby groups as an active individual agent” (Hanafin 2007: 5). Hanafin’s
emphasis on vitapolitics resonates with the assessments of feminist actors and of nonpolitically engaged leftist women in Italy. I heard on at least two occasions women engaged
in feminist politics describe this sense of feeling weighed down by a “leaden pall” 12 or
“oppressive pall.”13 The recognition of this vitapolitical project is a useful reminder that
even in the neoliberal moment, biopolitics has not transformed into ethopolitical “selftechniques” that align subjects with particular political projects through optimization,
desire, and aspiration. At the same time, a top-down vitapolitics is not the only politic of
life at work in Italy. Sovereign and disciplinary power are contiguous and co-existant with
technologies of self-regulation and ethopolitical projects; they are not sequential (Nadesan
2008: 7).
Ignacio Carrasco de Paula. n.d. Il rispetto dovuto all'embrione umano: Prospettiva [sic] storico-dottrinale.
Pubblicazioni Pontificia Academia Pro Vita, Translation by Milena Marchesi,
http://www.academiavita.org/template.jsp?sez=Pubblicazioni&pag=testo/ident_embr/carrasco/carrasco
11
In the late 1950s Pope Pius XII voiced the first denunciation of artificial insemination by the Catholic
Church on the grounds that it represented “acts against nature,” even in cases of “homologous” fertilization
that uses a woman’s husband sperm (Cirant 2005: 173).
12
Fieldnote, Susanna Camusso, UdS meeting, April 4, 2007.
13
Fieldnote, Daniela, Fetal Burial Meeting, February 13, 2007.

80

The debate over ARTs revealed deep divisions among legislators as well as
significant resistance among different groups and associations in Italian society. The
political interventions of the Church are viewed by leftist and liberal activists, intellectuals,
politicians, and journalists as illegitimate, illiberal, backwards, and even un-European. The
curtailment on moral grounds of individual choice in matters of reproduction and in
biomedical research galvanizes intense opposition. While this resistance did not prevent the
law’s passage or its amendment via referendum, it did succeed in producing a feminist
network out of numerous dispersed feminist groups. Additionally, some of the law’s more
restrictive provisions have since been found unconstitutional in the courts.14 That the battle
for reproductive rights takes place through less visible policies and practices that de facto
undermine abortion without changing the law suggests that a top-down vital politics of
entrapment does not fully capture the struggles over reproduction and the family in Italy.
The concept of “reproductive governance” (Morgan and Roberts 2012: 243), which draws
on Foucault’s concept of governmentality, is more useful for making sense of the politics of
reproduction in Italy than either the oppressive, top-down power described by Hanafin’s
vitapolitics or the empowered and responsibilized individual of ethopolitics in Rose’s
accounting. Reproductive governance encompasses a broad spectrum of institutions and
“actors” and of forms of power, ranging from coercion to incitement:
Reproductive governance refers to the mechanisms through which different
historical configurations of actors – such as state institutions, churches, donor
agencies, and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) – use legislative controls,
economic inducements, moral injunctions, direct coercion, and ethical incitements

14

A 2009 ruling by the Italian Constitutional Court overturned the ban on cryogenic freezing of embryos, the
limit of producing three embryos per cycle of in vitro fertilization, and pre-implantation diagnosis. See De
Luca 2012. Central issues that have not been redressed in the courts are the ban on fertile couples who are
genetic carriers of diseases like Cystic Fibrosis and who would access IVF in order to select a healthy embryo,
the ban on donor-assisted fertilization, and the restriction of access to heteronormative couples.
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to produce, monitor and control reproductive behaviours and practices (Morgan
and Roberts 2012: 243).
One of the most contested issues in the politics against reproductive rights is the
assertion of the rights of the embryo. Italian feminist women have loudly countered the
constitution of the embryo subject, resisting, contesting, and even mocking the notion of a
“sacred” embryo, insisting that it represents nothing less than an attempt to diminish
women’s subjecthood and citizenship. In response to the approval of the assisted
reproduction legislation in 2006 a new umbrella feminist organization, Usciamo dal silenzio
(Let’s Come Out of Silence) organized a hugely successful protest, organizing by some
estimates upward of 200,000 people into the streets of Milan in defense of reproductive
rights (Hanafin 2007: 39).15 These numbers, which are comparable to, or even exceed,
estimates of feminist protests of the 1970s (Birnbaum 1991: 91) remind that “women are
not ‘docile bodies’” (Krause and De Zordo 2012: 140). Or, as Nilde put it on one of
multiple occasions in which she described the protest to me: “women, when you needle
them, they respond!”16
The politics of reproduction, however, are fraught with unresolved tensions within
Italian feminism regarding abortion, the politics of rights, and engagement with the state,
which I discuss below. Many in the women’s movement of the 1970s were disappointed by
the terms of the abortion legislation. Some had warned about the dangers of engaging in a
politics of rights in which women would by definition always lose. Patrick Hanafin refers to
Italian feminist Ida Dominijanni’s critical stance against the 2006 protest, which made

15

Legal scholar cites an estimate of participation at the protest ranging between 100,000-200,000 people, but
does not cite a source (2007: 39). In the field I often heard a 100,000 estimate, including from Nilde.
Whatever the actual number, the UdS protest was undoubtedly the largest protest on reproductive rights since
the mass protests of the 1970s and sent a message about the political feasibility of revisiting law 194.
16
Fieldnote, Consultorio, January 24, 2007.
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newly relevant “all the issues which were current at the time of the debate about the
decriminalisation of abortion in the 1970s, namely, the need to refuse to reduce abortion to
a mere question of legal rights, how abortion legislation is a compromise with male power,
and how today women should not be forced to use a grammar of rights in relation to
abortion, which would force them into a merely defensive position” (Hanafin 2007: 40).
The Politics of Reproduction in Post-War Italy
The influence of the Catholic Church over the drafting of Italy’s postwar
Constitution (1948) produced a document that recognizes a special status to motherhood
and defines the family based on marriage as a “natural society.” The constitutional
recognition of women’s equality and rights, such as the right to work, was qualified by the
assertion of women’s unique duties to family and motherhood (Andall 1994; Caldwell
1991; Hanafin 2009).17 The postwar moment was marked by the continuation of fascist
laws criminalizing abortion and contraception as “Crimes against the Integrity and Health
of the Stock,”18 which remained on the books for three decades following the end of
fascism (Caldwell 1991).
The divide between Catholics and Communists extended to women’s organizations
in the postwar period. In 1944 the Udi, Unione donne italiane (Union of Italian Women)
was formed, eventually bringing together partisan women who had fought against Nazism
17

Article 29 of the Italian Constitution, often referenced in debates on assisted reproduction as well as in
public debates over civil unions, subordinates equality to the “unity of the family,” implicitly subordinating
women’s roles to the family: “The Republic recognizes the rights of the family as a natural society founded on
matrimony. Matrimony is based on the moral and legal equality of the spouses within the limits established by
law to guarantee the unity of the family.” Article 37 recognizes women’s equal rights to work and pay at the
same time that it calls for this work to be compatible with “women’s essential role in the family”: “Working
women have the same rights and, for equal work, the same wages as working men. The working conditions
must allow women to carry out their essential role in the family and ensure special adequate protection for the
mother and the child.”
18
A series of articles in the Fascist Rocco Code of 1930 criminalized abortion and contraception under a new
category of crimes: “Crimes against the Integrity and Health of the Stock) making both doctors and women
seeking abortion punishable with prison sentences (Caldwell 1991: 89; Horn 1994: 83-84).
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and Fascism in northern Italy and southern women (Birnbaum 1986: 48). Following the
war another important women’s group, Centro italiano femminile (Italian Women’s Center)
emerged among Catholic women associated with the Christian Democratic Party (Birnbaum
1986: 48). In the late 1960s and 1970s, a new generation of feminists came of age in the
leftist activism of the times. After decades of marginalization in decision-making within the
Communist Party, women collectives emerged separately from the party feminism of Udi
(Birnbaum 1986: 80-81).19 Women’s groups argued that women’s liberation could not wait
for, and was not guaranteed by, a proletariat revolution. The slogan: “There is no revolution
without liberation of women. There is no liberation of women without revolution”
(Birnbaum 1986: 81) captures the spirit of the time.
The collectives engaged in the practice of autocoscienza, “self-knowledge”
(Birnbaum 1986: 81) or “consciousness-raising” (Bono and Kemp 1991: 2).20 These groups
saw liberation in broad terms: not only in political structures, but also in the depth of the
very sense of what it means to be a woman. The practice of autocoscienza in small
women’s groups entailed “a process of the discovery and (re-) construction of the self, both
the self of the individual woman and a collective sense of self: the search for the subjectwoman” (Bono and Kemp 1991: 9). “Emancipatory” feminists organizations, like Udi,
worked within the institutional and gendered hierarchy of the Communist party structure
seeking women’s equality in employment and political rights (Birnbaum 1986: 48;
Pojmann 2005: 74). “Liberationist feminist,” on the other hand, associated with the feminist
19

Udi itself separated from the Communist Party to become an independent feminist organization in 1982
(Nuzzo 2007).
20
While the idea of consciousness raising was an American “import,” “the name given to this practice in Italy,
‘autocoscienza’, indicates its distinctly Italian character” (Bono and Kemp 1991: 8). Carla Lonzi, a prominent
Italian feminist, introduced the practice “in the context of a theoretical speculation which had already moved
away from the mere analysis of oppression to envisage the autonomous production of interpretative categories
of reality. Autocoscienza meant independent, small groups of women, meeting to discuss issues of all kinds on
the basis of personal experience” (Bono and Kemp 1991: 8-9; Hanafin 2009: 230; Pojmann 2005: 89).
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cultural associations and collective argued that one could not find liberation in the logics
and power relations of patriarchy (Bono and Kemp 1991; Hanafin 2009; Irigaray 1985).21
Even in the 1970s, however, the practice of autocoscienza was not removed from politics as
many women participated in “doppia militanza” (double militancy) by participating in both
the separatist and relational work of liberation with other women and in political and
institutional organizing (Birnbaum 107-109; Bono and Kemp 1991: 11). In addition to
practices of autocoscienza aimed at deconstructing women’s subjectivities under patriarchy,
some feminist groups eventually embraced the practice of affidamento (entrustment)
between two women (Bono and Kemp 1991; Hanafin 2009: 230). Italian feminism has also
been characterized by its rejection of the notion of gender parity and equality in favor of an
embrace of “the crucial issue of difference” between the sexes (Bono and Kemp 1991:
14).22 The legal and political accomplishment of the Italian women’s movement in the
1970s suggest that these practices were not incompatible with the movement’s achievement
of significant political change.23

21

However, Italian feminist Ida Domnijanni offers a less positive assessment of the autocoscienza, charging
the practice was “naive in believing in the authenticity of the lived experience and of the word which
expresses it, and therefore unable to go beyond the recognition of each woman in her fellow-women (Bono
and Kemp 1991: 132).
22
Bono and Kemp argue that it is the insistence on difference that distinguishes most Italian feminism from
Anglophone feminism (1991: 14). The embrace of women’s difference, as Bono and Kemp acknowledge
“may sound essentialist” to Anglophone feminists (1991: 17). However, Italian feminists, they argue play
with “the risk” of essentialism “seriously,” while denying a “deterministic” and essentialist reading of
difference. Influential feminist theorists such as Rosi Braidotti deny a “deterministic” understanding of
woman, in favor of seeing women as being constituted by “historical experience” (Bono and Kemp 1991: 1718). This is neither a political project organized around “a simple request for equality,” nor a call for
separatism; rather it is an assertion that “difference means duality … It has to do with the full acceptance of
the partiality of both the female and the male subjects” and the denial of man as “the only subject” (Bono and
Kemp 1991: 18).
23
Lucia Chiavola Birnbaum’s (1986) list of these political accomplishments gives a sense of the scope and
successes of feminist struggles in the decade of the 1970s:
repeal of punitive law against unfaithful wives (1968); divorce law (1970); nursery schools
legislation (1971); repeal of law forbidding birth control information (1971); protective
legislation for working mothers (1971); referendum campaign to repeal punitive abortion
law (1971); protective legislation for women in cottage industry (1973); defeat of
referendum to repeal divorce law (1974); court decision declaring constitutionality of
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The Struggle for Abortion
The issue of reproductive self-determination dominated the decade of the 1970s,
even as some feminist groups were critical of the politics of legalization (Andall 1994;
Birnbaum 1986: 87; Pojmann 2005: 74). In the early 1970s, feminist groups established
independent family planning clinics (consultori autogestiti), spaces where women could
obtain information on abortion and contraception, and in some cases obtain abortions
illegally (Bono and Kemp 1991).24
The fight for the decriminalization of abortion was marked by suspicion of the
project of asking the state to recognize abortion as a right. Prominent feminist philosopher
and writer Luisa Muraro reminds in a 2011 interview that while the libertarian Partito
Radicale fought a campaign for the right to abortion, the women’s movement “asked for
its decriminalization without making it a right” (Bertoncin 2011).25 In fact, a number of
feminist collectives were critical of the path toward a legislation on abortion, seeking
instead for a repeal of the fascist laws that criminalized it. Writing in the years just before
law 194 on abortion was approved, the Comitato Romano per l’Aborto e la
Contraccezione (Roman Committee for Abortion and Contraception, or CRAC) describe
their goal as being to secure “the right to free abortion on demand for all women, including
minors, within public health structures, and for the woman to make the decision without
therapeutic abortions (1975); law for family health clinics with provision for birth control
counseling (1975); maternity and infant legislation (1975); law clarifying equal family
rights (1975); house approval of bill on abortion (1977); law clarifying equal pay and equal
treatment of male and female workers (1977); law legalizing abortion (1978); referendum
campaign against sexual violence (1979); 300,000 referendum signatures for law against
sexual violence presented to parliament (1980); defeat of referendum to repeal the abortion
law (1981) (89-90).
24
Fieldnote, Nilde, December 4, 2006.
25
Luisa Muraro is one of the most well-known femministe storiche, historic feminists who were on the
frontlines of the women’s movement in the 1970s. Bono and Kemp credit Muraro as the main writer behind
Non credere di avere dei diritti (Don’t Think You Have Any Rights), even though the manifesto, in keeping
with feminist practice, was published under the name of the collective, La libreria delle donne di Milano
(1991: 130).
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censorious interventions by so-called experts” (Programme of the CRAC, in Bono and
Kemp 1991: 219). After years of protest and as political parties worked on a compromise
bill on abortion, the Movimento per la Liberazione della Donna (Movement for the
Liberation of Women) published a manifesto in 1978 that outright rejected a recourse to
law: “We’re more convinced than ever that we don’t want laws on our bodies. We
maintain that any law on abortion will give the state power to decide for us” (Manifesto of
the Movimento per la Liberazione della Donna, 1978, in Bono and Kemp 1991: 226). The
group, like CRAC, sought for the repeal of the criminalization of abortion and for its
treatment on par with “giving birth” and other surgeries, such as “appendectomies or
pulling teeth.”
One of the most well-known manifestos on abortion was published by the Libreria
delle donne di Milano: Non credere di avere dei diritti (Don’t Think You Have Any
Rights).26 The authors argued that “when women turn their attention to the law and ask
Parliament to resolve some of the social conflicts which affect them, and when sexual
difference and the man-woman conflict are involved, they damage their own sex and put it
into a position of lacerating contradictions” (cited in Dominijanni 1987, in Bono and
Kemp 1991: 134). Rivolta femminile (Female Revolt) argued that a law on abortion would
not address sexual inequalities. They argued that unintended pregnancy was rooted in
women’s sexual subordination and colonization by men’s sexuality (Bono and Kemp
1991: 216).27

26

The full title reads: Non credere di avere dei diritti: la generazione della liberta’ femminile nell’idea e nelle
vicende di un gruppo di donne (Don't think you have any rights: the generation of female freedom in the ideas
and events of a group of women). The first part of the title is taken from a quotation by Simone Weil. (Bono
and Kemp 1991: 110).
27
These claims echo similar Anglophone arguments in feminist texts, such as Andrea Dworkin’s Intercourse
(1987), that abortion served man’s pleasure (see also Dworkin’s Right Wing Women, 1983).
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In 1978, under pressure from the women’s movement to decriminalize abortion, and
following a 1975 Constitutional Court ruling allowing abortion in cases of a serious threat
to the woman’s health, 28 the Italian Communist Party and the Christian Democrats
produced a compromise legislation (Hanafin 2009: 231). The law, which came to be known
by its number as “la 194” or “la legge 194” (“the 194” or “law 194”), however, did not
decriminalize abortion as feminists had demanded. The title of the law, “Norms for the
social protection of motherhood and for the voluntary termination of pregnancy,” belies the
tensions and compromises behind its legislative process in the Italian Parliament. Law 194
asserts the state’s responsibility “to recognize the social value of motherhood and to
safeguard life from its beginning” at the same time that it asserts the primacy of women’s
psychological and physical health and of her economic and social conditions over the right
of the unborn to life.29
To obtain an abortion within the first 90 days of gestation a woman needs to obtain
a doctor’s certificate attesting to physical or psychological threats to her health should the
pregnancy continue. A waiting period of 7 days is required. Legislators limited abortion to
public hospitals and required parental consent or a judge’s approval for minors and
included a conscientious objection clause, enabling doctors and other medical staff to opt
out of providing abortion services, except in cases when the women’s life is in imminent
danger. While it brought abortion outside of illegality, the law did not recognize women’s
28

The constitutional ruling recognized the rights of “the conceived” but it prioritized those of the pregnant
woman: “there is no equivalency between the right not just to life but also to health of who is already a
person, like the mother, and the safeguarding of the embryo whom has yet to become a person” (cited in
Colombo 2005).
29
Article 1 and article 4. Legge 22 maggio 1978 n. 194 (pubblicata nella Gazzetta Ufficiale n. 140 del 22
maggio 1978). “Norme per la tutela sociale della maternita' e sull'interruzione volontaria della gravidanza.”
The first article of the abortion law asserts that access to abortion should be granted on grounds that
pregnancy and birth constitute “a serious danger for the pregnant woman’s physical or psychological health,
in relation to her health status, or her economic, social, or family conditions, or in relation to the
circumstances under which conception occurred, or in cases of anomalies or malformations in the fetus.”
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reproductive autonomy, as the women’s movement had demanded: “contrary to what is
generally believed, this is not a law which allows abortion. It is a law which prohibits it,
except in certain circumstances” (Conti, 1981: 100, in Hanafin 2009: 231). This was no
“free abortion on demand” (Movimento di Liberazione della Donna, 1978, in Bono and
Kemp 1991: 226).
The women’s movement and the Radical Party were disappointed by the restrictions
on the law. On the opposite side of the political spectrum, the Vatican strongly opposed the
legislation. The Italian Movimento per la vita (Movement for Life) formed in response to
the legalization of abortion, with the support of the Catholic Church, and gathered
signatures for a referendum to overturn its legalization.30 The failure of the Vatican to block
abortion in Parliament and then its inability to prevail in the referendum, along with a
similar failure in its opposition to divorce, were watershed events in Italian politics and
culture, broadly interpreted as an indication of the decline of the church’s political, social,
and moral influence in Italy. 31 Politically, the Catholic Church seemed headed to
irrelevance. Writing in their widely referenced reader on Italian feminism in 1991, Paolo
Bono and Sandra Kemp dismissed the intellectual importance of the church to Italian
feminism. They noted that while “the church has saturated the cultural traditions of the
country and helped to shape the prevailing images of women, … its intellectual premises
are not challenging” (Bono and Kemp 1991: 22). If anything, according to Bono and Kemp,
too much attention has been paid to Catholicism in Italy, a mistake they seek to rectify by
purposefully granting it “so little space” in the 450-plus pages they devote to Italian

30

Another referendary effort, by the Radicali with support from some parts of the women’s movement, sought
the complete deregulation of abortion. This too was rejected.
31
Italians voted resoundedly (67.9%) in favor of protecting the recently gained right to a legal abortion
(Cirant 2005: 177).
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feminism (Bono and Kemp 1991: 22). A decade later, however, Italian feminists find
themselves faced by a politically resurgent church prolific in its discourse on life and
family, ideas that hold new resonance and meanings in the moral neoliberal era. Today’s
feminists, dispersed across various associations and cultural groups, struggle with how to
respond to the politics of life of the Catholic Church.
Reproductive Rights at the Turn of the Millennium
Even as abortion and contraception have remained legal and public family planning
clinics, established by law, provide certification for abortion and access to contraception,
the right to abortion has been limited in practice, especially through the conscientious
objection clause. Over the past decade, the rates of conscientious objection have increased
greatly. Some hospitals, even in cities like Rome and Milan, do not provide abortion
because all doctors are objectors; in the central region of Lazio, 10 out of 30 public
hospitals do not provied abortions because the entire staff has declared themselves to be
conscientious objectors (De Zordo 2012). Government data show that in 2007 almost 60%
of gynecologists and almost 50% of anesthesiologists in Italy were conscientious
objectors.32 Data from 2010 show that the rates have increased to over 70% for
gynecologists and to over 50% of anesthesiologists.33 In both years, the highest rates of
objection are found in the South, where a number of regions have rates of conscientious
objection above 80%.34

32

Ministero della Salute, Relazione del Ministro della Salute sulla attuazione della legge contenente norme per
la tutela sociale della maternità e per l’interruzione volontaria di gravidanza (legge 194/78), dati preliminari
2006, dati definitivi 2005, Roma, October 4, 2007, pg. 35.
http://www.salute.gov.it/imgs/C_17_pubblicazioni_679_allegato.pdf
33
Ministero del Lavoro, della Salute e delle Politiche Sociali, “Relazione del Ministero della Salute,
sull’attuazione della Legge contenente norme per la tutela della tutela sociale della maternità e per
l’interruzione volontaria della gravidanza. Dati preliminari 2010. Dati definitivi 2009,” pg. 34, Roma,
6/8/2010, http://www.salute.gov.it/imgs/C_17_pubblicazioni_1312_allegato.pdf
34
Ibid.
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Pharmacists too can invoke conscientious objection. Spurred by the Vatican’s
denouncing of emergency contraception, also known as the morning after pill, some
pharmacists have refused to dispense it, while doctors in some Catholic hospitals will not
write prescriptions for it. The decade-long attempt to obtain approval for RU-486, the drug
that induces a medical abortion, has similarly encountered a host of obstacles. The
requirement for a hospital stay, for example, defeats the anonymity and privacy that this
type of abortion is supposed to provide. As a result of the limited numbers of abortion
providers, women accessing abortion in Italy are faced with long waiting periods. Carolina,
a cultural mediator who worked with migrant women in reproductive services and who
sometimes attended Donne, Diritti, Salute meetings, reported that the wait can sometimes
be as long as a month.35 Additionally, institutional and regional practices have enabled the
presence of volunteers for the Movimento per la vita in public hospitals in Milan, where
they provide pre-abortion counseling. While this counseling is supposed to be voluntary,
the line is not always clear. During my fieldwork activists familiar with hospital policies
described how being a conscientious objector benefited a doctor’s career, while practicing
abortions was detrimental to it, an explanation confirmed by recent ethnographic research
on conscientious objection (De Zordo 2012). Silvia De Zordo found that doctors who are
not morally opposed to abortion still become objectors because of the multiple ways in
which being an abortion provider can negatively affect a doctor’s career (2012).
After the intense politics of the 1970s, the Italian feminist movement fragmented,
becoming diffused and turning toward a kind of cultural feminism spread out in numerous
associations (Birnbaum 1986: 262; Caldwell 1991). The threat posed to the reproductive
35

Fieldnote, Donne, Diritti, Salute meeting, March 12, 2007. The one-week waiting period required by law
before a woman can undergo an abortion procedure is waived in cases when it would put the woman over the
90 days limit required by law.
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rights gained in the 1970s by contemporary vitapolitics galvanized a temporary and
strategic coming together of various associations and collectives, most visibly through the
2006 march organized by Usciamo dal silenzio. Nilde, the receptionist at the independent
feminist clinic consultorio, who had participated in the resistance and had been active in the
Communist party, was very frustrated by this retreat of Italian feminism, and of leftist
politics in general, remarking that: “there are no longer any political projects, neither on the
left nor on the right. … Prodi36 says yes to US military bases in Italy, and us, [we sit] here
in our own space, like some stronze (assholes). I don’t like it … it’s been like this for thirty
years!”37
Tracing the Rise of the Embryo Subject
Outside of the medical setting, other obstacles to abortion emerge with a concerted
effort to link the recognition of subjecthood and personhood to the moment of conception.
The Vatican has played an important role in this eminently biopolitical project. In 1987, the
Congregation for the Doctrine of Faith, led by then-Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, published
“Instructions on Respect for Human Life in Its Origin and on the Dignity of Procreation.
Replies to Certain Questions of the Day”38 (see also Cirant 2005: 178-179). The document
addresses the new interventions enabled by assisted reproduction, arguing that the human
body is not simply biological matter and asserts that: “The human being must be
respected—as a person—from the very first instant of his existence” (Ratzinger and
Bovone 1987). Ratzinger’s “Instructions” draw upon Catholic doctrine to assert conception

36

Prime Minister Romano Prodi, head of the center-left coalition governing Italy at the time of Lidia’s
comments.
37
Fieldnote, January 17, 2007.
38
http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_19870222_respectfor-human-life_en.html
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as the determining moment of human moral existence. The document, however, buttresses
Catholic doctrine with biological knowledge, arguing that the Church’s teaching on matters
of life are “confirmed, if confirmation were needed, by recent findings of human biological
science which recognize that in the zygote resulting from fertilization the biological identity
of a new human individual is already constituted” (Ratzinger and Bovone1987). The
document’s assertion of these biological “facts” negates the complex history of the
emergence of embryos and the fact that “there is a great deal of disagreement among
embryologists about the so-called facts and significance of fertilization and other biological
markers” (Morgan 2009: 21). On the doctrinal side, the status of the ensoulment of the
unborn has also not been absolute. Yet, drawing on biological “fact” and Catholic doctrine,
the Ratzinger-penned doctrinal map of what is morally acceptable in matters of
reproduction almost perfectly foretells the restrictions to ARTs that would become law
almost two decades later (Ratzinger and Bovone 1987; see also Cirant 2005).
One of the most influential recognitions of the rights of the embryo, however, came
out of Italy’s National Bioethics Committee, an institutional body that carried the status of
scientific neutrality even as conservative Catholic members were overrepresented. In a
1996 document on the statute of the embryo the committee’s president, Francesco
D’Agostino, wrote that: “the embryo is one of us: this phrase, so simple as to sound
irritating to some, explicates well the fundamental bioethical attitude that emerges from our
text: the sense of the limitation of the potential of our technological actions” (Comitato
nazionale per la bioetica 1996). In including the embryo as “one of us” the committee
sought to protect it from technological intervention.
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The National Bioethics Committee’s statement was not an obscure development: it
garnered significant media coverage. A television interview of D’Agostino featured
“behind his shoulders … the image not of an embryo but of a fetus of a number of months
holding his little finger in his mouth” (Valentini 2004: 115, cited in Cirant 2005: 181). The
statement galvanized the Movement for Life and other associations to organize for an
amendment to Italy’s civil code that would recognize juridical capacity at conception rather
than at birth (Cirant 2005: 181).
The embryo gained grounds in less visible ways, too: In the late 1990s and early
2000s at least two regional laws recognized the unborn as a member of the family. In the
region of Lazio, the center-right administration produced legislation that recognized the
conceived as a member of the family for purposes of figuring family income.39 In 1999 the
region of Lombardy, recognized “the conceived” in regional family policy legislation: “The
region ... recognizes the family as a politically relevant legal subject … For the purpose of
the interventions intended by this law, the conceived is considered a member of the family”
(Regional Law 23/1999, art. 1, comma 1). Just as a growing consensus on the need to
regulate assisted reproduction was emerging in the mid-to-late 1990s, so was a multipronged politico-religious-scientific effort to assert the subjecthood and personhood of the
embryo, to make the embryo “one of us.”
Governing Medically Assisted Reproduction
The most vigorous and contested assertion of the embryo as a subject came in
national legislation to regulate assisted reproduction in Italy. Until 2004, despite numerous
legislative proposals on the matter dating back to the late 1950s, assisted reproduction was
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Zegarelli, Maria Annunziata. “Anche l’embrione è un cittadino.” l’Unità, November 16, 2001.
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governed by circolari, (administrative directives).40 In 1998, the government’s directives
were supplemented by a voluntary medical code of ethics that informed practice in private
clinics.41 However, by virtue of being self-governing, these guidelines were also subject to
flexible interpretation. This flexibility, and the fact that third-party donor techniques were
fully located in the private sector, made assisted reproduction in Italy a particularly
unregulated field (Bonaccorso 2006). In 2004, Italy had 331 clinics, 206 of which were
private. 42
In the mid-1990s, a growing consensus solidified around the “problem” of
unregulated assisted reproduction in Italy. One of the biggest areas of concern was the lack
of regulation of the business of gamete donation in the private sector (Bonaccorso 2006:
84). In the 1990s and early 2000s, feminist and progressive legislators and activists argued
for the state to regulate the market and safeguard women’s health (Soldano, personal
communication, 2004). Some Italian feminists, however, warned of the political dangers
inherent in opening up reproductive matters to the legislative and political process. The
invitation to discipline assisted reproduction risked “reopening the debate over the role and
limits of State intervention on the reproductive choice of individuals” (Zuffa 1994: 100). A
number of legislative proposals were put forth in the 1990s, none of which succeeded in
becoming law.

40

The most important of those was the 1985 Circolare Degan (Circolare n. 19/1985), which disciplined
assisted reproduction in public hospitals and clinics, and the 1987 Circolare Donat Cattin. The Circolare
Degan was concerned with defining which reproductive techniques would be accessible in publicly-funded
institutions.
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Article 42, Codice Deontologico Federazione Nazionale degli Ordini dei Medici Chirurghi e degli
Odontodiatri, approved October 10, 1998.
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Lombardy and Lazio had the highest density of clinics among the regions of Italy (over 50 each). Data from
2003. Istituto Superiore di Sanità. “Procreazione medicalmente assistita: risultati dell’indagine
sull’applicazione delle tecniche nel 2004.” http://www.iss.it/binary/rpma/cont/08_25_WEB.pdf. 2005.
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Researchers probed the particularities of Italy’s political system that would lead it to
its inability to approve a national law on ARTs, including the stalemate in the bicameral
system and the political divide between Catholic and secular leftist politics on assisted
reproduction (Neresini and Bimbi 2000; Ramjoué and Klöti 2003, Vincenti 2008). With the
collapse of the postwar parties during the “Clean Hands” scandals of the 1990s, however,
came a new political configuration in which Catholic politics were no longer consolidated
into a degree of “political unity” in one political party, the Christian Democrats (Diamanti
and Ceccarini 2007: 43). Instead, Catholic votes were dispersed across the political
spectrum and the power of the Church exercised in the form of a “pressure group” or
“lobby” representing “an influential minority” (Diamanti and Ceccarini 2007: 48). Rather
than weaken the influence of the Vatican, under this new political arrangement Catholic
votes became sought after by all parties, including leftist and centrist parties, significantly
expanding the influence of the Vatican over Italian politics and politicians (Bova 1999;
Soldano, interview 2004). By the early 2000s, the stalemate in Parliament had shifted
enough for the approval of a bill informed by Catholic positions on reproduction. The
conservative coalition presided by Silvio Berlusconi instructed its politicians to vote in
support of the law rather than leaving them free to vote according to “conscience” (Fenton
2006: 75). The structuring of the voting process and the Vatican’s declaration in January of
2003 that Catholic politicians must abide to Catholic doctrine,43 “led to a ‘Catholic vs
secular’ (respectively, for and against the law), polarisation within Parliament,” which
added to the Catholic influence over the content of the law and produced the most
restrictive regulation of assisted reproduction in Europe (Fenton 2006: 74-75).
43

“Doctrinal note on some questions regarding the participation of Catholics in
political life,” http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_
cfaith_doc_20021124_politica_en.html, cited in Fenton 2006: 75, n. 16.
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Despite controversy in and outside of Parliament, in February 2004, after two years
of intense debates, the Italian Parliament approved restrictions to medically assisted
reproduction. Among its many controversial provisions the ART law, which came to be
known as la legge 40 (law 40) introduces “the conceived” as a subject on par with the other
parties involved in assisted reproduction. The law also bans donor gametes,44 the cryogenic
freezing of embryos, pre-implantation diagnosis,45 surrogacy, experimentation on embryos
and reserves access to reproductive technologies to heterosexual “stable” couples, defined
by cohabitation. Additionally, the law defined a maximum number of embryos that could
be produced and insisted that they all be transferred in utero.46 Within a few years these
restrictions led to a significant practice of “cross-border reproductive care” (Shenfield et al.
2010) toward European members states, like Spain. In a study involving six European
countries, Italy emerged as the most common country of origin of “cross-border
reproductive care” (Shenfield et al. 2010).
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Rulings by Courts in Milan, Florence, and Catania have found the ban on heterologous fertilization to be
constitutionally dubious.
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Beginning in 2006, numerous cases have made their way through Italian court appealing the ban on preimplantation diagnosis, in some cases enabling the procedure on an individual basis. In 2012, the European
Commission for Human Rights (ECHR) found in the Costa and Pavan v Italy case that Italy’s ART law is in
violation of human rights. The case concerned a couple who discovered they were healthy carriers of cystic
fibrosis when they had a child affected by the disease and who chose to have an abortion when in a
subsequent pregnancy the fetus was found to be affected by the disease as well. Unable to access assisted
reproduction and pre-implantation diagnosis to conceive a child without cystic fibrosis, the couple appealed to
the ECHR. The Commission found that the ban on pre-implantation diagnosis constitutes “a violation of
Article 8 (right to respect for private and family life) of the European Convention on Human Rights” and
noted its “inconsistency” considering the legality of abortion. Interestingly, the official press release of the
court also includes the following caution: “The Court observed first of all that the notions of ‘embryo’ and
‘child’ must not be confused.” (“Ban preventing couple of healthy carriers of genetic disease from screening
embryos for in vitro fertilisation violated their right to respect for their private and family life,” Press Release
issued by the Registrar of the Court, ECHR 327 (2012) 28.08.2012,
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=003-4055415-4740328#{%22itemid%22:[%220034055415-4740328%22])
46
A 2009 ruling of Italy’s Constitutional Court found this article unconstitutional, doing away with the limit
of three embryos and the requirement of their transfer (Ruling n.151 May 9).
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Conceiving “The Conceived” as a Precarious Subject
The term “concepito,” “the conceived,” only appears in the first article of the law
(see also Hanafin 2007: 62 ; Cirant 2005: 99), in the context of the assertion of its rights:
“recourse to medically assisted reproduction is allowed, on the conditions and according to
the modalities envisioned by this law, which assures the rights of all subjects involved,
including those of the conceived.”47 Unlike “fertilized egg” or “embryo” or “fetus,” “the
conceived” lacks biological and developmental specificity at the same time that it
foregrounds conception as the defining characteristic of this new rights-bearing entity. A
leftist politician commented that these provisions were “so embryo-centric that law 40
could be renamed the ‘law on the statute of the embryo”.48 Even before the ART law’s
formal approval, a center-right Senator boasted “that having obtained the recognition of the
principle that the embryo is a human being, we will now have to undertake a profound
revision of the law on abortion in order to avoid a clamorous contradiction.”49
The linguistic choice of concepito echoes the Catholic Church’s focus on
conception and its denial of distinctions, such as the designation of “pre-embryos,” that
have been used to allow ART techniques and stem cell research in other settings:50
The terms "zygote", "pre-embryo", "embryo" and "foetus" can indicate in the
vocabulary of biology successive stages of the development of a human being. The
present Instruction makes free use of these terms, attributing to them an identical
ethical relevance, in order to designate the result (whether visible or not) of human
generation, from the first moment of its existence until birth (Ratzinger and Bovone
1987).
47

Law 40/2004, Article 1, Comma 1, emphasis added.
Fieldnote, Conference “Stato e Laicismo” (State and Secularism), Anna Bernasconi, March 10, 2007.
49
Senator Maurizio Ronconi, Udc. In L’Unità” website, 10/12/03.
http://www.unita.it/index.asp?SEZIONE_COD=HP&TOPIC_TIPO=&TOPIC_ID=31220
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The 1984 Warnock Report in Britain delineated a phase, lasting 14 days from conception, during which
embryos could be used for research purposes. This move was controversial, and initially rejected by the
British Parliament. In 1990, Parliament reversed itself and endorsed the Warnock Report. The change hinged
on the successful lobbying by the scientific community, which pushed the distinction between the pre-embryo
and the embryo phases (see Mulkay 1994).
48
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The term concepito encompasses and equates different stages of development, from zygote
to fetus.
With the approval of la legge 40, Italian legislators effectively prioritized the
embryo’s potential right to life over women’s bodily autonomy and reproductive choice and
established the embryo’s “independent relationship with the State” (Oaks 2001: 175).51 The
extension of subjecthood and rights to the embryo, the “weakest subject,” 52 emerges at a
time when the relationship between the Italian state and all of its subjects is being
renegotiated. Just as the post-welfare state retreats from its responsibilities of social
citizenship shifting them onto “society,” the private sector, the family, and ultimately on
active citizens, the state reaches deeper into the moral terrain of reproduction and familymaking to protect the welfare of “the conceived.”
Activists and politicians had argued for the need for a national norm on assisted
reproduction as it concerned the lightly regulated private sector. In a 2004 interview,
Monica Soldano of the Madre Provetta (Test-Tube Mother) association took responsibility
for introducing the term “Far West of reproduction” in the process of advocating for
legislation (see Krause and Marchesi 2007). While Soldano had introduced the term from a
leftist feminist perspective in the name of safeguarding women’s health and regulating the
51

Legislators went to such length to protect the embryo that they negated informed consent to treatment from
the moment conception occurs, imposing that embryos be transferred in utero even if the woman undergoing
IVF decided against having the procedure. A feminist sociologist MP called this provision equivalent to rape
(Fieldnote, Bimbi, Margherita Roundtable, February 25, 2004). In December of 2012, the revoking of consent
once the embryo is formed mandated by Law 40 was referred by judge to Italy’s Constitutional Court for
review of its constitutionality. The case in question concerns a couple which after undergoing preimplantation diagnosis, another procedure originally banned by law 40 but subsequently found
unconstitutional, refused the embryo transfer and asked for the embryos to be destined to research (Bocci
2012).
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Senator Corrado Danzi, a member of the Catholic Udc party argued in the Italian Senate that: “We consider
this a just law, because at every step, in each of its articles, in each of its words, it foregrounds the defense of
the weakest subject” (Senato della Repubblica, seduta pubblica 506, Resoconto sommario e stenografico, 11
Dicembre 2003, pg. 11,
http://www.senato.it/documenti/repository/leggi_e_documenti/raccoltenormative/15%20%20Procreazione/SENATO/AULA/st506.PDF
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private market, the term resonated with the conservative right’s moral project of
disciplining reproductive disorder (see Krause and Marchesi 2007; Marchesi 2007).
However, some overlap exists between the left and the right over the “Far West” of
reproduction. This overlap solidifies around concerns with the market’s penetration and
commodification of life. In that shared terrain lies some of the power of the politics of “life” in
neoliberal Italy. The “Far West” justifies regulation by the state at a time when the rhetoric of
deregulation prevails. The embryo holds special status compared to the already-born in this
respect too, deserving special protection from the market. This exception is evident in the

argument articulated by a conservative Catholic MP during the early debates of the law:
We need a good law and we need to employ every effort to neutralize the
transversal attempts of those who work so that everything remains in complete
deregulation [English in original]. Only the approval of a law can introduce those
limits and establish those norms that will safeguard the right to life and the dignity
of the to-be-born. Thus, it is not thinkable to entrust everything to the regulations
issued by the Ministry of Health. … I believe that it is in fact essential to restate
that the law has a principal finality: to reduce, avoid (and not allow) the many
abuses that are perpetrated, in a perfectly licit and legitimate manner, in the testtube Far West of this country of ours.53
Neoliberal projects are compatible with the restriction in rights and “choice,”
especially when those restrictions are accomplished through the assertion of the human
rights of other, competing subjects (Morgan and Edward 2012: 243). The approval of strict
regulations of reproductive technologies weaves together Catholic politics of life and a new
relevance of discourses of human rights under neoliberalism. Attention to the terms by
which the assisted reproduction law was argued and contested brings into relief a complex
reconfiguration of rights, social citizenship, and morality under neoliberalism that holds
profound implications for gendered and sexual bodies. Donna Haraway’s insight that “the
fetus functions as a kind of metonym … for configurations of persons, nation, origin,
53

Giuseppe Fioroni, Camera dei Deputati, 2002: 18-19.
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choice, life, and future” (2001:75) points to the unborn’s ability to condense relevant social
meanings and political projects. The embryo emerges from these discourses as the most
deserving subject of the state because of its ultimate weakness and inherent dependence, a
quality at odds with the active citizenship expected of other subjects. Writing about the
awarding of subjecthood and even citizenship to the unborn in Poland, Janine Holc argues
for examining the relationship of the rights of the unborn with those of other subjects,
especially in at a time when “all citizenship identities are in the process of reformulation
and reimagination” (2004: 758).
While Italy is not a post-socialist state, it has been invested by profound
transformations in employment protections, welfare, and in the terms of social citizenship
(Molé 2010, 2008; Muehlebach 2012). The extension of rights to the embryo reaffirms the
role of the post-welfare state in fostering the life of its citizens and reaffirms its role in
“moral regulation” (Corrigan and Sayer 1991). The state is called upon to protect “the
weakest subject” from the threats of deregulation, commercialization, and the Far West of
capitalism. This safeguarding is linked to the State based on rights, and, according to
another conservative Catholic MP,
from this rationality descend all the limits introduced by this law. These limits are
not “no’s” but also “yes’s.” It is about saying ‘yes’ to life; saying ‘yes’ to the
family; a ‘yes’ to the principle of equality, because in the face of the human being in
the youngest phase of its existence we witness the very participation of a common
humanity; of ‘yes’ to solidarity, because no one is smaller and poorer than our
children when they begin to exist.54
This protection, however, comes at the expense of the rights of women. As legal scholar
Rachel Fenton notes, “The Italian position is a striking example of how, the more that law
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is concerned with protection of the embryo, the more women stand to lose in terms of
bodily autonomy” (Fenton 2006: 83).

After the Law: Where Were Feminists?
The ART law, particularly in its recognition of the embryo subject, engendered
significant resistance, both inside and outside of parliament. However, in its earliest
incarnation the opponents of the law coalesced around its threat to scientific progress and
to Italy’s modernity, more than to women’s bodies and reproductive rights. The early
contestation of the law was also marked by a widespread Orientalizing discourse that
warned the ART law tainted Italy with backwardness and threatened a “slide” away from
Europe (Krause and Marchesi 2007). Patrick Hanafin’s observation that the “Far West” is
in fact a misnomer, a combination of the “Wild West” and the “Far East” (2007: 51 n. 13)
captures the sense that the space of appropriately European and modern regulation of
reproductive technologies had been overshot. Neither anarchy nor moral regulation befit a
modern, liberal, European nation. This early public debate around the law was surprisingly
masculinist. The campaign for a referendum, initially organized by the libertarian-leaning
Partito Radicale, centered on a former politician, Luca Coscioni, affected by Amyotrophic
Lateral Sclerosis (ALS). Coscioni came to personify the law’s turn away from medical
research and its denial of IVF and pre-implantation diagnosis to fertile couples who are
carriers of genetic diseases. That the most visible campaign against the law would be
articulated in terms of science, progress, and liberal individual rights, and embodied by the
suffering of a man’s rare illness, displacing in the process the implications of the law for
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women and reproductive rights, illustrates the relative political weakness of feminism in
the early 2000s.
Feminist efforts lacked institutional power and visibility, a fact noted by some
leading Italian feminists and by scholars writing prior to 2006. Rachel Ann Fenton, for
example, writes that “Italian feminism revealed itself reticent, if not silent, and certainly
not organized” (2006: 77). However, it is not that feminists were not talking about the
issue within the cultural associations that characterize the diffused feminism that followed
the mass movement of the 1970s. In May of 2004, for example, I attended the last of a
series of meetings titled “Gruppo Procreativo” (Reproductive Group) at the Libera
Universita’ delle Donne, a cultural association in Milan. The meetings were centered on
assisted reproduction and its recent legislation. The meeting was small, including only a
handful of women, all of whom had or were gaining expertise in the matter and relative
visibility. Participants included Daniela, who would write a book on the legislation the
following year, and Elena, a noted feminist. The discussion sheds some light on the silence
of feminists on the law as it revealed the underlying ambivalence over reproductive
technologies and motherhood.55 Other noted historic feminists like Luisa Muraro and Ida
Dominijanni weighed in on the silence of feminism noting “the reticence on the part of the
feminist narrative to confront feelings of hatred towards the desire for motherhood, a
desire possessed by many women. This is an issue which Muraro suggests that many have
on their minds but few wish to discuss” (Fenton 2006: 81). Another obstacle in articulating
a feminist position on ARTs was more political in nature: many feminists expressed
unease at the gamble of a referendum; they were keenly aware of the implications of a
potential failure.
55
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“Welcome to the Embryo”:
The Failure of the Referendum on Assisted Reproduction
In June 2005, the referendum to overturn key articles of the law failed to reach its
required quorum, a failure that marked a dramatic reversal in the political and moral power
of the Vatican over Italian society and signified a watershed in the politics of reproduction
in Italy. The failure of the referendum has been attributed to the intense political
intervention of the Vatican, to the technically difficult questions that faced voters, and to
inadequate information in the media (Fenton 2006: 76), much of which was controlled by
Silvio Berlusconi. The ART legislation was the inverse of the politics and social changes
that had come out of the decade of the 1970s: Whereas the abortion law had extended, with
limitations, the reproductive rights of women, asserting women’s physical, psychological,
and social wellbeing as being primary relative to the fetus, the assisted reproduction law
asserted an equivalence between women and embryos; whereas the divorce law, along with
the reform of family law in 1975, had recognized the family as an evolving social
formation, rejecting the patriarchal oppression inherited from fascism, the assisted
reproduction law reasserted the notion of the “natural” heteronormative family; and, finally,
whereas the failure of the Vatican to block the legalization of divorce and abortion legally,
politically, and electorally had signaled the Church’s waning political and social power in
matters of sexuality, the family, and gender, the Vatican’s explicit and successful influence
on the assisted reproduction law heralded an invigorated political and moral role. A
newspaper headline from the day after the referendum reads: “Welcome to the embryo” and
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acknowledges the power of Church official to “dictate law.”56 The leftist intellectual daily Il
Manifesto ran a blackened out front page to signify the return of the “Dark Ages.”
A few days after the referendum’s failure, I visited a feminist consultorio
familiare, a feminist planning clinic, to inquire about conducting dissertation
research. In the foyer of the clinic I encountered Nilde, the formidable receptionist
and administrator. As I mentioned earlier, Nilde had been a partisan during World
War II, a communist political activist, a veteran of feminist struggles, and one of the
consultorio’s original founders. The talk at the consultorio was the referendum. As
Nilde gave me a tour of the clinic she told me that doctors there provided the
certification that women need to obtain an abortion at the hospital. As she reminded
me that abortion in Italy is free for everyone, she stopped and qualified her statement
by saying “at least until the referendum. Now…?”57
“Coming Out of Silence”: Engaging with the State
When I returned a year and a half later to conduct my dissertation research,
abortion was still free and the consultorio still offered certifications for women seeking an
abortion. After the referendum campaign and then following its defeat, a more cohesive
and active feminist movement had emerged. A concerted and visible response to the law
only emerged after the failure of the referendum and increasingly explicit attempts by
emboldened Catholic politicians to target the law on abortion. In direct response to those
attacks an email by an Italian journalist went viral and set into motion a series of events
that culminated into the formation of Usciamo dal silenzio (Let’s Come out of Silence)
into a huge protest in defense of reproductive rights and law 194. Italian feminism,
56
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particularly the kind in which historic feminists are most influential and visible, can more
easily unite around the protection of legal abortion than assisted reproductive technologies.
Soon after I started to volunteer at the clinic I became involved in a group focused
on women’s health issues, Donne, Diritti, Salute (Women, Rights, Health). The group met
in the clinic’s reception after hours, and often after our meetings we would join the larger
meetings of the feminist organization Usciamo dal silenzio (Let’s Come out of Silence). In
the wake of the defeat of the referendum and of increasing talk of reforming abortion, a
coalition of women from the fields of journalism, union politics, and law had come together
to reassert feminist voices.58 Usciamo dal silenzio had managed to build a large coalition
and to mobilize one to two hundred thousand women to march in the streets of Milan on
January 14, 2006 (Hanafin 2007: 39). The march was a protest against the legge 40 and
against attempts to restrict abortion. Nilde referred to the Usciamo dal silenzio protest on
numerous occasions, always lighting up as she recounted her participation. The power of
large numbers of women marching for reproductive rights was very meaningful to her. On
slow days and evenings, sitting behind her wooden desk in the heart of the consultorio,
Nilde would bring up the protest and chide me for not having been there (even though I was
not even in Italy at the time). On one occasion she told me, “women, when you needle
them, they respond. We saw it with that protest, the streets were full, a river of women from
the Stazione Centrale to the Duomo, in rows of 50, there were no empty spaces!”59 A large
poster advertising the protest hung in the clinic’s hallway for the entire length of my
fieldwork, more than a year after the protest had taken place. Despite her long history of
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activism, Nilde was impressed by the scale of the protest, and more heartened than when I
first met her in the days following the defeat of the referendum.
The approval of the assisted reproduction legislation temporarily galvanized
feminism into a unitary response. Yet, Italian feminists found themselves fundamentally in
defensive mode regarding reproductive rights (Dominijanni 2006, cited in Hanafin 2009:
232). With a sustained effort aimed at abortion and other reproductive rights, the suspicions
of political engagement with the state of some of the feminist groups of the 1970s seemed
less relevant. Even some feminists who in the 1970s had focused in the autocoscienza
practice argued for political engagement in the face of intensifying biopolitics. Confronted
by the assertion of the embryo subject and the restriction and weakening of reproductive
rights the question “how do we respond?” increasingly required confronting both cultural
and political and legal issues.
I heard the articulation of a new politics from one of the most well-known public
intellectual and femminista storica (historic feminist),60 Elena, who spoke at meetings of
the Usciamo dal silenzio feminist group. Elena described her process of coming to
understand the impossibility of avoiding the realm of the political in our time. Elena argued
that as bio-politics intersect in the female body to the degree that they do today, women’s
politics cannot afford to ignore politics and policies:
So, I’m new at this type of issue, I come from an experience of activism, the
women’s movement, and on the question of relationship. The issue of rights, as you
know, has had a varied history in [Italian] feminism. I don’t belong to the feminism
who wrote Non credere di avere dei diritti [Don’t Think You Have any Rights].61
60

See Di Cori 2007 for a discussion of different generations of feminists in which she uses both the common
terminology of femminista storica “historic feminist” and “not-so-young feminist” to refer to the generation of
feminists born in the 1940s and 1950s, in contrast to “young feminists,” born in and after the 1970s. Di Cori
uses this generational distinction to argue that “young feminists” in Italy are shut out of public discourse while
historic feminists dominate what little visibility feminism maintains in the Berlusconi era.
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Libreria delle Donne di Milano. 1987. Non credere di avere dei diritti: La generazione della liberta'
femminile nell'idea e nelle vicende di un gruppo di donne. Rosenberg & Sellier, Torino 1987. Translated into
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On the abortion issue as well, the part of feminism [who said] “we don’t want the
law, we don’t protest [in the streets] because these are the ways in which, again, in
some way, the State intervenes, intervenes with the form of control, etc.”
… I did not underwrite that document that said, “no, I’m not interested in
abortion,” but I too was diffident of the politics of rights. Protest, no, I’m of the
piazza, I come from Romagna, I don’t know, maybe I like piazzas, I like to protest,
but I was saying, with time, maybe I have reflected and since, and I have come to
understand that now, more than ever in the past, the relationship between, I mean,
that the politics of rights, that the right/law is not so insignificant after all, so
foreign to the practices of the movement, especially, after, let’s say, that today I see
more clearly, because today all of that stuff that we have reflected upon and began
a political practice, the practice of the encounter among all the themes of sexuality,
sexuality, motherhood, the body, etc., today are profoundly intersected by
institutional politics. Today to do just consciousness-raising work, of changing
consciousness, wouldn’t, would be really unrealistic in the sense that today the
body, sexuality are the object upon which, over which they are applying laws, upon
which the Church intervenes heavily.62
At an earlier meeting Elena had similarly argued: “I am not institutional now that I have
integrated the State and institutions into my vision.”63
Daniela, the main impetus behind Donne, Diritti, Salute, was in her mid-thirties,
with startling blue eyes, a head of unruly, curly hair, and an infectious boundless energy.
Her political activism was forged in the G8 protest of 2001 in Genoa in which Italian police
brutally assaulted protestors in the high school in which they were staying. During her
involvement in the referendum campaign as frequent speaker at roundtables in her role as
author of a book on ARTs she had become frustrated by the limited parameters of its
debate, which centered on science and modernity versus “life.”64 Heartened that the
feminist “networks had mobilized” in response to the ART law she wanted to keep it going,
“to not let them settle” back down. Daniela helped fund the network Donne, Diritti, Salute,
which focused on women’s health as it was impacted by regional and national health care
English as Sexual Difference: A Theory of Social-Symbolic Practice. The literal translation I used in the text
speaks to the relevance of the speaker’s reference to one of the multiple threads of Italian feminism that
fought against the recognition of rights from the State.
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and reproductive policy. The group’s insistence that to safeguard reproductive rights
feminists had to keep an eye on the fine-grained mechanisms of health care policy and
funding was the antithesis of the campaign for the ART referendum. Daniela and the
women who participated in Donne, Diritti, Salute understood “freedom” and “choice” as
being grounded in the material and ideological realities that structured access to
reproductive rights.
The struggle over subjecthood and rights directly implicated the state and law. Yet,
there was disagreement about how much to focus on reproductive rights. The leadership of
Usciamo dal Silenzio, for example, was wary of keeping too tight a focus on reproductive
issues. One of the movement’s most visible and powerful leaders cautioned against a
defensive politics that limited feminists to the role of “vestals of the 194.”65 The members
of Donne, Diritti, Salute profoundly disagreed with this assessment, seeing in the defense of
reproductive services the central struggles of women’s rights in contemporary Italy. In
response to their unwillingness to be tied predominantly to reproductive health, Donne,
Diritti, Salute member Laura remarked to me “once the 194 [the abortion law] is gone, then
they will all cry over it.”66
Echoing Dominijanni’s assessment of the inherent defensive stance of Italian
feminism in the 2000s, the meetings of feminist groups in which I participated were
implicitly or at times quite explicitly organized around the question of how best to respond
to the latest attack to health care and reproductive rights. Feminist actors, especially, but
not only in the Donne, Diritti, Salute group, understood and sought to counter what they
saw as an “erosion” of reproductive rights, often through indirect and invisible means. The

65
66

Fieldnote, Usciamo dal Silenzio, Susanna Camusso, February 28, 2007.
Fieldnote, February 28, 2007.

109

recurrent topic in these discussions was the status of the embryo. The organizers of Donne,
Diritti, Salute, Daniela, Laura, and less regularly, Franca, a middle-aged politician in the
Rifondazione Comunista party, regularly traced back the latest attack on reproductive rights
to the recognition of the embryo subject in the ART legislation. The first article of the law,
which asserts the commensurability of the embryo’s rights as a subject with those of the
other parties of reproduction, was seen as the basis on which policies and regulations aimed
at weakening reproductive rights rested. Entwined with a material analysis of the
channeling of funds from public to Catholic clinic described in the previous chapter, they
also identified an “internal” political project in need of resistance, the remaking of women’s
subjectivity from within, especially relative to the status of the embryo.
Inspired by the “personal is political” slogan of the 1970s, Daniela’s comments at
roundtables or meetings started with herself, including her struggles with the desire and fear
of motherhood. While participating in a roundtable on a recently published ethnography of
assisted reproduction in Sicily,67 Daniela raised the question of “what is freedom” and
“what are the conditions of a free choice?” The roundtable took place in a former nunnery
turned women’s library in the city of Bologna. On the Eurostar train ride from Milan to
Bologna, Daniela and I had already discussed some of these issues in Italian feminism and,
more personally, our own ambivalent relationship with the desire for a child. At the
roundtable, Daniela seemingly picked up the conversation where the two of us left off. As I
sat in the audience I pondered the difference in how Daniela and I thought about the line
between the public and the private. Daniela’s politics rejected those boundaries in matters
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of reproduction. Highlighting the sacrificial narratives of in-vitro fertilization that
Gribaldi’s ethnography documented, she asked:
who are the subjects who choose, what is the meaning of self-determination? …
My desire for motherhood freezes and thaws. I experience it as oppressive, as
martyrdom. I feel ambivalence, fear of having to adhere to a model that makes me
coincide with a reproductive organ, it manifests as a form of conflict that is lived
individually in the intimacy of mothers.
She referred to her experience of a “conflict and a process in my willingness to become
mother, even if this assumes the folkloristic tones of ‘the women who don’t want to have
children.’ I oscillate between control and desire.” Through the practice of autocoscienza
Italian feminists sought to grapple with the question of motherhood as well as sexuality,
often through a feminist reframing of psychoanalytic theory (see for example Irigaray
1985). The way out of the individualizing politics and experiences of reproduction, for
Daniela, lay in coming out from isolation, in narrative, in relationship with other women,
and in political engagement to reconstruct the “us” of feminism that had become diffused
and fragmented following its crisis in the 1980s. The original feminist idea for independent
family planning clinics remained important to Daniela not just in terms of medical services,
but also of the “narrative spaces” they provided. Daniela’s project combined the
autocoscienza of the 1970s, the sense that women’s subjectivity could be changed through
self-awareness, narrative, and relationships with other women, with attention to politics and
the fine-grained policy mechanisms of health care.
Italian feminists like Daniela confront a very different political and cultural
landscape compared to the 1970s. The project of decriminalizing abortion generated
significant consensus by the time the referendum reaffirming its status was held in 1981
(Caldwell 1991). Illegal abortion had been widespread and even “routine” at least since
Fascist times as emerges from oral histories, such as Passerini (1986, cited in Caldwell
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1991: 90; see also Guiducci 1977). For Italian women of the generation that struggled to
legalize abortion the question of the moral or social status of the fetus was secondary to the
issue of saving women’s lives from illegal abortion and of asserting women’s selfdetermination. Nilde, who had been active in abortion politics for decades, including
through the practice of taking women who needed to abort across the border to the former
Yugoslavia and in forming the first independent feminist family planning clinics,68 was
famous for her no-nonsense attitude about abortion. Daniela twice told me the story of the
time she worked in the reception at the clinic and Nilde responded to a woman crying about
the prospect of having an abortion by saying: “’but no! It’s just like pulling out a tooth!’”69
While cautious not to overgeneralize, Daniela argued that
Those who fought for abortion, probably generally speaking, they tend to
emphasize this aspect less, instead those who already have abortion all wrapped up
and guaranteed, as we say, maybe is more… All the, their generation, the ones not
politically engaged, it’s like this, they don’t, they have absolutely no idea, except
with rare exceptions, of the fact that abortion years ago did not exist, eeeh, there is
this rhetoric really, this thing is there, of the emotion, of the, plus there, the
discourse of the church according to which life is life and you can’t touch it, has
taken hold.70
Daniela explained the difference in terms of complacency and de-politicization of a
younger generation of women but also pointed to success of the cultural politics of life in
reshaping meanings and emotions related to pregnancy and the unborn and in changing
subjectivities around abortion.71
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Daniela’s own perspective on the embryo gave space to emotions and to the
potential for it to hold multiple meanings. Daniela argued for recognition of the “ambiguity
of the embryo, an embryo that is also the image of the child” rather than an outright
dismissal of its meaning or status. She disagreed with those, like Nilde, who dismissed the
embryo as a non-entity. For Daniela, embryos should be safeguarded, though not from
women and not in terms of “life” in the abstract, but from capitalist exploitation. In an
interview72 she articulated her position on the embryo:
My thought on the embryo is like this, life is gradual, and thus, like law 194
recognizes, in fact that there is a gradualness, such that for me the question is not,
‘is it life or not life,’ eh, it doesn’t make sense, it shouldn’t even be asked. Of
course it’s life! We are not those, those who say, ‘ah, it’s a clump of cells!’ I think
it’s wrong even posing in the attempt, um, to proselytize, saying, ‘ah, it’s just a
clump of cells!’ For me it’s not just a clump of cells, I mean, for me there is also a
whole emotional charge, which, um, which which which brings, hmm, which
brings to the fact that the embryo is not just a clump of cells, but it is created out of
the body, but it is stored, it is conserved, it is frozen, it can be used for research,
thus, this poses new problems which before, when embryos stayed inside a
woman’s body, did not exist. So, I think, in fact, um, I have had the chance to
experience first hand when I was doing the debates, especially in the schools, with
high school students, um, the fact-, mmm, there, the fact that it may be a life in the
making is felt, in a way very, maybe, it is an aspect that counts in their decision
about how the law should be. So, thinking also about how much emotional charge
we women put in motherhood, it’s not as if it was all neatly resolved, it’s very
contradictory and ambivalent, and so why wouldn’t it be also in the case of a
frozen embryo? So, for me we should also, that those who argue the need to change
law 40 should also integrate this problematic, but resolving it denying the
possibility of touching these embryos is not in my opinion the correct route. We
should instead put some, some limits regarding the research of biotechnolobiomedical research, um, on the other, um, for example with respect to the problem
of ownership, copyright, the fact that, I mean, another thing that I, I was struck by
during the referendum was how there was no, there was no attention to the aspect
of the prevarication of the market. I mean the fact that in any case DNA today is
subject to, it can be, sequences of DNA can be subject to copyright, I mean, I say,
let’s start there, let’s make sure that the law is exercised, that it interrogates and
finds a solution with respect to this problem, I mean, eh, between an individual and
a multinational, who has more power? Certainly the multinational, so, ok freezing
the embryo, but I mean, what after?
Milena: to what end?
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Daniela: Exactly, to what end. And so here specify these two: one, take into
consideration all the emotional imagination aspects, emotional that in any case
surround, no, give reality to the embryo, substantiate the embryo, and on the other,
put attention, politics, in my opinion, should put attention to these aspects of the
market.
Daniela’s argument that “life” in the form of DNA should be protected from the
market rejected both the notion that embryos should be made off-limits in the way that the
law 40 had done or that they could just be considered “a clump of cells.” Instead, Daniela
called for the recognition of the plural and emotional meanings of the embryo and made the
case for regulation to protect life from profit-driven interests.73 Negotiating reproductive
rights at the intersection of an increased vulnerability of all life to the market in the postwelfare moment and of moral politics that offer a sacred alternative to commodification is
no easy task. The question of “how to respond” to the politics of life had no easy answers
and differences in strategies among feminist groups tested the fledgling network that
Usciamo dal silenzio had built even as continued attempts to undermine reproductive rights
continued to fill spaces of protest.
“Choice” in the Politics of Life & Death
The multi-pronged march of the unborn to political and social recognition gained a
new urgency early in 2007 when the Regional Council of Lombardy, led by a conservative
Catholic coalition, succeeded in approving an amendment to an article in Lombardy’s
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burial regulations concerning the handling of embryonic and fetal remains. The Regional
Council of Lombardy voted unanimously to amend the existing regulation on funerals and
cemetery matters (Regolamento in materia di attività funebri e cimiteriali),74 in effect
mandating the burial of fetuses and embryos, regardless of age of gestation. The
amendment changed the status of embryos and fetuses less than 20 weeks gestation from
“unrecognizable anatomical parts”—previously incinerated with other biological waste
from the hospital—to “recognizable anatomical parts” that require burial. Women having
an abortion or suffering a miscarriage would be offered a “choice”: to privately bury the
embryo or fetus or to delegate burial to the health authorities. The amendment introduced
two changes: first, women would need to state a “choice” on a form about what to do with
the products of conception, instead of having the option to request it; and second, all
products of conception, including embryo, would now be buried with “recognizable
anatomical parts,” instead of being incinerated. The amendment would not create a separate
cemetery for fetuses and embryos, nor require a funeral.
This change in the way these materials would be treated was rejected forcefully by
various women’s groups in Milan. Even an obscure regional bureaucratic regulation in fact
represented another salvo in the battle over the status of the unborn, a challenge
immediately recognized by feminist activists, but not by the leftist councilors who had
unwittingly approved it. With their attention focused on a pay fight over health care copays,
the councilors claimed not to have noticed the implications of the amendment to the 2004
burial code, for which they voted unanimously; they had missed the assertion of
personhood buried in a seemingly uncontroversial item concerning modifications to the

74

Modifiche al Regolamento regionale del 9 novembre 2004, n. 6 “Regolamento in materia di attività funebri
e cimiteriali”, d’iniziativa della Giunta regionale.

115

regional code on funeral and burial activities. 75 The conservative Catholic governor of
Lombardy, Roberto Formigoni, wasted no time in bragging about its significance. The
morning following the approval of the new regulations the newspapers carried statements
Formigoni boasting that “finally the dignity of the fetus is recognized” (Dazzi 2007).
In February of 2007, I joined a meeting of Donne, Diritti, Salute in the reception of
the consultorio. Participants included Daniela, Laura, Franca, Viola, from a feminist
collective, and Carolina, a cultural mediator. The plan was to meet as a group to discuss the
issue prior to joining together with other feminist groups at a meeting of Usciamo dal
silenzio later that evening. As we sat on the new Ikea couch and on wooden chairs pulled
from the desks of the receptionists, Daniela started to summarize the situation. She
circulated a copy of the regulation that had been approved and because of her involvement
with the leadership of Usciamo dal silenzio, she had a sense of the critique of the regulation
that was going to be articulated, a critique that hinged on the argument that the “choice” of
organizing the burial oneself or having the regional administration take care of it through
burial in a “common grave” was no choice at all.76 The form came to represent both the
lack of choice in matters of reproduction and an attempt to shape women’s experience of
the nature of the unborn.
Franca called the amendment “macabre” and argued that “what is behind it is the
first article of the legge 40. You keep reasserting through different means that the
conceived has juridical dignity.” These other means, for Franca, included not just the fetal
burial law, as it came to be called, but also the Church’s overwhelming presence in the
media: “if you browse newspapers, including Corriere and la Repubblica, they are full, the
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front pages, full of the interventions of the Church. Even watching TV shows, it is
indicative.” Almost three years since the ART law’s approval, the awarding of subjecthood
to the embryo continued to motivate contestation of the emerging reproductive regime and
loomed large in the discussion of other reproductive policies.
The discussion turned on how to respond to the fetal burial law. An entwined
struggle of subjecthood and subjectivity played out against the alliance of politics and
church. Both Viola, of resistenti, and Daniela argued that a broad perspective on the issue
was required. Viola called for a response that would "hold the threads together” of this
moral project and that would include reasserting the subjecthood and citizenship of women
vis-à-vis the embryo. Seeing the fetal burial law as linked to the assertion of the
subjecthood of the embryo, Viola warned: “we have to reflect because the moment the
embryo becomes a subject they can also impose a thought that is not yours. You impose
your thinking on me because it would never occur to me.” This thought was in fact a
“theological vision, a sanction of a second-class citizenship.” Viola’s focus was on the
different facets of the Vatican’s “immense project” to define and impose “the natural”
across reproduction and family-making. Viola called for the fetal burial protest, which
would deny the embryo its sacredness and put it back in its place, as it were, with other
bodily function. Daniela argued for a return to a movement that raised awareness and
worked at the level of subjectivities because “subjects mobilize starting with themselves.”
The question remained “how to make this important to a large number of people” and not
just to the usual suspects. She called for keeping the focus on “the territory,” on protecting
public reproductive health services from the privatization that was opening them up to
Catholics. She also emphasized the need for narrative, for continuing to “talk about

117

ourselves, sex, school, relationships with guys” with young women. Otherwise, she
cautioned, “Ratzinger constructs us from within.” She asked: “what changes in our heads”
through these continued assertions of the embryo’s subjecthood,” especially “if the subject
in cause does not experience herself as a political subject”?
However, looking for a way against and out of these politics was not
straightforward. Franca, who dismissed the sanitary pad protest as “dealing with the effect
but not the cause,” was also critical of one of the most common oppositional discourses,
including among feminists, which rested on appeals to laicità, the term for “secularism” in
Italy. She argued that these calls for laicità were not, in fact, truly oppositional, but rather
constituted a misuse of a term that in the Middle Ages described the non-ordained faithful.
Even the language of resistance seemed to not provide a way out of the reach of the
Catholic Church on Italian society, just as there was no out in the “choices” of the fetal
burial form.
The conversation continued in the street after we closed the clinic and headed
toward the Usciamo dal silenzio meeting. Glistening from a light rain, the streets and
sidewalks reflected the lights of downtown Milan. I felt lighter leaving the stuffy air of the
consultorio where I had been since early in the afternoon, and invigorated by being out in
the fresh air, walking across the piazza del Duomo. I enjoyed the feeling of belonging to
this group of engaged women trying to articulate a complex and reflexive political
perspective to the politics of the embryo. I soaked in the beauty of the Duomo Cathedral, its
ornate marble façade illuminated in the darkness. This very cathedral was occupied in
January 1976 by a feminist group who sought to protest the Church’s position on abortion
(Cirant 2005: 175). I have loved this building since I was a young child and the
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contradictions of this simultaneous aesthetic appreciation of the cathedral and enjoyment in
being part of a group of reproductive activists struck me as part of the complexity of Italian
society.
It was almost 9pm as we made our way to the headquarters of Italy’s biggest union,
the CGIL, for the Uds meeting. I knew from experience that the meeting would go on for at
least two hours. Often I did not get home from these meetings until after midnight. I
wondered how the women who attended these meetings, all of whom had day jobs and
some of whom had families, maintained this level of engagement. Daniela was always
overbooked, with her work, her writings, the many roundtable discussions in which she
participated, not to mention the organizing of Donne, Diritti, Salute and other projects. As
we walked down corso Italia I asked her how she managed to maintain such a high level of
activism. She laughed and replied that she felt like she had no other choice: “I feel like I’m
living under a cappa oppressiva,” an “oppressive pall;” the only way to survive under its
weight was to fight it. However, Daniela added, she would soon have to pull down the
saracinesca, the metal security door used to lock up businesses a night, in order to catch her
breath.
We arrived at the Casa del Lavoro and we climbed the wide flight of steps toward
its entrance. Groups of women were lingering on the steps, engaged in animated
conversations, and smoking. A few participants of the Donne, Diritti, Salute group peeled
off to greet friends. I followed Daniela to a large auditorium, much larger and more modern
than the basement conference room used for other Usciamo dal silenzio meetings I had
attended. The auditorium was crowded. At least 100 women and a handful of men filled the
seats or mingled in the aisles. More kept streaming in long after the discussion had started.
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The room was abuzz in conversation. As I was settling in my seat a woman I’d never met
before leaned towards me. A mournful look on her face, she declared: “things haven’t been
this bad since the 1970s.” A similar comment was made by Cristina, the introductory
speaker from Union’s press office and one of the organizers of Usciamo dal Silenzio.
Cristina described the fetal burial law as part of “the violence of the clerical attack by the
right, which is really cohesive. I don’t think I’ve ever seen the clerical hierarchies so lined
up… not even in the 1970s [was there] such oppression.”77 These comments speak to the
fact that in many ways Italian feminists had been caught off guard by the intensity and
success of the Catholic right, especially in matters of reproduction. With the failure of the
referenda to repeal divorce and abortion, the Vatican’s political influence had seemed on
the wane and the Church increasingly irrelevant.
The introductory speeches weaved together the fetal burial law, reproductive rights,
and the battle over the civil union legislation. A legal scholar asked whether one can “call a
closed option a choice… who has the freedom and the power to choose? Who has a right to
exist? For the church, yes, [woman] is reproductive. For politics, we are becoming
reproductive as far as the electoral body is concerned.”78 The organizers then invited the
center-left councilors who had voted for the amendment to explain themselves and to
discuss what could be done to remedy the situation. The debate centered on the nature of
what had happened, countering the notion of some council members who had voted for the
amendment that this was simply a technical matter. One of the councilors speaking to the
group said that that while the norm may hold “symbolic power,” in fact it was only a
change in how people were informed, not in substance: “we simply confirmed a procedure
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already in place.” The audience, including the leaders of the movement, forcefully, and
angrily, countered these arguments. Visibly frustrated they educated their representatives:
“we are not dealing with a technicality” all one has to do is read “the propaganda in the
newspapers from Formigoni,” the conservative Catholic governor of Lombardy, charged
one of the organizers. With Formigoni speaking of the “dignity of the fetus” this was a
question of “legal personhood,” which had not only “a strong symbolic value, but also a
practical one.” What the council members had voted for was “a choice that is not a choice.”
Susanna Camusso, one of the main organizers of Usciamo dal silenzio and secretary general
of the CGIL union in Lombardy,79 countered “I am not convinced that politics can be
differentiated into techniques and politics. I am not able to dissociate technique from
politics. Formigoni has one object: the fetus as person.” Her response was to “change the
terrain of the struggle” to the political project that she was championing of women’s
political representation rather than continue to just play defense: “women as subjects of
politics, it’s a subject that doesn’t exist anymore, a subject no longer a full-fledged subject,
but an object of reproduction.” Camusso argued that the left lacked
a culture of the values that are in play today. The values of life, death,
etcetera. These values are in the hands of the Church … These bourgeois
values, conservative, family, perbenismo [respectability], [we have] contested
them since the 1970s, they are still dangerous. … the battle on abortion and
divorce, and now we’re right back in it. We lack that big picture about which
ideas of society we want to further. We need to re-launch the values on which
we the left should be founded … and on which citizenship we live.
At the end of the meeting, an intercultural psychologist who provides pre-abortion
counseling to migrant women stated that the fetal burial change “has a symbolic and real
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impact on real lives and structures social relations in reproductive services. The embryo is a
person because funerals are only given to persons. We have lost the courage to say that the
embryo is not a person.” Following the meeting, Usciamo dal silenzio produced a press
release that charged:
Once again, women, who are the bearers of life into the world, are pushed back
into history, relegated to the reproductive role and, in those cases in which they
decide to terminate a pregnancy according to the procedures provided for by law
194, they are associated with death through the rite of burial, which is in the public
space, with an obviously punitive and guilt-inducing intent.
The Funeral for the Unfertilized Ovum
Viola and the collective she organized had not “lost the courage to say that the embryo was
not a person” and they set out to publically contest the fetal burial amendment. The growing
“imposition” of the embryo as subject was the catalyst. Participants wanted to challenge the
idea that the embryo deserves a funeral and they envisioned a protest that would ridicule the
very notion of the embryo’s personhood not only by giving it an over-the top funeral, but
also by anticipating the recognition of personhood even further to the unfertilized egg. The
protest, while explicitly directed at the fetal burial amendment, also reminded of efforts by
pro-life organizations over the previous decade to institute funerals and cemeteries, and
even to erect monuments, to “the children who were never born” (Laurenzi 1991).
The first organizing meeting for the mock funeral protest took place in the
headquarters of a women’s cooperative on the ground floor of an apartment building in a
hip area of downtown Milan.80 When I joined the group I realized that despite attending
Donne, Diritti, Salute and Usciamo dal silenzio meeting for a couple of months I didn’t
know anyone in the collective except for Viola. I sat next to her on the couch as she pulled
up the document she was still editing, and which would become the flyer for the protest. In
80
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a haze of cigarette smoke Viola shared her design of the logo for the event, which cleverly
morphed the regional clover-like logo of the region of Lombardy into a pad with wings;
instead of reading “Region of Lombardy” the text by the logo had been changed into
“Region of Sacristy”81 to underscore the rising power of the Catholic Church in the regional
government.
Viola read aloud a draft the flyer to be handed out at the protest. The flyer
announced a “new requirement” issued by the health administration offices for the women
of Lombardy, urging them to pick up “regulation sanitary pads for the collection of the
unfertilized ovum.” The pads would be blessed and buried; “transgressors will be
persecuted and prosecuted according to inquisition law.” Viola’s text equated the Governor
of Lombardy to a slave owner and the bodies of women in Lombardy with those of slaves:
“during slavery, landowners would rape female slaves and those born of those rapes were
considered property of the slave-owners. Today, in the year of the lord 2007, the feudal lord
of the Region of Sacristy considers himself owner of aborted fetuses on his territory and
enforces that they be considered as already-born.” The flyer called on women to fight back
against this form of slavery, which it defined as
not only a clear criminalization of abortion—already made difficult by the
increasing presence of conscientious objectors in the hospitals of the Region of
Sacristy—but also of the imposition on all women of the religious conviction of
Governor Formigoni. We don’t intend to tolerate this climate worthy of a theocratic
regime any longer.
To resist this imposition, Viola’s flyer called on participants to gather at the central
headquarters of the ASL, the health administration offices in Milan to turn in “our used
pads so that they be buried ‘with dignity.’” All women are invited “to participate, dressed
for mourning, and to bring their used pads (and condoms) to be turned in to the fetishists [a
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play on words on the Italian “feti”(fetuses) and the word “fetiscisti” (fetishists)] of the
Region of Sacristy.”
The women of the collective liked the flyer. Some, however, expressed reservations
about having to save their pads for a couple of weeks (“I live in a small apartment, my dog
will get into them!” worried one participant). The idea, however, was appealing to some,
such as a university student who thought that it would be like a “stink bomb,” a bomb made
of menstrual blood, maybe even one that included a spring so that it would pop up. Other
participants found the thought of saving up their pads for the month or so until the protest
disgusting and inconvenient. Ideas bounced around, until the main concept was decided: a
mock funeral procession for the unfertilized egg, symbolized by a large bloody menstrual
pad. A discussion ensued as to whether to include men, and it was finally agreed that they
should march in the back.82
The decision that men should march separately from and behind women cost the
group the participation of younger women involved in a Milanese centro sociale (social
center) started by students in an abandoned theater at the periphery of Milan. One of the
members of the center participated in the cultural mediation training group I audited. I also
met other members who came to interview Nilde at the consultorio about her history of
political activism in the Resistance and in women’s issues. These young politically engaged
activists had no patience for what they saw as a dogmatic, separatist, and old-style
feminism. They organized their own, much larger protest for the morning of Women’s Day.
Thousands of students and members of political collectives participated calling in their
speeches, through a functioning loudspeaker, for self-determination in matters of sexuality,
bemoaning the high rates of conscientious objection, calling the fetal burial law “shameful,”
82
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and criticizing the moral politics of the Church as medieval.83 These activists did not
participate in the more institutional and older political activism of Usciamo dal silenzio and
even of Donne, Diritti, Salute (one group was, however, interested in the previous
generation of feminists, coming to interview Nilde about her history in the resistance and in
the feminist movement). At that protest, the moral politics of life and the family came under
attack in the speeches of members of a social center, a political collective, and of students.
Their demands were for individual rights and self-determination for all. Topping the van at
the front of the protest was a priestly figure covered in a giant condom.
Despite the mock funeral protest and other, more institutional, forms of political and
legal resistance, the regulation on fetal burial was not overturned. In June, months after its
initial discussions, the issue reemerged as a topic of discussion at the Donne, Diritti, Salute
meetings. Donne, Diritti, Salute did research through contacts in health services about
whether and how the law was being implemented, finding that there were no real
guidelines, that products of conception were being thrown down the drain. Carolina
reported that “they are accumulating in all the hospitals.” My fieldnotes from these
meetings document the gruesome discussions of three-dimensional unborn biological
“waste” bundled up with severed legs and other human waste to be “dismantled” and
incinerated, and of embryos being disposed of with bandages.84 This “macabre” regulation
and discussion, as Franca described it, reflected the intent of the amendment to closely
associate abortion with the death and dismemberment of already-born human bodies. Lynn
Morgan’s research on the constitution of the status of fetuses and embryos and on their
disposal (2002, 2009).
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Digital recording, student march, March 8, 2007.
Fieldnote, June 18, 2007.
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Pressure from women’s groups and the libertarian Partito Radicale brought an
important change: rather than having to fill out a form of “informed consent” about burial
options, the information would be hanging on a bulletin board in hospital foyers. While this
was an improvement, Daniela said “the problem was, it’s not enough for us that they hang it
on the bulletin board.” Michela, a young woman who rarely participated in the meetings,
jumped in “they need to eliminate this rule, throw away this nastiness.” The struggle was to
return to a situation in which women could ask but it would not be imposed upon them.
Franca agreed that the goal should be to go back to the time when the burial code didn’t
“impose the fetus on you,” but the center-left opposition in the Regional Council lacked the
votes.85
Participants had heard through their contacts in the hospitals that there were still
instances when women were confronted with this question. Carolina reported the story of a
migrant woman she assisted in her role as a cultural mediator who had been faced with the
question of whether to undertake the burial of the fetus after an abortion, only to find out
that there was a 50 euro fee that she could not afford. In response, Daniela wrote an op-ed
for the Communist paper Liberazione in the voice of the migrant woman. The pressure
from Donne, Diritti, Salute, Usciamo dal silenzio, and the Partito Radicale finally extracted
a promise that the less invasive application of the law would be implemented and verified
and that women would not have to fill out individual forms regarding fetal burial. The
combined efforts of different networks and groups active in reproductive rights issues had
successfully pushed back against this policy, in the process revealing the diversity and
fractures of the movement. The “us” in feminism that Daniela sought to recuperate
remained elusive. The Region’s political strategy of undermining reproductive rights,
85
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meanwhile, continued to intervene in social and health services. In 2008, the Regional
Council of Lombardy approved legislation that requires social service providers to protect
motherhood and unborn life from the moment of conception (Regione Lombardia 2008).
Embryo Subjects of the Post-Welfare State
The governing and disciplining of reproduction in Italy is an important dimension of
an emerging moralized neoliberal governmentality. The politics of reproduction are
particularly suited to and effective at moralizing and legitimizing political change, as
anthropologists Susan Gal and Gail Kligman (2000) have argued with reference to the postsocialist context. Analysis of the politics of reproduction should encompass understanding
of how policy shapes and affects reproductive matters, but also “how the political process
itself is shaped through the discussion and control of reproduction” (Gal and Kligman
2000:17). In Italy, the politics of reproduction and family-making represent an important
terrain over which the role of the State is being renegotiated and redefined, and its retreat
from other areas of welfare responsibility legitimated. The disciplining of assisted
reproduction, abortion, and even contraception, enables the State to assert responsibility for
the welfare of the unborn at the same time that it devolves the provision of welfare to civil
society, the private sector, and ultimately families.
One of the terms on which the embryo’s rights are asserted that resonates across the
Catholic/leftist and feminist divide concerns the need for the state to safeguard assisted
reproduction and the gametes and fertilized eggs and embryos that it makes available, from
commodification and the market. The State’s intervention to protect the embryo and
recognize its rights, defines the realm of reproduction and “life” as a moral exception to the
logics of deregulation just as health care and other welfare protections are in the process of
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being deregulated. The extension of the state’s protection of the “precarious” embryo, the
inclusion of the embryo as “one of us,” legitimates neoliberal policies of deregulation that
expose the already-born to the market.
The politics of reproduction and “life” in contemporary Italy are emerging in the
context of a broader political project reshaping the role of the State through the
moralization of society and the family. In this new social model of active citizenship and
civil society, social cohesion is reframed to be a result of cultural, social, and ultimately
moral interventions rather than economic and political justice. With the emergence of the
embryo-subject, women’s reproductive choices are qualified and restricted in the name of
the rights of the embryo at a time when women’s reproduction is already the object of
intense expert and moral scrutiny because of anxieties over low fertility rates.
Transformations in the social contract reconfigure the relationship between citizens
and the state and the status and rights of subjects (Gal and Kligman 2000; Holc 2004;
Turner 2001). Women’s subjecthood is already qualified under liberalism because of
women’s reproductive roles (McLaren 2002: 74-46; Ruhl 2002). As the unborn as a
competing subject gains ground through medical and political technologies, women’s rights
transfer to the embryo and the fetus. Yet, the notion that the fetus is a right-bearing subject
makes no sense from a liberal perspective because “in liberal theory, rights are irretrievably
tied with obligations” (Ruhl 2002: 39). Since the unborn subject cannot possibly be
considered to fulfill any obligations of subjecthood and citizenship,
what we witness in this description of pregnancy is not two liberal subjects in one
body, but rather one liberal subject in two bodies. The pregnant woman has all of
the obligations of a ‘normal’ or typical subject but none of the rights. The fetus, on
the other hand, has all of the rights of a typical liberal subject but none of the
obligations. A strange situation indeed (Ruhl 2002: 39).
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Women’s compromised role as a liberal subject holds powerful implications for
reproductive politics because “the law, the institution most likely to be called upon to
defend (or curtail) this freedom, is based on liberal principles” (2002: 38). Italian feminists
have argued against looking to the state for women’s liberation for over three decades
because of these and other contradictions. However, confronted with a steady erosion of
rights guided by the politics of the Catholic Church, feminists today find themselves
defending an abortion law that represents a compromise that many had criticized three
decades prior. In addition, some feminists who had seen engagement with the law as
inherently self-defeating for women, had changed their minds in the face of the biopolitics
at play in the new millennium.
The granting to the unborn of rights without obligations makes sense in the moral
neoliberal context where its status as “the weakest subject” marks it as uniquely deserving
of state protection and welfare. A new welfare model that calls upon Italian citizens to
make themselves into autonomous “active citizens” is moralized through appeals to the
“respect for life” and to the “family” (Ministero del Lavoro, della Salute e delle Politiche
Sociali 2008). The unborn, cast as the “weakest subject” and even “the foremost among the
precari” (Schoepflin 2012), represents the “ideal citizen” that a neoliberal state can afford
to recognize—apolitical, non-racialized, non-gendered, appropriately dependent.86 The
embryo as an “icon of life” (Morgan 2009) in need of protection from doctors, women, and
the market is well-suited to moralize new logics of welfare and new configurations of social
citizenship.
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See Holc 2005 for a similar argument on the politics of unborn citizenship in Poland.
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Conclusion
This chapter traced the rise of the embryo through policies and discourses that have
asserted its subjecthood and personhood, and examined the terms by which this assertion
has been contested by feminist groups in a region of Italy closely associated with
conservative Catholic politics. Feminist responses to the emerging politics of reproduction
in Italy attempt to “hold together” various dimensions of the moral politics of reproduction
in contemporary Italy even as they struggle to find a unified response. Despite differences
in strategies and politics, however, Milanese feminist groups were at their most unified and
galvanized when reproductive rights were put into question by a further recognition of the
personhood or subjecthood of the embryo. The awarding of subjecthood to the embryo in
the first article of the 2004 ART law remained a highly contested issue across the
movement that managed to bring together, at least temporarily, various feminist groups and
convinced many feminists, including those whose activism goes back to the 1970s, that
engagement with politics is vital. While the fetal burial amendment had once again
underscored the power of policies, no matter how obscure, to create or negate personhood,
subjecthood, and citizenship, Donne, Diritti, Salute seemed alone in its focus on regional
health care policy as an important means through which reproductive rights were regulated.
The struggle against more and less visible erosions of reproductive services ultimately
centered around the reassertion of women as subjects, an assertion made harder to negotiate
in the midst of the reconfiguration of the relationship between citizens and the post-welfare
state.

130

CHAPTER 4
“THE FAMILY GROWS, ITALY GROWS”: THE “CULTURAL LEAP” TO
THE POLITICAL STAGE
Experience teaches us that the family is the solid base
upon which all of society rests.
Pope Benedict XVI, 20081
It’s time to think in terms of the family
Rosy Bindi, National Conference on the
Family, May 2007
Introduction
In May of 2007, Prime Minister Romano Prodi participated in a Q&A session at
the First National Conference on the Family. After sitting through two days of political
speeches and scholarly panels, I still watched with the excitement of a political junky as
the Prime Minister took the stage. Ten families were invited to pose a question to the
Prime Minister. The first question went to the Vivarelli, a family with six children.
After enumerating their struggles and declaring the family’s faith in god, Giovanna
Vivarelli asked whether the Prodi government would address the problem of high utility
costs for large families.2 Prodi assured the couple the issue was of concern to him and
proceed to outline his center-left coalition’s approach to family policy. He highlighted
efforts to increase incomes and referred to the government’s budget, which set aside €3
billion to support family policies. However, he also acknowledged that these efforts
1

“L’esperienza insegna che la famiglia è lo zoccolo solido sul quale poggia l’intera società” la
Repubblica.it, “Il Papa a Lourdes: ‘I vescovi accettino la messa in latino,’” September 15, 2008,
http://www.repubblica.it/2008/07/sezioni/esteri/benedetto-xvi-23/lourdes-14set/lourdes-14set.html
2
Large families are penalized by an energy saving incentive that increases the price of energy beyond a
certain threshold of consumption.
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“are not sufficient, obviously. But, finally, they are the beginning of the inversion of the
previous course.” Prime Minister Prodi then turned reflective, asking the audience to
allow him to draw upon his personal “family experience”:
It’s something that my father used to say many, many years ago. I am the eighth
of nine children and he, I remember it very well, used to say: “except for the
newspaper, all the expenses of a famiglia numerosa (large family) multiply.”
Very simple, no? It was something of extreme simplicity. Then he would bury
himself in the newspaper, no? Finally, the problem of the family has blown up.
But still I don’t forget that 26-27 years ago there were still the titles in the
newspapers: “Italians … like rabbits” and the youth doesn’t know this. This is
what they used to say in Italy. There is then the problem that breaking out of this
has not been a simple problem. Now there is finally an opening of this kind, also
because the birth rate has declined to almost the lowest levels in the world. Only
in Russia and in other countries, and Japan, barely, barely, barely, but certainly
we are at very low levels. It’s clear, then, that finally, a discourse on [inaudible]
etcetera also coincides with the national interest. I say finally because now there
is more ease, more possibility, there is more push … to make the decisions that
we need.3
Prodi’s personal anecdote captures key elements of the contradictory politics
and discourse on the family in Italy: The “problem of the family” has “not been a
simple problem” to assert. Even in the context of a new legitimacy buttressed by a
decade-long discourse on Italy’s demographic problems (see Krause 2001, 2006),
family politics remain a delicate subject. I was reminded of this as I noticed some
discrepancies between my recording of Prodi’s off-the-cuff, personal remarks on the
Italian family and the official transcript published as part of the conference proceedings.
Most of the differences can be attributed to the polishing of spoken speech into a more
coherent text. However, one significant disparity stood out. The official transcript does
not include Prodi’s comment that, “finally, a discourse on …. also coincidences with
national the national interest.” That this part of his talk would be omitted, despite it

3

Prodi’s quote is drawn from digital recording by the author and official conference proceedings by the
Dipartimento per le Politiche della Famiglia 2007.
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being immediately reported in the media,4 is unlikely to be an oversight. The elision of
the national reference suggests that while the family has gained legitimacy as an object
of political intervention, this is a delicate legitimacy that depends, in part, on its
distance from any nationalist echoes of fascist policies.
What do the politics of the family reveal about emerging citizenship projects in
Italy, and by implication, in the Eurozone? In this chapter, I examine policies and
discourses that make possible this “cultural leap” of the heteronormative family to the
center of the political stage and the struggles of those opposed to it to articulate
alternatives. The terms of a new social contract are so tightly coupled to the reassertion
of the family that even feminist actors historically opposed to the moral project of the
family and to neoliberalism struggle to find the terms to articulate their positions.
A convergence of factors, including demographic anxiety, the dismantling of the
social safety net, and the resurgence of Catholic influence on social issues in Italy, all
contribute to the family “blowing up” onto the political stage. In this chapter I trace this
coalescing of a confident, explicit, and legitimized message on the family’s social role.
As the family’s political role solidifies, so do its heteronormative boundaries. I draw on
ethnographic research with feminist groups in Milan to examine counter-discourses and
projects critical of moral familism. The struggle of women engaged in feminist politics
against reproductive and family politics reminds that, while increasingly mainstream,
the moral discourse on the traditional family is contested in Italian society. It also
reveals the difficulty in articulating an alternative vision of the social and its welfare as
4

See for example: “Prodi alla Conferenza della Famiglia. Tesoretto per anziani e nuclei numerosi,” which
opens with: “Today the family coincides with the national interest”
http://www.repubblica.it/2007/05/sezioni/politica/coppie-fatto-9/famiglia-firenze/famiglia-firenze.html,
la Repubblica.it, May 26, 2007.
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the language of social solidarity, cohesion, reciprocity and affect has become entangled
with the moral economy of welfare in neoliberal times (see also Muehlebach 2009,
2012). Finally, I conclude by examining the “National Plan for the Family,” an expert
proposal on family policies approved by the Italian government in 2012. In calling for a
“citizenship of the family,” the program confirms the heterosexual, married, and
reproductive family as the centerpiece of the new welfare model and underscores the
implications of the moral remaking of the terms of the social contract and of citizenship.
Neoliberalism and Moral Familism
Yesterday’s stigma of famiglie numerose, of Italians reproducing like out-ofcontrol rabbits, contrasts with today’s hand-wringing over figli unici (only children) and
with the pervasiveness of discourses and policies aimed at encouraging reproduction.
What is considered rational, responsible family-making might have reversed from the
time when Italians were considered too fertile, but the centrality of reproductive and
family-making practices to Italian identity, politics, and, increasingly, social citizenship,
endures. For decades, a number of obstacles prevented explicit government
interventions in family-making. The memory of fascist pronatalist policies (Krause
2001, 2006; Horn 1994), the lingering stigma attached to “excessive” reproduction and
backward familism (Krause 2006) indexed by Prodi, and the first Republic’s political
and cultural Catholic-Communist divide (Kertzer 1980; Ginsborg 2003; Shore 1990),
all contributed to delimiting explicit family politics in Italy. As recently as the 1990s,
demographic concerns were still politically dangerous territory making possible only a
discursive “sneaky pronatalism” (Krause 2001). In retrospect, this sneaky pronatalism
paved the way for increasingly more explicit interventions beginning in the early 2000s
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(Krause and Marchesi 2007). Since then, as Prime Minister Prodi so vividly proclaimed,
“the problem of the family” has “finally” “blown up” onto the political stage. The Prime
Minister’s personal anecdote on the family and its reproduction lays bare the legitimacy
that demographic alarmism today affords pronatalist and profamily politics and the way
it has reversed previous framings. The remaking of the social state, in turn, opens up
new possibilities for interventions in the family in the name of supporting the costs of
reproduction.
The entwined nature of the new politics of the family and the emergence of a
new welfare model is evident in the way another pathologizing discourse concerning the
Italian family is giving way. For decades a negative association has adhered to the
Italian family, popularized by the influential work of Edward Banfield’s 1958 The
Moral Basis of a Backward Society. Banfield coined the term “amoral familism” to
describe the family-oriented social strategies of southern Italian villagers, which he
characterized as incompatible with civil society and thus democracy.5 The term has
stuck in Italy, where it is not an uncommon reference in discussions of the “problem” of
the Italian family and of Italian society.6 Through the first decade of the new
millennium, Italians’ family-making practices continued to be lamented by experts.
Italian demographers warned in increasingly alarmist tones of the upcoming crisis of
pension and of the disappearance of Italians (Krause 2001; 2006). Even in the context
5

See Sydel Silverman 1968 article “Agricultural Organization, Social Structure, and Values in Italy:
Amoral Familism Reconsidered” for a critique of Banfield’s thesis that inverts the causality of his
argument. Silverman argues that the strategies described by Banfield are a result rather than the cause of
the economic, political and social conditions he describes. Silverman argues that explanations should
focus on the region’s agricultural system rather than family structures.
6
See, for example, a New York Times Op-Ed, translated from the original Italian, titled “How Italy is
Adjusting,” on the response of Italians to the economic crisis: “As so often happens in Italy, anxiety
manifests itself in individualistic survival strategies. People turn away from government and broader
society, fall back on family and clan loyalties and the informal sector. Sociologists call the result “amoral
familism,” a term Edward C. Banfield coined in the 1950s” (Rastello and Parola 2011).
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of low fertility, the “problem” of “too much family” rather than too little has come
under scrutiny. The relatively late departure of children from the family home (see
Santarelli and Cottone 2009) has been blamed as a cause of Italy’s low birth rates (Livi
Bacci 2001). Demographer Massimo Livi Bacci has diagnosed this pathology of the
Italian family as “la sindrome del ritardo” or “postponement syndrome” (Livi Bacci
2001:147, see also Sgritta 2003:65 cited in Krause and Marchesi 2007). The
phenomenon of the mammoni, adult children who linger at home well into adulthood,
was cause for international derision in the early 2000s.7 In the fall of 2007, in the
context of presenting the center-left Prodi government’s budget, then Minister of the
Economy Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa spoke dismissively of young Italians as
bamboccioni, overgrown and spoiled children. The Minister declared that in introducing
rental subsidies for young adults “we are sending the bamboccioni out of the house. …
We provide an incentive to leave the home for young adults who stay with their parents,
do not get married, and do not become autonomous. It’s an important idea.”8 Even the
residential proximity between parents and adult children who moved out of the parental
home has been identified as indicative of “too much family” and the unwillingness of
Italian youth to be flexible workers.
An inversion in this discourse seems in the works in the face of economic crisis
and of a welfare model increasingly oriented toward and dependent upon the family.
The problem of “too much family” represents a solution to Italy’s welfare problems, a
7

See for example, articles by the Guardian: ‘Why Italy’s mamma’s boys can’t cut the ties,’ January 20,
2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/lifeandstyle/2010/jan/20/italys-mamma-boys-cant-cut-ties, the BBC:
‘Italians ‘slow to leave the nest,’ February 1, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4227675.stm, and
the CBS 60 minutes segment on ‘mammoni’ that aired in March 2001 (I am grateful to Elizabeth Krause
for this reference).
8
“Mandiamo i bamboccioni fuori casa. Padoa Schioppa: con la Finanziaria misure che consentiranno ai
giovani di affrancarsi dai genitori. October 4, 2007,
http://www.corriere.it/politica/07_ottobre_04/padoa_bamboccioni.shtml
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way to maintain social cohesion. Recent family policy proposals identify kinship ties as
a resource to be supported as opposed to a “pathology” to be cured (Ministero del
Lavoro, della Salute, e delle Politiche Sociali 2009; Presidenza del Consiglio dei
Ministri 2012). A 2012 statistical survey, titled Crisis: Living Together, Living Better
(Crisi: Vivere insieme, vivere meglio),9 shows that one third of Italians live with their
mother, while over 40% live no more than 30 minutes’ distance by foot. This is not a
new finding; what is new is the positive interpretation. In reflecting on the study’s
findings, the president of the study’s sponsor, the agricultural association Coldiretti,
notes that
often, the structure of the Italian family in general, and of the rural one in
particular, is considered outdated while in fact it has proven itself fundamental to
keeping many citizens from plunging into the difficulty of the crisis… the
solidarity among the generations upon which is based the family enterprise is a
winning model for living and being well together, and not a sign of social and
cultural backwardness as many insist on arguing.10
Sociological and demographic experts advising policy-makers now advocate
supporting the proximity of family members. The National Plan for the Family,
discussed below, calls for housing incentives that support “growing” and extended
families, and the residential closeness of adult children and their elderly parents
(Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri 2012: 10). Catholic sociologists and politicians
argue that the time has come for a citizenship of the family in which the state “finally”
recognizes citizens not simply as individuals but as belonging in meaningful affective

9

The survey was run conjunctively by Censis (Centro Studi Investimenti Sociali, Center for the Study of
Social Investment), a research institute focused on socio-economic issues, and Coldiretti (Confederazione
Nazionale Coltivatori Diretti, National Confederation of Direct Cultivators), a Catholic association
representing Italian farmers, http://www2.coldiretti.it/News/Pagine/731---19-Settembre-2012.aspx.
10
The official summary of the survey’s finding attributes these changes to two factors: economic crisis
and the emergence of a new welfare in which the family is the primary subject “that operates as provider
of services and safeguards for its members who need it.” http://www2.coldiretti.it/News/Pagine/731---19Settembre-2012.aspx.
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and social relationships (Donati 2007; Belardinelli 2005). Central to this moral order is
the emergence of homo relationalis alongside homo oeconomicus (Muehlebach 2009:
502). This value-oriented approach, which is not limited to Italy but is a feature of a
new articulation of neoliberalism in the post-Washington consensus moment,
recognizes social relations as an important component of the engine of social capital.
The emphasis on values and social relationships “finds particular expressions in Italy,”
argues Muehlebach, at “the intersections of the EU’s Third Wayism11with postWashington consensus economic theory” and with a discourse on society “as a social
panacea … rendered in highly moralized registers that spring directly from the
country’s Catholic and communist tradition” (2009: 503). As a result, the “Italian
neoliberal welfare society” is not driven “by mere utilitarian calculation and
instrumentality but by compassion and solidarity, not by mere market logics but by
moral logics. This neoliberalism entails a model of man not only as homo oeconomicus
but as homo relationalis. The market neo-liberal, in other words, is accompanied by
what one might call a moral neoliberal” (2009: 499). The language of solidarity that
characterizes neoliberal welfare in Italy appeals to both left and right, enabling the
“suturing of incommensurables” into “a single moral order” (Muehlebach 2009: 499,
495). Progressives in Italy participate in this suturing of the rips in the safety net of the
social state while interpreting their actions as oppositional. According to Muehlebach,
they engage in a kind of forced “ventriloquism” of moral neoliberal solidarity, which
has appropriated the values and language of solidarity of the left.

11

Most notably enshrined in the 2000 Lisbon Strategy, which calls for “developing an active and
dynamic welfare state.” Presidency Conclusions. Lisbon European Council
23 and 24 March 2000, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/00100r1.en0.htm.
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However, as I show in this chapter, Italian moral neoliberalism is not simply
centered on broad notion of homo relationalis. An emerging neoliberal welfare model
in Italy explicitly identifies the heteronormative, reproductive family as the natural and
ineludible generator of solidarity and social cohesion. Here I depart from Muehlebach’s
argument, which sees the discourse on the family as rhetorical, “a register.” The family,
according to Muehlebach, is residual in the neoliberal welfare, a waning institution that
needs to be harnessed into the private third sector (2007: 507). This represents “a core
aim of the welfare society—to redistribute affect away from dwindling forms of familial
care toward the nonprofit and voluntary sector and thus to privatize the private sphere,
as it were” (Muehlbach 2007: 507). In so doing it performs a “magical trick” by making
the new, privatized welfare model “seem inspired and grounded in anticapitalist logics”
(2009: 507). I show in this chapter that the family’s role in legitimizing the moral
neoliberalization of care cannot be so quickly dismissed. While it is true that the work
the family performs in moralizing neoliberalism is discursive and that in reality the
family as measured by the statistics of marriage, divorce, and single-person families
seems on its way out.12 However, kinship ties in Italy remain close (Santarelli and
Cottone 2009). In the time of economic crisis, the Italian family’s role as “social shockabsorber” becomes all the more significant.
Additionally, when the context of demographic alarmism and of Catholic
resurgence in matters of reproduction and the family are considered, the role of the
family in the remaking of the social contract emerges as anything but residual. Asserted
as the ultimate model and source of social reproduction, solidarity and cohesion, and as
12

See the statistics on the family elaborated by the Italian Statistical Institute, Istat, for Italy’s 150th
celebrations “L’Italia in 150 anni. Sommario di statistiche storiche 1861-2010.” Chapter 3, “Families.”
http://www3.istat.it/dati/catalogo/20120118_00/cap_3.pdf.
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I show in chapter 6, even of Italian identity, the family is central both discursively and
materially to the Italian moral neoliberalism that Muehlebach describes.
Concerns with fostering social cohesion and social solidarity, which gain
traction at the turn of the new millennium in the midst of transformations of the social
state, become problems to be addressed beginning with the family. The reframing of the
subjects of social citizenship in relational terms in Italy is tied to the family as the basis
of solidarity and welfare. This trend underscores the centrality of kinship and
reproduction, and thus of gender and sexuality, to the profound transformations
investing European states. The demographic convergence of low fertility rates and high
immigration legitimizes the political focus on the family. A shrinking welfare state
increasingly shifts its responsibilities onto the family at the same time as the family is
discovered as the primary source of social cohesion.
The turn toward the family as a solution to the crisis of the welfare state is not
limited to Italy. Despite widespread leftwing and feminist appeals to the European
Union as a source of modernization and secularism for Italy, the Eurozone is also
rediscovering families in the midst of demographic change and of transformations in the
social state. Partnership with an emerging European Alliance for Families was
announced by the Prodi government at the Conference on the Family.13 Today, the
European Economic and Social Committee “firmly supports the idea of making 2014
the European Year for Families.”14 In the UK, Prime Minister David Cameron places
the family “right at the top of our agenda”: “to those who say that government should
13

http://www.familyplatform.eu/; http://ec.europa.eu/social/families/index.cfm. The European Alliance
for Families describes itself as “the European Commission’s official resource for family policy news,
events and good practices from across Europe.”
14
“EESC opinion: Family policy and demographic change,” http://www.eesc.europa.eu/?i=portal.en.socopinions.14900.
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forget about parenting and families and focus on the big, gritty issues, I'd say these are
the big, gritty issues. Families don't just shape us as individuals, they make a stronger
society. That's why supporting families is right at the top of our agenda – and I'm going
to make sure it stays that way.”15 At stake in these discourses are questions about the
relationship between individual rights and the terms of social citizenship, and ultimately
ideas about the nature of society itself.
The “Family Grows, Italy Grows:” The First National Conference on the Family
Prime Minister Romano Prodi’s off-the-cuff musings about his own large
family-of-origin capped the three-day first Government Conference on the Family. For
the first time since the fascist period, the family became an explicit and legitimate
object of political attention. Nearly the entire cabinet participated along with the Prime
Minister in an institutional display that at once acknowledged the family’s new-found
legitimacy as a political subject and legitimized the urgency and importance of
governing the family. The conference arrived on the heels of a hot spring of contested
politics on reproduction and the family: the fetal burial amendment in Lombardy, a
legislative proposal granting some recognition to civil unions, and, only two weeks
prior to the opening of the conference, the hugely successful Family Day protest
organized by conservative Catholic politicians and associations, with support from the
Vatican, in response to the civil union proposal.
By the time official ceremonies marked the opening of the Conference on the
Family its organizer, Minister of Family Policies Rosy Bindi, had for months been the
target of an intense backlash from the Catholic right. More recently, she had come
15

“Parenting lessons: this is not the nanny state, says David Cameron,” The Guardian,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/society/2012/may/18/parenting-lessons-not-nanny-state-davidcameron?INTCMP=ILCNETTXT3487, May 18, 2012.
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under attack from the left as well. Bindi’s involvement as co-author of a proposal to
recognize civil unions had set off the hostility of the teocons, a term used to refer to
conservative Catholic politicians.16 Despite her Catholic bona fide being wellestablished—she is widely referred to as “a lay nun” and an urban legend has it that she
lives in a monastery in Rome17—the civil union proposal was treated by Catholic
politicians and by the Vatican as a direct attack on the “traditional family.” The
Minister reacted to the backlash by continuously reassuring that civil unions were not
the same as marriage, that the “natural family” is founded on marriage, and, eventually,
by very publically stating her exclusion of associations representing gay and lesbian
families from the Conference on the Family.18 In an interview with a Catholic
newspaper she made public her response to gay rights organizations that had requested
to participate in the conference: “I answered with serenity that I won’t invite them
because this is a Conference on the Family, the one that is founded on art. 29 [of the
Italian Constitution], founded on marriage.”19
In protest, the Minister for Solidarity, Paolo Ferrero, canceled his participation
in the conference (Buzzanca 2007). Prominent scholarly figures who had been
scheduled to participate, including two of Italy’s prominent leftist sociologists of the
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The term, widely used in media coverage of “ethical issues” such as assisted reproduction to refer to
the Catholic Church friendly positions of conservative Catholic politicians, is, according to the Italian
dictionary Treccani, derived from the English “theocon” (see, “teocon,” Treccani.it L’Enciclopedia
italiana, http://www.treccani.it/vocabolario/tag/teocon/). The term finds its opposite in “teodem,” a term
used to describe politicians, such as Minister Bindi, who take conservative Catholic ethical positions,
despite being in the center-left (see, “teodem,” Treccani.it L’Enciclopedia italiana,
http://www.treccani.it/vocabolario/teodem/).
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“La Bindi sul ring: io, il sesso, i gay combatto e nessuno mi rottamerà,” Repubblica.it, July 21, 2012,
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family, Chiara Saraceno and Marzio Barbagli, withdrew their participation in protest.
Barbagli and Saraceno said in interviews that they could not participate in a conference
that explicitly excluded an entire group of people. Moreover, they disagreed with the
government’s definition of the family. Barbagli noted that “for a sociologist, the family
is not that which is defined by law. There are no clear distinctions between what is and
isn’t a family. Any time there are ties of solidarity among people, whether they be of the
same sex or not, and independently of their numbers, it’s a family.”20 In a revelation
that underscores the exclusionary and intensifying politics of the family in Italy
Barbagli also added: “I was thrown out as director of the Osservatorio sulla famiglia
(Family Observatory) by the center-right government’s Minister of Welfare, Maroni.
And with me was excluded Chiara Saraceno. The reason: we focused on ‘irregular
families.’”21 The decision to publicly exclude “unnatural” families—family forms other
than the “natural family” recognized by the Constitution—from representation in this
institutional setting caused significant controversy. The exclusion of unmarried and
same-sex families from the National Conference on the Family dogged the conference
proceedings through high-profile desertions, protest speeches, and media coverage of
the issue. A group of women who identified themselves as being involved in social
services (nel sociale) worried about whether the conference was going to be a personal
failure for Bindi because of all the desertions.22 The National Conference on the Family

20
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became an institutional stage on which played out some of the main themes,
contradictions, and tensions of the politics of the family in Italy.
While these controversies make clear that the politics of the family in Italy are
the object of political struggle, the conference stands as a prime example of the
ascendance of the institutional legitimacy of family and pronatalist politics. This
ascendance has been swift: the explicit nature of policies on the family and reproduction
has intensified over the space of just a few years, the outcome of two decades of
demographic alarmism over Italy’s low fertility (Krause 2001). Just three years prior to
the first National Conference on the Family Rosy Bindi had been involved in organizing
a conference on the family for the Margherita Party, at the time in the opposition
(Krause and Marchesi 2007). At that earlier conference in 2004, called “Let’s Raise the
Family!” the question of the family was treated gingerly; cautiousness and an ethos of
inclusiveness seemed to predominate. Speakers did not attempt to define the family,
referring to “families” instead (Krause and Marchesi 2007). In contrast, the public
pronatalist and pro-family orientation of the 2007 National Conference on the Family
marks a significant shift in Italian political discourse, which has since continued to
move in the direction of explicitly privileging the heteronormative family in both
symbolic and material ways. Ever more explicit assertions and definitions of what and
who is family accompany its rise to the status of privileged political subject. A project
that cloaks itself in the rhetoric of social solidarity and social cohesion is in fact
increasingly built upon systematic exclusions.
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The Conference
I arrived in Florence on the first day of the conference and hurriedly tried to find
my way from the train station through throngs of tourists, dampened by unseasonably
hot and muggy weather. It was a relief to arrive at the air-conditioned conference center.
After going through a security check that included metal detectors, I checked in and was
given a messenger bag emblazoned with the official logo and stocked with supportive
materials. These included a booklet and CD of statistics on the family specifically
elaborated for the conference by Italy’s statistical institute, Istat, and a booklet based on
an interview with Minister of Family Policies Rosy Bindi about her Catholic-informed
positions on the family. I valued the conference messenger bag because of its precious
research cargo. However, as soon as I would leave the Conference Center grounds I
would find myself turn the bag so that the logo was facing inward. I was embarrassed to
be identified as a participant lest people assumed that I identified with the exclusionary
definition of the family that had come to mark the first National Conference on the
Family. Other participants in the conference included representatives of associations
working nel sociale (in the social), the constellation of third sector associations that
provide social services in contemporary Italy, sociologists and demographers, local
administrators and politicians. National politicians made an appearance over the three
days of the conference.
In the conference messenger bag was also a picture book titled La storia della
famiglia in immagini (“The History of the Family in Images”), which in its portrayal of
a hundred years of Italian families evoked all the complexities of the politics of the
family in Italy: the tensions between nostalgia and modernity, the gender roles that
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undergirded the patriarchal family, the striking decline in numbers of children over the
decades. The book is a portrait of the profound changes investing families in Italy,
changes that simultaneously support the notion that the family is in crisis and in need of
intervention and remind of its historical and social nature, contradicting arguments
about its essential nature.
While evocative, the book and its images cannot capture the complexity of the
history of kinship relationships and of the family in Italy. The term “family”
encompasses a very different set of social relations today than it did 150 years ago. The
first census of Italy’s population, taken ten years after unification in 1861, used a broad
definition of family that encompassed all who shared food together and warmed
themselves around the “hearth,” servants, guests, and roomers included.23 The practice
of sending children to wetnurses and the forced removal of illegitimate children from
their mothers challenges romantic notions of natural and warm relationships among
members of families past (Krause 2001, 2005; Kertzer 1993).
The stage of the conference main auditorium was framed by graphics of
colorful, stylized figures symbolizing affective and care-taking relationships: two
figures holding hands, one of them in a wheelchair, a heterosexual couple with their
arms around each other, a grandfatherly figure with a cane walking with a child, a father
carrying a young child on his shoulders, and a pregnant woman. The logo of the
conference depicted a heterosexual family with two children and a third one on the way,
and one of the most prominent figures was that of a pregnant woman in profile.. Above
this “solidarity tableau,” these same figures were projected on a large screen when the
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L’Italia in 150 anni. Sommario di statistiche storiche 1861-2010. Chapter 3, “Families.”
http://www3.istat.it/dati/catalogo/20120118_00/cap_3.pdf.
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conference was not in session. These visual representations of solidarity as background
for a conference on the family marked by the slogan “The Family Grows, Italy Grows,”
highlight the two main roles assigned to the family in contemporary Italy: to reproduce
the nation biologically and to generate a more efficient social solidarity and welfare via
personal relationships of care. The empowerment of the family toward these aims is a
political project shared across the political spectrum.
The logo of the Conference on the Family is not statistically representative of
the Italian family. In 2010, women in Italy had an average of 1.40 children (Istat 2010:
2). Only a tenth of Italian couples with children have three or more (De Luca 2010).
The aim of the conference, however, was not representation but aspiration. By bringing
together politicians and experts, Minister Bindi sought to identify effective policies that
would make both the family and Italy “grow” into the larger family with three children
that demographers identify as the way out of Italy’s low fertility issues.
Framed by the pronatalist slogan “The Family Grows, Italy Grows,” and the
logo of the couple with (almost) three children, and by the large profile drawing of a
pregnant woman on repeat on the screen, speakers began to assemble around the stage.
They were aided by a number of young attractive women dressed in yellow, with
matching hair bows. These assistants helped speakers settle, answered questions, and
once the talks got started, brought them water. Even as the conference balanced its
pronatalism and pro-familism with a narrative of progressive gender roles (“[we want]
more fathers in the family and more mothers at work”24), the presence of these vestals
in yellow was jarring, perhaps because it was an unwitting reminder of the gendered
division of labor that still characterizes the Italian family; Mills et al. (2008), for
24
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example, found that “Italy has a pronounced unequal division of household labour, with
about 70 percent of women engaging in more than 75 percent of the household duties”
(16; see also Istat 2011c: 5).25
The conference’s opening ceremonies included a dramatic reading of “The
Canticle of Canticles” by Amanda Sandrelli and Blas Boca Ray, two actors married to
each other. Prior to beginning their reading, the couple made an unofficial personal
statement about their support for the legitimacy of different kinds of families: Sandrelli,
herself the daughter of two Italian celebrities, actress Stefania Sandrelli and singer Gino
Pauli, declared: “We have been married for 13 years, and we did it at City Hall. His
parents were married in Church, mine never married, but we are a family.”26 Her
husband thanked Rosy Bindi for her “less than cautious invitation” of a “coppia laica”
(a “secular couple”) to open the conference. Their statement gave a public voice to the
struggles over definition and recognition of the family that had come to mark the
conference. Unlike those who had canceled their participation in protest of the
exclusion of non-normative families, Sandrelli and Boca Ray appeared to have
reconciled their role in the conference by taking the opportunity to publicly state their
disagreement with the conference’s exclusionary definition of the family. While their
very statement suggests that public disagreement over these politics is possible, it also
points to what such disagreement is struggling against. The very act of thanking
Minister Bindi for her “daring” invitation of a “secular couple” reveals the degree to
which the moral politics of the family have permeated the political discourse of a
supposedly secular country.
25

According to this Istat report, Italian women spend an average of 2 hours and 25 minutes more than
men on housework, a disparity that holds across the life course (2011: 5).
26
Fieldnote May 24, 2007.
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In his keynote speech broadcast from Rome, Italian President Giorgio
Napolitano spoke of the historical tensions between secular and Catholic positions on
the family in Italy and called for compromise. A formerly Communist politician, the
elderly Napolitano referenced the referendum on assisted reproduction as proof of
Italians’ desire to protect the family from intervention. At the same time, he also
acknowledged the existence of “new families” (famiglie nuove), which he argued
deserved recognition of their “rights and duties.” On the one hand, he advocated a
historical rather than essentialist reading of the Italian constitutional definition of the
family “as a natural society based on marriage”; on the other, like Minister Bindi, he
reaffirmed the uniqueness of “the family based on marriage.” Napolitano justified the
need for the recognition of all “stable relationships” in terms of their contributions to
social cohesion: “understanding that all the solidarity and mutual responsibility that
grows out of stable relationships based on love and reciprocal respect constitute a
significant reality in terms of civil coexistence and of social cohesion.” The President’s
speech reflected and contributed to the discourse that locates in family relationships the
glue that holds society together. This commitment to the family as the source of social
cohesion spans the political spectrum. Whether the family should be the locus of
solidarity in the post-welfare state generates little controversy; what is at stake is the
question of which relationships should be recognized as “family,” and thus as worthy of
official recognition and of the benefits associated with it.
“It’s Time to Reason in Terms of the Family”
Minister Bindi’s opening speech to the conference asserted the notion that the
family is the source of Italy’s social cohesion. She argued that Italian families, even
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with all their contemporary challenges, “remain the living backbone of this country, the
extraordinary social capital of energy, trust, loyalty, stability, sociality that feed and
regenerate social ties and cohesion in the country.” Perhaps as a nod to the controversy
over the civil union proposal, the Minister acknowledged that governing the family
remains “a very delicate matter to be handled with care and discretion.” Despite the
difficulties, however, Bindi argued that the time had long past for matters of the family
to be addressed through policy, claiming that “it’s time to reason in terms of the
family.”27 This new, explicit politics of the family was on display on the political stage
of the conference in the celebratory assertions of ministers as well as regional
administrators and demographers. Minister of Health Livia Turco, who has been
involved in policies related to family for more than a decade, declared that a “cultural
leap” had taken place in the politics of the family in Italy:
this conference marks a real turning point because we go from, including in our
[political] experience … of developing family policy,28 through which we
experienced almost a cultural hesitancy in talking about the family, with this
conference … today we mark a turn, a cultural leap that says that politics, very
slowly, concretely, takes on the family.29
Leftist politicians, like Turco, celebrated the newly found availability of the family to
politics without acknowledging the ideological and moral implications of this
development.
Yet, even at the conference, despite its being organized and held under a centerleft government, politicians and personalities aligned with the opposition made clear the
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moral underpinnings of their support for family policies. Letizia Moratti, then mayor of
Milan and a member of Berlusconi’s conservative party, introduced one of the
conference’s working groups, titled “The Family and Generations.” Moratti described
her administration’s family policies as contributing to “the making of a society in which
the role of the family truly returns to being central,”30 a society in which the family is
recognized as “an active subject.”31 Moratti described the policies proposed by her
administration, which include tax detractions for grandparents caring for grandchildren
and a “baby bonus” subsidy of about 400 euros to be awarded to low-income women
who stay home for a year following the birth of a child.32 Rather than being additional to
social services like daycare, the “baby bonus” was an alternative to daycare; accepting
this subsidy would make the child ineligible to attend public daycare (Benuzzi and
Colombini 2007).
While Moratti presented these policies as examples of good practices in the
support of the family, their gendered implications were denounced by the women of
Usciamo dal Silenzio in a press release dated only two weeks after the conference. In
the press release, Usciamo dal Silenzio accuses the Moratti administration of “having
its head turned toward the past” (Benuzzi and Colombini 2007, emphasis in original).
Policies like the baby bonus, they charge, foster “traditional roles” by encouraging
women to stay home instead of providing better services and policies to enable them to
remain in the workplace.

30
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The critique articulated by the Usciamo dal Silenzio group indexes a struggle that
feminists thought they had “won” in the 1970s with the shift in social policy toward a
recognition of the individual as such rather than as a member of a family (Bimbi 1993).
These changes included the establishment of public daycares to allow women access to
the workplace. Tensions between an orientation of social policy toward the individual
or toward “family rights” was a theme that emerged in discussions at the conference,
and even Minister Bindi referred to it in her speech. Yet, just as quickly as she raised
the issue, she dismissed it as a false dichotomy in need of its own cultural shift. Bindi
claimed that the conference marked a new era in which the citizenship and rights of the
family need not be in contradiction with the rights of individuals:
A new phase of change is afoot around some of the challenges that we need to
face together and around which [we] need to recognize first and foremost the
cultural change: the capacity, finally, to be able to conjugate the rights of the
family and the rights of the person. These rights are not in contradiction with
each other.33
Despite Bindi’s reassurances, the protests and boycotts elicited by the explicit
exclusions of non-married families from the conference suggests that the conjugation of
those rights remains problematic at best. At the same time that Minister Bindi sought a
synthesis of individual and family rights, influential figures on the right, like Catholic
sociologist Pierpaolo Donati, argued for a new model of welfare in which the family is
awarded its own citizenship and in which individual rights are reframed in relational
terms. In that context too, the rights of the family and the rights of individuals,
particularly women, are asserted to not be in contradiction despite evidence to the
contrary.
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“Erased But Resistant”
The “cultural leap” on family politics playing out on the stage of the First
National Conference on the family was not universally celebrated. As I sat in the
auditorium listening to Prime Minister Prodi’s reflection on the “explosion” of the
family to the center of politics, my partner Jeff participated in, and documented, a
protest outside the conference center. The protest was organized by Facciamo Breccia
(Let’s Breakthrough), a feminist and GLBT network that included one of the feminist
collectives I knew in Milan, resistenti.34 The flyer produced by the group to advertise
the protest played with the logo and the slogan of the conference. The slogan “Cresce la
famiglia, cresce l’Italia” (The Family Grows, Italy Grows) was turned into a question
mark: “Cresce la famiglia, ma l’Italia cresce?” (The Family Grows, But Does Italy
Grow?). Using the same graphic style as the conference materials, the flyer depicts the
fertile couple of the conference logo in black and white. The representations of other
family configurations—two men holding hands, a single pregnant woman, an elderly or
disabled couple, and two women holding hands—are faded out, as if hit by an eraser.
The text reads:
President Napolitano will open the proceedings, Rosy Bindi and Romano Prodi
will close them. Together they celebrate the family. We ask: which and why?
The answer is easy: it’s in the logo. So, we look around, but we really do not see
this family. Something is strange… it looks like the sacred family or the family
of the mulino bianco.35 Erased from this place/logo, erased from politics/policy,
our relationships and free choices erased. With the strikes of an eraser
neoliberalism erases rights and the social state and denies them to those who
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don’t sanctify themselves in the traditional family. Rights are either for
everyone, or they are the privilege of the few.36
The protest drew about 100 people to a piazza nearby the conference center.
Police officers lined the entrance of the center while protesters unfurled banners and
engaged in street theater critical of the normative push of the family conference and of
the state’s reliance on the family as the source of its welfare. A hand-written sign read:
“welcome to the family, since forever the hidden leg of the Italian social state” (Fig. 2).
Others manifested the theme of erasure by donning cardboard masks and carrying signs
that stated: “cancellati ma resistenti” (“erased, but resistant,” Fig. 3). 37 The protest
articulated the exclusion of those who fall outside the bounds of heteronormativity, a
sense that I often heard expressed in meetings and personal conversations with women
involved in feminist and LGBT issues. The protesters were contesting not “just”
symbolic erasures. The exclusions increasingly enacted in the name of the normative
family inform an emerging welfare system of and for the family.
The welfare implications of these family policies were highlighted in a counterconference organized by Facciamo Breccia to coincide with the official family
conference. The alternative conference, titled “The Uses of the ‘Natural’ Family in the
Time of Neoliberalism” offered two panels, one of which I was able to attend, in which
academics and radical left and feminist politicians reflected on key themes raised by the
36
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government’s conference on the family: analysis of the significance of the notion of the
“natural” family and the relationship between neoliberalism, welfare, and the family.
The Facciamo Breccia critique aimed right at the heart of the connection between the
intensifying moral politics of the family and the assertion of a neoliberal familist
welfare.
The Rights & Duties of Stable Relationships
The First National Conference on the Family played out against the backdrop of
the successful backlash over a civil union proposal co-authored by Minister Bindi. With
the blessing of the Prodi government, along with co-author Barbara Pollastrini, Minister
of Equal Opportunities, Rosy Bindi presented a limited civil union proposal in January
of 2007. The proposal, titled Diritti e doveri delle persone stabilmente conviventi
(Rights and responsibilities of persons in stable cohabitation), immediately became
known by the acronym “DICO,” which in Italian also means “I say.” Introduced just as
the controversy over the fetal burial legislation was intensifying in Lombardy, the
DICO legislative proposal promised to recognize some basic rights to cohabiting
couples, including those of the same sex. If approved, the DICO would award
unmarried couples, same-sex and heterosexual alike, the right to participate in health
decisions for one’s partners, eligibility for inheritance, alimony, the right of succession
on rental leases, the right to some benefits granted to public employees, and eligibility
to residency permits on the basis of cohabitation. The process of entering into a DICO,
however, seemed explicitly designed to avoid any semblance to a marriage ceremony.
The couple would not appear together; one person would initiate the process at City
Hall while the other would wait to be notified by certified letter.
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This attempt at a compromise between secular leftists’ demands for recognition
of civil unions and renewed Catholic intransigence against the recognition of any
relationship outside of marriage as family was not well-received. The DICO generated
outrage from the right and derision tinged with hope among leftist supporters of civil
unions. Politicians, commentators, and church officials came out against the DICO. The
Vatican weighed heavily on the matter, casting the DICOs as a powerful threat to the
“natural family” and to Italian society. Conservative politicians and experts used the
DICO as further proof that the “traditional” family is under siege and to argue that
priority should be afforded to the reproductive, heteronormative family, particularly in
light of Italy’s low birth rates.
At a conference sponsored by the Italian Movement for Life ominously titled
“Demographic Winter,” the DICO became a rallying point. The Catholic editor of one
of Italy’s main conservative dailies, Il Giornale, articulated the Catholic position
against the DICO: “we are against the DICO because it’s an act that undermines the
family in Italy, and thus Italian society.”38 The weekly Catholic magazine Famiglia
Cristiana ran a cover titled “Less ‘Dico,’ More Family,” which included an interview
with Minister Bindi.39 The Forum delle Associazioni Familiari (Forum of Family
Associations) organized a protest that came to be known as Family Day. The Family
Day rally40 was very successful: several hundred thousand participants filled piazza San
Giovanni in Rome and major political figures, including Silvio Berlusconi, made an
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appearance. Then-mayor of Milan Letizia Moratti declared that “without family there
can be no society.”41
DICO No!
The DICO also engendered protest from the left, though on a much smaller and
less visible scale. On Valentine’s Day 2007, my partner and I headed to a protest
against the DICO in downtown Milan. After leaving the consultorio at closing time, we
walked on corso Vittorio Emanuele, a pedestrian-only street lined with fancy cafés and
shops nestled under porticos. The corso, framed on one end by the illuminated Duomo
Cathedral and on the other by the fountain in piazza San Babila is a romantic evening
spot any time of the year. On this evening it was teeming with couples. Once we
reached piazza San Babila we had trouble locating the protest, which turned out to be so
small as to be dwarfed by the police presence, a few journalists, and the mob of
passersby. About twenty people held signs saying “Dico no!” a play on words that
translates as both “I say no” and “no to the DICO.”
I recognized Viola, a feminist academic and activist who was often a critical and radical
voice at meetings of Donne, Diritti, Salute and Usciamo dal silenzio. I didn’t know
anyone else, so Jeff and I added our numbers as participant observers. We chatted with
a man from Taiwan who was taking pictures of the protest; he turned out to be a
researcher too. A young man from Arcigay42 joined us. He remarked how unusual it was
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As reported by the Berlusconi-controlled TGCOM website,
http://www.tgcom24.mediaset.it/politica/articoli/articolo361510.shtml.
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Arci, an acronym for “Associazione ricreativa e culturale italiana,” (Italian Cultural and Recreational
Association). Arci was founded in 1958 but its roots go back to the mutual aid societies and solidarism of
the 1800s and to anti-fascism and anti-Nazism. Today, Arci is divided into a number of circoli, or circles,
and includes sub-sections such as Arcigay, Arcilesbica, and Arcidonna and an anti-racist, antiglobalization, and anti-Berlusconi political orientation (see “Storia,” Arci,
http://www.arci.it/arci/storia/index.html).
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to see a heterosexual couple at a gay rights event in Italy. “Whether it’s the left or the
right,” he added “you’re a faggot in Italy” if you participate in a gay rights rally.43
Some protestors complained about the certified letter, the focus on the morbid
aspects of relationships (inheritance, succession in an apartment lease, the right to have
access to and make decisions about a partner in a medical emergency). One participant
questioned why a married couple would have inheritance rights immediately, whereas a
“DICO couple” would have to wait nine years. Another participant described the DICO
as “humiliating.” Not all agreed, however, and an argument was going on at the side
between two men, one of whom was wearing a t-shirt with a serigraph of a laughing
Romano Prodi.
At a meeting of the feminist Usciamo dal Silenzio association, one of the
founders and past presidents of Arcilesbica, Italy’s largest and most influential lesbian
rights association, summarized the problems she saw with the DICO proposal:
The legislative proposal is considered by the movements, by the homosexual
associations and by the one I belong to, which is Arcilesbica, to be strongly
inadequate with respect to the demand, inadequate with respect to European
standards, inadequate with respect to the commitments first made and then
walked back, then readjusted, and insufficient with respect to real needs.44
Nonetheless, she defended the proposal as a first step toward the recognition of samesex relationships.
The DICO proposed the institutionalization of affective relations outside of
marriage at the time that such relations are being held up as the basis of a new model of
welfare. While the DICO would not have recognized these relationships as a family, it
would have formalized the rights and responsibilities of those who entered toward each
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other. By entering into a DICO the two parties would be responsible for providing each
other with “reciprocal material and moral support and solidarity.” In addition, the DICO
would potentially recognize affective relationships broadly construed, not just
romantic/sexual ones. Eligibility would be open to two adults “even of the same sex,
united by affective ties, in a situation of stable cohabitation and who provide each other
with assistance and material and moral solidarity, without being united by matrimonial
ties or by kinship relations of direct descent.” This inclusiveness may be one of the most
striking aspects of the DICO.
The proposal marked the beginning an intense few months of political debates,
including among feminist and LGBT actors, over the DICO, and ultimately over the
family. The DICO, like the assisted reproduction debates of the early 2000s, explicitly
raised the question of what is family. Feminists who opposed the moral politics of the
“natural family” found themselves needing to articulate their own views on the matter.
In a different way from the Conference on the Family, the reflections among a group of
Italian feminists on the family underscores the way the family is inextricably linked to
the remaking of the social in the moral neoliberal moment. The terms by which the
DICO and similar political projects are supported or contested underscores the stakes of
the politics of the family in a time in which the rights of social citizenship are
increasingly reoriented toward the “natural family.” At the same time, the sense of
potential that some feminists and lesbian activists expressed in relation to the DICO,
points to the desire for an alternative to the tightening definition of the family as
heterosexual, married, and reproductive.
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After all the protests and discussion, the DICO never had their day in
parliament. Following the success of the Catholic Family Day protest, the proposal was
tabled. The issue of civil unions resurfaced later in the summer of 2007 under a new
title and acronym: the Cus (Contratti di unione solidale, or Contracts of Supportive
Union). The Cus would be a private contract undertaken in front of a notary public or a
justice of the peace. In Italy justices of the peace do not marry people, civil marriage
takes place at City Hall. The Cus removed any shred of symbolism of a quasi-marriage
by taking it away from City Hall. For many the Cus was like the Dico minus the
certified letter. The rights and responsibilities acquired would have been fairly
equivalent, except for the right to obtain a residency permit for foreigners, which
disappeared without comment in the Cus. In the end, the Cus also disappeared due to
the opposition of the center-right, leaving Italians, as of yet, with no civil union
option.45 On the other hand, the arguments in favor of protecting and privileging the
heteronormative family, which had gained momentum in the debate over assisted
reproduction, the DICO, and over the shape of a new welfare model, continued to gain
ground.
Thinking about the Family
With the locus of social citizenship increasingly shifting toward the family,
struggles over inclusion and recognition of affective relationships have gained new
relevance and intensity. Widespread economic precariousness has made these issues all
the more urgent. Neoliberal reforms have profoundly reorganized Italian society while
maintaining legitimacy through a moral discourse attentive to solidarity and critical of
45

In the summer of 2012 the issue of civil unions came up again in the debates over the platform of the
Democratic Party. The political memory of the debate over the DICO and their ultimate failure was an
important part of these discussions.

160

individualism and capitalism (see Muehlebach 2012). Central to this discourse of social
solidarity is its insistence on locating its ultimate source in family relationships. Social
solidarity and cohesion are reimagined and, as a result increasingly governed, as an
extension of normative family bonds of affective reciprocity rather than as the outcome
of a state responsible for the welfare of its citizens. This discourse, emanating especially
from Catholic politicians, from sympathetic scholars, and from the Vatican, identifies
the “traditional” family as the perfect moral and economic mediation between state,
market, and individual.
A number of women in the groups I attended in Milan seemed taken aback by
how quickly the Catholic right had gained ground in matters of reproduction and the
family. Part of this surprise may be the disconnect between the social changes that have
taken hold in Italian society since the 1970s and the attitudes on ethical and social
matters of many Italians, including those who consider themselves Catholic, which are
more liberal and pluralistic than those of the Church (see Diamanti and Ceccarini 2007:
54).46
The intensifying of the Church’s political influence and its legislative success
made a feminist reflection unavoidable. Should the DICO be supported despite its
significant limitations? Should feminists seek to broaden the scope of the family when
three decades prior they had declared the institution inherently oppressive? Should other
social formations and affective relations be recognized as something other than family?
Participants in meetings on the DICO expressed different positions on these questions.
Nonetheless, a common thread emerged from their reflections: an argument for the
46

“on the most controversial subjects – de facto families, assisted procreation – opinion surveys (Eurisko,
Demos, Ipsos, Lapolis) suggest that the positions of the ecclesiastical hierarchy failed to prevail even
among observant Catholics” (Diamanti and Ceccarini 2007: 54).
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state’s recognition of all social and affective relationships that hinged on their
contribution to social cohesion and the “common good.”
The format of these meetings, like the format of other feminist discussions and
meetings I attended, was loose: usually one of the organizers would open the discussion
with some remarks that would frame the issue. Participants spoke in turn, usually for
about ten minutes, sometimes representing an association to which they belonged,
sometimes as individuals. Often the comments seemed to go in such different directions
as to appear not to be in conversation; at other times participants engaged more directly
with each other’s comments. Everyone spoke without notes and yet most produced
coherent and eloquent arguments. This format enabled revealing differences of
perspective to share the stage.
In this section I analyze the speeches and arguments of participants engaging the
question “what do we think about the family?” Elena, one of the more influential
participants in the group, had explicitly posed this question. My focus in analyzing the
terms by which these speakers sought to persuade fellow participants of their position
on the family is threefold: First, to examine what these arguments suggest about the
circulation and growing hegemony of the discourse on social solidarity and cohesion;
Second, I am interested in the political subjectivities engendered by the discourse of a
new welfare and what it reveals about the possibilities for alternative articulations;
Third, I am interested in what these debates reveal about the remaking of social
citizenship in Italy in the post-welfare moment. The answers to the question of the
family that emerged in these meetings shed light on the struggle inherent in
renegotiating feminist positions on the family in Italy. They reveal the power of

162

discourses that link affective social relations to social solidarity and cohesion, and,
ultimately, underscore the growing importance of questions of the family to social
citizenship in the post-welfare state.
“We Have to Say What We Think about the Family”
In early 2007, women belonging to different feminist and lesbian associations in
Milan came together to discuss feminist positions on the civil union legislation. In the
reproductive health association Donne, Diritti, Salute, the questions raised by the DICO
and by the Catholic backlash against it wove in and out of discussions over the fetal
burial legislation and resuscitated the debate over the assisted reproduction legislation.
Shortly after the introduction of the DICO proposal, I joined a group of about twenty
women in the bookshelf-lined, one-room basement headquarters of a historic feminist
organization in Milan. The group included a number of women in elite professional
roles: lawyers, writers, journalists, as well as leaders in the feminist and lesbian
movement. Most of them were femministe storiche, “historical feminists,” a term that
refers to the generation active in the mass movements of the 1970s. Thirty years later,
the radical and anti-family thought that ran through the Italian feminist movement
remained relevant for some, while others expressed a different view of the family based
on their personal experiences and social changes.
Elena, a well-known feminist writer and public intellectual, argued for the need
to articulate a feminist position on the family in the face of the DICO and the Church’s
growing influence on these matters:
we have to say what we think about the family … about this deep form of
belonging that will really take a long time to deeply chip away. Within us,
what do we think of these new forms of cohabitation? Well, I think that on
this, well, certainly a protest cannot succeed in saying all these things in
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depth, it will take, I think that it will take in any case work of … groups,
workshops, in other words, we have to work on this theme that I believe is
fundamental.47
For Elena, a feminist contribution to the public discourse on the family ought to start
with reflection. Her own stance on the family is never in doubt, however: the feminist
project is to chip away at the bonds of the family, the very forms of “deep belonging”
that current politics elevate.
Elena stated her continuing allegiance to the anti-family feminist analyses
articulated in the 1970s. Critical of the demands for the recognition of unmarried and
same-sex relationships as families, she reminded participants of the historical
contributions of feminism:
If I remember well, the discovery of feminism … was that of identifying
in the family the site of male power, the subjection of woman … feminism
had identified precisely within the affective group, of the relationship
man-woman, in the family, the site of the oppression of women. So the
family had been identified many years ago as the site of oppression. Now
we go and ask for other families. This has always really astounded me
(Elena 1/24/07).
This critique of the family is rooted in the feminism and politics of the 1970s. An antifamily ethos informed the decade as feminists as well as liberals, sought to overturn
misogynist laws that governed the family and reproductive rights. Until the 1970s, as
Leslie Caldwell notes, “the subservience of women to their fathers and husbands is
actually written into Italian law” (1978: 71). Women were subordinated in marriage,
required to follow their husbands, subject to harsher penalties for divorce, and seen as
extensions of the honor of their family members (Caldwell 1978:76-78). Central to the
unequal treatment of women and men under the law was the qualification of equal
citizenship rights enshrined in the Italian Constitution. While under article 3 “all
47
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citizens have equal social dignity and are equal before the law, without distinction of
sex, race, language, religion, political opinion, personal and social conditions,” the often
cited article 29 “recognises the rights of the family as a natural society founded on
marriage” and subordinates the “moral and legal equality of the spouses” to the need “to
guarantee the unity of the family.”48
Against the Family
A booklet published in 1974, and available on the bookshelves of the feminist
association hosting the workshop on the DICO, embodies the radical anti-family politics
of the time. Titled Contro la famiglia, (Against the Family) and published by Stampa
Alternativa (Alternative Press), 49 the manifesto against the family was banned by the
Italian government. All available copies were recalled, and the director of the press was
imprisoned for 18 months. While Against the Family is not a feminist tract but rather a
Marxist denunciation of family violence in which the family is presented as “the
fundamental repressive structure” under capitalism (1975: 10), it resonates with
feminist critiques. The cover graphic places the “traditional family” inside a bloody-red
bomb, its fuse lit, about to explode. The potential for bloodshed and violence depicted
on the booklet’s cover also reminds of the intensity of political struggles over the family
in Italian society and captures an institution in the midst of a cultural explosion. Today,
in contexts such as the First Government Conference on the Family, politicians speak of
a different kind of “explosion” of the family as they celebrate its move to the front of
the political stage.
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By the end of the 1970s, divorce and abortion were legalized, family law
reformed, a network of family planning clinics (consultori familiari) established by law,
family social services, including public daycare expanded, and a universal health care
system was established (Bimbi 1993; Saraceno 1994). These changes represent a shift
from the family-oriented welfare and social services provided by the Catholic Church to
a more universal welfare approach that addressed individual rights (Ginsborg 2001:
226). The defeat of the Catholic Church in referenda against the legalization of abortion
and divorce in the late 1970s and early 1980s, marked the waning of the Church’s
power over the social and moral arena giving way to significant changes in familymaking, gender roles, and sexuality. The graphics and language of Against the Family
today evoke a bygone era of radical politics seemingly incongruous with a modern
society. Yet, with the resurgence of Catholic politics on the family and reproduction,
some of its arguments still resonate.
The struggles over the Italian family form an important backdrop to these
debates and to calls like Elena’s for forsaking recognition in an historically oppressive
institution. Elena offered an alternative, urging that feminists seek the public
recognition and support of all relationships, citing their “social value”:
Well, then, if the traditional family has been privileged, or has laws that protect it
because it contributes to the good of society, because it creates relationships,
setting aside all the homicides [laughter], but let’s forget those, but at least
because we thank our families who raised us and cared for us, … and at one
point the elderly were taken care of… if it’s because of all this, why not
recognize the enormous social value for society of any form of aggregation,
anything that makes community? And here lies in my opinion the limitation of
… having just a defensive discourse, a discourse that is just defensive, it
becomes just a thing of rights for those who need them and does not bring
together also a group of people that believe that society needs sociality, that we
are in a moment so disconnected, for economic causes, how production is, the
state of transportation, the way the city is organized, for all these things that we
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know, … people who get together, who help each other, support each other, why
does society not recognize them? Why shouldn’t they have something more than
those who just mind their own business? …I am of this perspective, I mean, I
believe that more than rights, to work in this sense of the common good, of love,
of mutual help, of creating forms of collectivity, I think that no one can deny
this, there can’t be ideology, there can’t be that absurd argument (Elena 1/24/07).
Elena’s critique echoes other feminist critiques of a politic of rights, even as Elena later
positioned herself as not averse to institutional engagement. Her comments point to the
struggles in locating a politic of solidarity caught between atomization and the moral
politics of the family, and the ease with which that alternative can slide into the
relational and affective labor that Andrea Muehlebach describes as one of the
characteristics of moral neoliberalism in Italy (2012).
Other Families
Other participants had different views on the family. Antonia, one of the
founders and past president of Italy’s main lesbian association, Arcilesbica, disagreed
with Elena. Her political project, and that of her organization, was to demand
recognition “that these things that we are making are families.”50 Arguing that gay and
lesbian families were not comparable to the heterosexual, patriarchal family, Antonia
declared
we have reclaimed the term “families” …. I find it a bit simplistic to define a
family composed of two men with that traditional family that we know to be
constituted on the hierarchies that women over the past thirty years have
disrupted, began to overcome. In any case, how can we say that if you use the
term ‘family’ then it must mean that you want to do the same thing. I don’t
believe my ears when I hear this thing. And then, a family of two women, how
can it be the re-proposition of a patriarchal form. I mean, … I don’t believe it
how much I hear these things said, maybe I’ve never understood it. I am not
afraid to say that there are new kinds of families that are experimenting with
relationships built on reciprocity, including also in heterosexual families today.51
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For Antonia the family is not owned by morally conservative forces and should
and could be, in fact, reclaimed. The DICO was an opportunity that required a unified
front of lesbian movements and prominent feminist groups like Usciamo dal Silenzio. It
is ironic that in making her argument in favor of the flawed and even “comical” DICO
proposal, Antonia was forced to navigate not just the obvious obstacles thrown up by
the Catholic right, but also those put forth by the “traditional” Italian feminist
movement’s view of the family as inherently patriarchal and oppressive. She denied that
feminist critiques of the heterosexual family apply: “[same-sex families are] in no way,
in my opinion, part of the structures of tradition, of the exchange52 of women, of the
exploitation of the reproductive body. It’s impossible.” A clear discourse could not
emerge until “some” in the feminist movements overcame their distaste for the term
family, “some stutter because some words gli si puntano fra i denti (get stuck between
their teeth) and they don’t want to pronounce this word.”53 When confronted by those
who say “’you are not family,’ Antonia argued that someone has to respond, ‘yes, we
are’” an affirmation that would carry more power if “we didn’t have to give the answer
alone.”
Despite this disagreement on the nature of the family, Antonia’s description of
what the meaning of same-sex families holds striking similarities to Elena’s argument
for the recognition of all forms of sociality. Both deploy the language of reciprocity, of
mutual help and solidarity. Antonia noted that “when we say family we say an affective
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core (nucleo), of mutual help, of solidarity, which demands respect and rights.”54 Like
Elena, Antonia appeals to the potential contribution of same-sex relationships to the
“common good” to legitimize their claim to public recognition:
I think that they [same-sex relationships] should be considered a common good,
not just for the people who carry them on, because romantic and care-taking
relationships are, as they say, it’s not just that it’s me who is here, … all
reasonable people, romantic relationships generate social cohesion instead of
loneliness, instead of disaggregation, instead… So, recognizing them on the part
of the state … means, ‘I recognize them, I register them, I protect them from
offense, from defamation, etc. etc.’55
Elena and Antonia represent two distinct approaches to the family that rehash
some of Italian feminism’s debates on the relationship between feminism and
institutions in the language of solidarity and social cohesion. Other women shared more
personal evolutions in their perspectives on the family. Some shared Elena’s notion that
the family is oppressive and that feminism’s political project ran counter to the family.
Deana reflected that never marrying her male partner was “a matter of freedom” and
related that her child says “my mother forgot to get married.” Milena described
“women’s lives” as being lived “inside norms. Ours is an escape from norms.” Others,
like Anna, a woman in her fifties, argued that the Italian family itself had changed, and
thus by implications should feminist positions:
today’s families are no longer that gas chamber that it was for us, that we
recognized as such, from which we have, we tried in all ways to get out, to do
some things, to leave, but then also to not recreate them. … Young women, the
young, the young women today, the family they do it differently, they
understand it in a different way. And then, that it is still the site in which a
discourse on woman and man is reproduced, I think that’s still the case, but it’s
not so obvious, much less, it’s more “soft,” it’s much more, how can I say it, a
lot less suffocating, if you will.56
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Anna also pointed to the personal and social changes that had shifted her views of the
family:
The critique of the family that we made in the 1970s… it’s age too. In the 70s
we were daughters, it was more oppressive. Over the years family relationships
are relationships that are born of ties of relatedness, positive or negative which
in the 70s I couldn’t see. It’s a path, [now] I see things that I used to see as a
daughter with different eyes. It’s age, given also that children are not born
anymore (i figli non si fanno più), the crisis of pensions… [we need] to
recognize that families are made up of freedom and ties, of reciprocity, an
exchange.
The family, she continued, “is a substance that hides the people who belong to it… an
opaque reality. If politicians continue to use this term as unitary, it hides what’s within.
But I reassert my relationship, in its diversity, [we need] public recognition for forms of
relation that are not family.” This narrative showcases the way personal experience of
change over three decades entwines with social discourse to generate a different
perspective on the family. Changes in the family affect the sense oppressiveness or
freedom inherent in the institution while the discourse on low fertility also engenders a
different view of the family and its social relevance, in this case to pensions. Sometimes
these perspectives coexist, recognizing that the family has changed and has a social
function, but rejecting participation in it.
A surprising “provocateur” argument came from another prominent voice,
Assunta Sarlo, a journalist and the woman whose email had sparked the Usciamo dal
Silenzio 2006 protest. Sarlo suggested that maybe the stronger ties of marriage did
contribute something more to society. Sarlo, who had recently married at “an advanced
age” in order to please her elderly mother, described discovering “the power of the
institution” over her life and, potentially, the “social function” of marriage:
With the original question, which was, “are you so sure [that the family] is not
just inherently oppressive?” I agree, a priori, with all that relates to the
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condition of discrimination, the safeguarding of freedom and of the choice of the
individual … but, I as, to understand each other, because we always, if we
choose less strong [relationship] ties, then I could, at the very least the
provocateur part of me could say, “ok, less binding ties, how to say, could be
also more convenient, in the sense that, not taking care of the 95-year-old
mother-in-law with Alzheimer’s could also be an advantage.” So do we want a
society who does not take care of the 95-year-old mother-in-law?
This suggestion that marriage cements the responsibility to care for family elicited
angry responses. Not only did it echo conservative Catholic arguments that marriage
guarantees social stability, it also reproduced the gendered responsibilities of caretaking. Furthermore, it legitimates the Berlusconi’s government project for a familybased welfare for the elderly.57
Sarlo pointed to the fact that increasingly care has been shifted to immigrant
careworkers, implying that “weaker ties” shift the burden upon them. Immigrant
carework is in fact increasingly recognized as the “backbone of the ‘do-it-yourself’
welfare.” By 2010 assistenti domiciliari (household assistants) were employed by 10%
of Italian families.58 That taking care of the “95-year-old mother in law with
Alzheimer’s” is seen as either the responsibility of family or paid careworkers points to
the degree in which welfare in Italy is expected to remain a private responsibility. The
suggestion, even under the guise of a devil’s advocate provocation, that social solidarity
depends on highly gendered caretaking responsibilities made stronger by marriage
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underscores the purchase of a new discourse of social solidarity centered on the family.
Implicitly, it suggests that social anomie and disintegration are failures of individual
and relational responsibilities.
Peeling away the layers of these arguments sheds light on the way feminist
perspectives on the family are entangled with prevailing discourses on social welfare.
The deep transformations that have affected Italian society have also shifted feminist
thinking. From the vantage point of a different location in the life course and with the
influence of a different social and political context, the feminist language on the family
shifts from critiques of its inherent oppressiveness as a site of patriarchal violence to a
reflection of a changed institution in a changed society. The oppressive gender and
family roles that many women had experienced in the 1970s have given way to
rhetorical commitments to “modern” gender roles and to changed practices and
experiences. For some, the tension between freedom and oppressiveness is recast in
terms of freedom versus reciprocity and solidarity.
Italian society, however, has been profoundly changed in other ways: the Fordist
context of the mass movements of the 1970s has given way to neoliberal rationalities
and policies. With the unraveling of the admittedly already wide-gapped social safety
net, existing social protections have given way to precarious, often short-term,
employment (Muehlebach 2012; Molé 2010). Immigration has engendered concerns
over social cohesion as well as social solidarity. Concerns over solidarity in the state of
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precariousness are shared across political chasms. In 2007, Pope Benedict XVI
publically criticized neoliberal precarietà’ for its effects on the family and society.59
While they disagreed on the politics of the struggle for recognition as family,
Elena and Antonia both appealed in their speeches to arguments about the common
good. Antonia advocated for the recognition of romantic and family relationships while
Elena made the case for social and political ones by appealing to the role relationships
play in fostering solidarity and social cohesion, while remaining critical of the notion
that the heteronormative family has a privileged or unique role to play in this regard.
Their arguments link up with the dominant discourse on the family and the new welfare
by seemingly embracing a model of social solidarity located within and between
personal relationships of mutual aid and reciprocity. Elena, who called for jettisoning
the term “family,” altogether, asserted the contribution that other (non-heteronormative
family) forms of solidarity make to society, and even the nation, while Antonia spoke of
the value of same-sex families in terms of their contribution to the common good. In
this they resonated with Catholic arguments on the “solidaristic value of the family,” a
point of contact that Elena acknowledged in her speech and embraced as a better
strategy than always “playing defense” against the Church.
Other resonances between Catholic arguments on the family and feminist and
lesbian ones can be heard in Antonia’s contribution. Despite her assertion that “we have
reclaimed the term ‘family’” and rejected “the lexicon and the ideological repertoire of
the Church,” in fact, some of the language used to justify the recognition of same-sex
families would not be out of place in Catholic defenses of the “traditional” family. In
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addition to claims for individual rights in matters of sexuality, “the freedom of persons
to self-determination,”60 Antonia appealed to arguments about the social value of such
relationships and their potential to contribute to “social cohesion instead of loneliness,
instead of disaggregation.” Moreover, according to Antonia, by denying same-sex
relationships recognition as family, the state “looks with a gaze that separates people
who are united,” seeing and thus treating them as nothing more than the individuals
who make them up. As a consequence, “we continue to be seen as individuals … people
who cohabitate, who do not constitute a nucleus holder of fundamental rights.”61 This
argument echoes Catholic calls for the recognition of families rather than just
individuals.
At a Catholic conference on religious values and immigration held in the Milan
Archdiocese in November 2006, for example, a priest argued that the Church’s “focus is
on the family not just as individual, but in terms of relationships, in response to social
rationales in our society where the subject is seen just as an individual.”62 These
arguments about the need to recognize subjects as citizens-in-relation, rather than as just
individuals, have coalesced into explicit policy proposals for a citizenship of the family
(Consiglio dei Ministri 2012). The context of a political project seemingly headed for a
special status for families, a project that is poised to draw new topographies of privilege
and discrimination, new terms of inclusion and exclusion in the name of the social
contribution of different social formations, is crucial to making sense of the
convergence, whether strategic or not, of calls for the recognition of individuals in
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relationship. This convergence is mediated by the stakes of a shrinking welfare state and
new rationalities for appropriating the benefits of social citizenship.
Disentangling the Moral Discourse on Solidarity
How did women with long-standing commitments to leftist feminism come to
articulate their positions on the family and civil unions in terms of their potential
contributions to social solidarity and the “common good”? Making sense of these
narratives posed an analytical challenge for me as I struggled to reconcile the
coexistence of the rejection of the heteronormative family model with the embrace of
relational solidarity that emerges in these narratives. In the dominant discourse the
heteronormative family and relational solidarity are two faces of the same coin. The
first iteration of my analysis focused on exploring the degree to which these debates
reflected the emerging hegemony of relational solidarity in post-welfare Italy. The
discussion on the family among historic feminists struck me as being infused with the
same moral logic that undergirds the neoliberal concern with social cohesion. The
deployment of terms that would not be out of place in the mouths of Catholic officials,
sociologists, and politicians, and which are in fact uttered by them on a regular basis in
discussions on the family, suggested a surprisingly shared set of social assumptions.
The appearance in feminist discourse of morally-laden arguments about affective and
familiar relationships seemed a kind of “ventriloquism” (Muehlebach 2009) ultimately
functional to an emerging moral neoliberal social order.
Appeals to “mutual help” as an alternative to a familist solidarity, such as in
Elena’s speech, reinforced my view that while these arguments were critical of the
individualistic subjectivity of capitalism they recapitulated the neoliberal embrace of
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“community” and other private forms of solidarity that characterize “the death of the
social” as we knew it (Rose 1996; see Muehlebach 2009). In the time of the “crisis of
welfare,” mutualistic model of social protection have gained attention as a non-statist,
grassroots form of solidarity that could mitigate the market’s “everyone out for
themselves” ethic (Luciano 2012: 4; 15). Even as they offer more local control,
however, these societies are limited in scope compared to the universal welfare state.
The original Mutual Aid Societies (Società di Mutuo Soccorso) were autonomous and
voluntary organizations that formed in Europe in the 19th century as a way to provide
some social safety nets to workers otherwise exposed to the unfettered market (Luciano
2012; Mauss 1990). In the post-welfare moment Mutual Aid Societies have garnered
new interest as a grassroots alternative to the social state.63 A recent study argues that
“nostalgia” for mutualism has given new relevance to Mutual Aid Societies, which are
idealized as a more organic form of democracy and citizenship compared to the social
state (Luciano 2012: 6). This “nostalgia,” however, ignores the fact that the “matrix” of
socialist and Catholic principles of “universalism and redistribution” that animated
these societies is what eventually gave way to the development of the universalist
welfare state (Luciano 2012: 6). In fact, as the author points out, the principle of
universality, “could never have been realized within the confines of short-range
solidarity and of local criteria of redistributive justice that characterize mutual aid
societies” (Luciano 2012: 7).
Feminist appeals to alternative models of solidarity, including mutualism, seem
a departure from the universalist principles that many of these same activists fought for
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three decades ago. Demands for the recognition of personal relationships articulated in
terms of their social functionality reflect the appeal and amenability of a moral and
relational model of solidarity. However, the feminist deployment of mutualism as the
basis of solidarity suggests an additional interpretation of these discourses that reads
them as less, or at least as not only, a re-proposition of the dominant moral discourse,
but also as an attempt to deconstruct the very basis of the post-welfare discourse on
solidarity in Italy: the heteronormative family. In these feminist discussions mutualism
and other forms of solidarity are proposed as an alternative to a dominant discourse that
privileges the heteronormative family because it identifies it as the ineludible source of
social cohesion. Elena’s approach strategically seeks to claim the high ground of a form
of solidarity and social cohesion that is based on a sociality and reciprocity outside of
the confines of the heteronormative family.
I decided to take these narratives seriously, along with other discussions,
informal and not, that focused on the oppressiveness of the moral politics of the family
and reproduction. Ultimately, in the Italian context, denying the heteronormative
family’s role, either by highlighting the power relations and inequalities that still
constitute it, or by emphasizing the violence that resides it in, or even simply by
recognizing that other ways of being a family exist, challenges the foundation of a
broad social project. It represents a challenge to the welfare model of subsidiarity,
which rests on the active citizenship of the family to construct social cohesion out of the
private moral values of reciprocity and the gift. The moralized family is the safeguard
against the alienating, anomie-inducing, and disintegrating effects of the unfettered
market. To deconstruct and deny the family is to deny the moral legitimacy of the
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neoliberal project by stripping it bare of the social values that make it tenable in Italy
and compatible with Catholic morality.
The extension of the social relationships that would be recognized as generative
of the common good would not be equally functional to a restructured social state that
relies on private forms of solidarity. At least not in the present configuration of moral
neoliberalism in Italy, which legitimizes the dismantling of the universal state in the
name of empowering the natural and moral social formation of the family. As I show
below, the project of generating a neoliberal post-welfare society and the rising social
citizenship of the family are inextricably linked. If the post-social moment is
characterized by a shift toward “governing thorough community” (Rose 1996), in Italy
that shift includes a heavy emphasis on “governing through the family”.
The narratives of historic feminists confronting new personal, social and
political-economic contexts highlight the degree to which the new welfare society in
Italy has been hitched to the heteronormative model of the family. The terms of these
arguments show how opposition to the moral politics of the family inevitable tangles
with the privileged role afforded to it in contemporary, post-welfare society. While it
may not challenge the privatized, relational aspect of care associated with neoliberalism
in Italy, this kind of politics does challenge the solidifying lines of inclusion and
exclusion on which the neoliberal project rests and which are poised to redefine social
citizenship. The shared language between feminism and Catholic neoliberal discourse
also suggests a poverty of oppositional alternatives to a project that cloaks itself in
concerns for the common good rather than in the naturalization of market logics of
profit and individualism. As the language of solidarity has lost its leftist oppositional
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significance in the post-welfare moment, merging into a vocabulary shared with
Catholic doctrine and sociology as well as with neoliberalism, its deployment has to be
approached with a critical ear in an attempt to parse the context, subtext, and
implications.
The grappling with the politics of the family showcased in these discussions also
reminds of the central role of the family in the neoliberal moment. Italy’s moral
neoliberalism is not constituted by a generalized homo relationalis, as Muelenbach
describes. It is built upon a specific and moralized set of relationships, those of the
heteronormative family. Any other way of making family, be it same-sex families,
unmarried couples, or the specter of Muslim polygamous relationships, is asserted to be
inferior to the task of generating social cohesion, if not detrimental to it.
The oppressiveness of this moral project is reflected by the degree of hope that
even the potential for the official recognition of relationships outside of “the family”
inspired in some women. While conscious of its limitations, some participants in
discussions on the DICO saw this civil union proposal as a challenge to the dominance
of the Church in the politics of reproduction and the family. Laura described the
meaning of the DICO proposal for her: in raising the question of “what does family
mean? It made me dream, I mean, if this is the route, then we can pick up again the
question of women and assisted reproduction, the question of parenthood.”64 Franca, a
feminist and politician in the radical left la Rifondazione Comunista (Communist
Refoundation Party), gave voice to ambivalence and hope:
this is not the law that I wanted. I am forced to confront certain issues when
there is a law, instead of [being able] to elaborate it… on the other hand, it’s
something that unhinges [scardina], otherwise you wouldn’t have these
64
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reactions. Symbolically it says, ‘there is no more family,’ and this makes them
go haywire. For me, the fact of affirming affective ties that are not immediately
connected to reproduction is important. … It’s a breaking point.65
The politics of the family and of welfare in Italy are not easy to disentangle in
the post-welfare moment. At stake are ever-shrinking social benefits and protections,
which become even more vital in times of economic precariousness. Increasingly, the
politics of reproduction and the family are the terrain over which are negotiated and
legitimated deep transformations in individual and social rights and in the basses of
citizenship. In the wake of the retreat of the social state and the “natural” family’s
increasingly important social role, the consolidation and tightening of the definition of
family has significant consequences for those who fail to meet the criteria. Those who
fall outside the boundaries of the “traditional” family may not only continue to be
implicitly excluded from the full entitlements of social citizenship. If the moral project
of redefining social citizenship in relational, familial terms succeeds, those who are not
recognized as family may be explicitly and legitimately excluded in the name of social
solidarity and cohesion.
The Social Relevance of the Family
Arguments about the social function of the family are increasingly widespread
across the political spectrum. At the First Conference on the Family the conservative
mayor of Milan, Letizia Moratti, justified the shift to a family-oriented approach to
social services by appealing to the “family’s social function” and to its centrality as site
of production of “social capital” and thus social cohesion.66 With the election of the
Berlusconi coalition in 2008, the politics of the family intensified and became more
65
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explicit. The Berlusconi government produced policy proposals on a new welfare
centered on the family. The family’s social role in reproducing the nation, which was
edited out of Prodi’s comments at the First Conference on the Family, was embraced
under the center-right Berlusconi coalition, which included the separatist and
xenophobic Lega Nord party and the post-fascist Alleanza Nazionale party. In the
Berlusconi years, the discourse on the family’s social function weaves together
demographic alarmism, the moral politics of life, and the assertion of the family as the
ultimate source of social cohesion.
This approach is exemplified by the testimony of Undersecretary of State Carlo
Giovinardi in a parliamentary committee meeting. Giovinardi justified the
government’s support for the traditional family in terms of the demographic and cultural
problems brought by immigration and demographic “decline”: “it is absolutely
important that fiscal policies recognize that having children is not simply a private
matter, but rather an issue of great social relevance for the future of our country”
(Camera dei Deputati 2008: 9). Against this backdrop, and because resources are finite,
Giovinardi argued “there should be a difference between the couple that guarantees a
potential stability” by being married and “the others” “if … we identify some priorities,
a favorable eye should be turned to those who also carry out a social function” (Camera
dei Deputati 2008: 27-28). The exclusion of relationships outside the boundaries of the
“traditional family” is justified in these discourses in the name of the heteronormative
family’s social and national functions: reproduction and the production of social
cohesion. These political discourses are not just aimed at increasing birth rates among
Italians, but at having Italian babies born within the moral and cultural parameters of
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the “traditional” family, understood as the best guarantor of identity, stability, and
social commitments.
These same arguments about the need to recognize the family as a privileged
subject of welfare emerged in a more public setting at the Second Government
Conference on the Family in 2010, this time organized by the Berlusconi government.67
Minister of Welfare Maurizio Sacconi made headlines by arguing that financial support
should be reserved for the “natural” family: “financial support and help should only be
given to the natural family founded on marriage and oriented toward reproduction.”68
By contrast, “heterosexual unmarried couples renounce public recognition of their own
volition, they want to live without assuming ties of any kind, it is clear that vis-à-vis the
state this is a different situation. And it is evident that they will have a differential
treatment.”69
The “cultural leap that says that politics, very slowly, concretely, takes on the
family”70 celebrated by Minister Turco in 2007 seems to be fully realized, if not in the
direction that the leftist former Minister would approve. The center-left’s discourse on
the family’s centrality to social solidarity and its implicit and increasingly less tentative
forays into pro-family and pronatalist policies, such as those on display at the
Conference on the Family, contributed to the legitimization of the more nationalist and
exclusionary discourses embraced by the right. Both left and right increasingly appeal
to the social function of the family to make claims about the importance of developing
67
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family policy. The right takes those argument to their logical conclusion, arguing for a
society that privileges the kind of families deemed to contribute the most to society.
A Citizenship of the Family
The assertion of the family’s centrality to a new social model in the post-welfare
moment has given way to calls for the recognition of the family’s citizenship. One of
the most prominent and influential voices in this regard is that of Catholic sociologist
Pierpaolo Donati. Donati proposes a relational sociology (2012) based on reciprocity
and the gift economy, and originating in the traditional family. In this section I examine
Donati’s work on the citizenship of the family because of its profound influence on
discourse and policy. His arguments and suggestions are not simply a powerful
articulation of a broader expert discourse on the family. As head of the Scientific
Committee of the National Observatory on the Family, a (politically-appointed)
organization that conducts research and produces policy recommendations on the
family, Donati oversaw the writing of a draft document titled The National Plan for the
Family (Il Piano Nazionale per la Famiglia), which was presented in June of 2011 and
approved by the Italian government in June of 2012. The plan reflects Donati’s writings
on the need for a rearticulation of citizenship from an individual orientation to a
relational, family-based approach. The relevance of sociological expertise in the
reorientation of citizenship and the basis of social cohesion suggests that reports of the
“death of the social” and of the decreased relevance of sociology have indeed been
exaggerated. Catholic sociology is influential in policy-making in Italy as it helps
negotiate a path that avoids welfare universalism and individualism.
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In 2007, the same year as the first National Conference on the Family, Donati
proposes a new approach to family policy in which the state would go beyond providing
“relief and assistance” and instead embrace “a relational policy, a form of social
governance based on a principle of complex subsidiarity” (2007: 128). Donati makes
three broad arguments: 1) that policies aimed at the family should be distinct from other
kinds of social policies; 2) that the recognition of what we call family should be
delimited to the heterosexual, married family; and 3) that this family should be
recognized as a social and juridical “subject” in its own right (Donati 2007: 128).
Donati is critical of existing models of social policy: the liberal model, he charges, leads
to “individualism and fragmentation of the social fabric;” the social state leads to “the
loss of social bonds,” while the corporate model of welfare based on work leads to
“gender inequality and “subsidiarity in reverse,” as the family props up the social state”
(Donati 2007: 131).
“Current family policies,” he charges, “individualize individuals and forget
about the primary social capital inherent to the family” (Donati 2007: 133). At the same
time, its “outsourcing” of social services from the family to the state leads to “an
overburdened welfare state” (Donati 2007: 132). Donati articulates the need for more
services in the liberal idiom of choice, arguing that families, rather than individuals,
should be the subjects of those services, that they should be empowered to “manage
themselves” the “services they need” through “family associations” (Donati 2007: 133).
The services that Donati identifies as ideal for self-management—“one thinks of family
counseling services, day care centers, care for children and the elderly, domiciliary
services” (Donati 2007: 133)—are the very services that became public in the 1970s, a
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move to which feminist sociologists attribute an increase in individual rights vis-à-vis
the traditional family (Bimbi 1993; Saraceno 1994).71
Because of its unique role in “generating relationships of full reciprocity
between the sexes and generations” the family merits recognition of its citizenship
(2007: 139). Donati articulates an expert sociological discourse that argues for the
unique contributions of the family to social solidarity to justify an emerging citizenship
of the family. The reason for delimiting privileges to “the family” is that only the family
based on marriage and sexual differentiation is generative of “full reciprocity,” stability,
and thus social solidarity and cohesion, as well as being biologically generative.72
Donati argues that “there is urgent need for a new ‘social pact’ between the
generations both within the family and in the collective sphere, that is, of work, of
distribution and redistribution of resources, and above all, in that of relations of
citizenship” (Donati 2007: 133-134). This new “social pact” requires the rethinking of
the basis of citizenship in which the individual citizenship of the Enlightenment gives
way to a “relational citizenship” (Donati 2007: 139) and natural rights are redefined as
“relational rights” (2007: 142). This new model requires the reconfiguration not just of
71
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citizenship but also of personhood into a “social personhood” that encompasses the
family: “The family has its own citizenship (family citizenship) in that the family is a
‘social person’, a holder of a complex of social rights that go beyond individual rights”
(Donati 2007: 140). This, combined with the family’s unique role in generating
reciprocity and social cohesion justifies its recognition as a subject and its rewarding
with privileged citizenship rights relative to other social formations and to individuals:
The distinction between citizenship/non-citizenship of family forms implies that
there are types of families that merit the acknowledgement of a set of
rights/duties having public recognition and other forms which do not. This
distinction is not made on the basis of a discriminatory criterion, but, on the
contrary, according to the very characteristics of the relations chosen and created
by the subjects. If persons create forms of co-habitation in which there is no
assumption of social responsibility towards the surrounding community, then
public recognition is not required. (Donati 2007: 147)
The new social contract proposed by Donati explicitly justifies discriminating
against those who are viewed as skirting “social responsibility towards the surrounding
community” by virtue of engaging in affective relationships that lack social recognition.
Leaving aside the tautology of this argument, what is striking about this passage is that
it explicitly argues for a new model of social citizenship built upon discrimination
among family forms.
Yet, Donati casts the project of a citizenship of the family as the way toward a
just society in the post-welfare world. Citizenship is required in order to protect the
family from the inevitable burden that the crisis of the welfare state would place on it
and for protecting society from “anomie”:
Only the recognition of a full citizenship of the family, with all that it implies,
would avoid widespread phenomena of anomie, discomfort, injustices, and
social pathologies, which families often experience today. Actually, without
such recognition, increasing burdens of generating social solidarity, which
cannot be assumed by the welfare state, would be transferred in a perverse,
implicit, indirect, and undeclared manner to families. This would act against the
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pursuit of goals of social equality and of universalistic solidarity inherent to
citizenship. (2007:152).
This approach of course says nothing about what would happen to those who are not
recognized to belong to a family. Would “the increasing burden of generating social
solidarity” be “transferred” to them?
Donati’s writings shed light on the contours of an emerging revision of the
social contract in the neoliberal, post-welfare moment. Neoliberal reforms in Italy have
provided fertile ground for the renegotiation of the social contract, putting into question
even its founding subject. The heteronormative family is the protagonist of a new social
citizenship. In these writings, the social citizenship of the family represents a preferable
“alternative to statism … and to that kind of liberalism that is a mere affirmation of
individual rights, but not bound to community responsibilities (citizenship of the
market)” (2007: 148). The importance of the family to this new model cannot be
overstated. Donati suggests that the family represents a “fourth way,” an alternative to
state, market, and civil society. If the relocation of society from the state to civil society
and “community” could be described as the “death of the social,” its further retreat into
the family would constitute its burial. Of course, the converse is also true: by becoming
so central to social reproduction, cohesion, and solidarity, and even citizenship, the
family assumes a public and social function that invites, even requires, intensified
governing.
Conclusion
The Italian welfare state has always leaned on Italian families to bridge the
many gaps in its safety net. What distinguishes the neoliberal moment is the explicit
anointment of the heteronormative family as worthy recipient of social services by
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virtue of its function as generator of solidarity. In the first decade of the new
millennium the family has “blown up” onto the political stage propelled by a new
welfare model, demographic concerns, and the resurgence of the Vatican. There it is
likely to play multiple leading roles for some time: threatened and vulnerable institution
in need of government protection; privileged site of biological, social, and cultural
reproduction; social formation that fosters cohesion, integration, and security; and
citizen of a new social contract. In this chapter I have examined policy proposals and
moments of institutional articulation of this new approach to the family, as well as the
terms of the resistance they have engendered. The First National Conference on the
Family laid out the logics of a new politic of the family, legitimating and justifying
explicit government intervention in support of particular kinds of families and the
exclusion of others.
The convergence of heightened politics of the family elicited reflection and
discussion among a group of feminist actors about feminist positions on the family. I
draw on this discussion to show the pervasiveness of a discourse that justifies the
recognition of relationships in terms of their social function in fostering social cohesion
and social solidarity. The discussions on the family among feminists drew upon shared
logics of the functionality of affective relationships to society. The very notion of
“social cohesion” presupposes harmonious social “goals” (Dobbernack 2010: 149), an
idea at odds with leftist and feminist theories. At the same time that they drew on a
shared lexicon of solidarity, however, feminist narratives on the family reject the
notion, central to the new welfare and new moral order, that only the bonds of
heteronormativity produce social cohesion and solidarity.
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I interpret these arguments as reflecting the pervasiveness of a post-welfare
social model that locates social solidarity in the private sphere of affective relationships
(Muehlebach 2012), a model that is functional to neoliberal governing. However, I also
suggest that these arguments represent more than simple “ventriloquism,” or even
“strategic appropriation” of the dominant discourse. Read against the context of
intensifying biopolitical and Catholic politics of the family and reproduction, the
assertion of the functionality of other family forms to society is not a residual critique.
Neoliberal restructuring in Italy is moralized and legitimated through discourses and
policies that inextricably tie social solidarity and cohesion to the heteronormative
family and its reproduction, both social and biological. The assertion of other forms of
family-making holds the promise to “unhinge” social logics.
The politics of the family are central to the transformations in social citizenship
unfolding in Italy. Developments in family policy since 2007 confirm the family’s
central role in the revisioning of the social contract under neoliberalism. New citizens,
subjects, and persons are being asserted through policies and in discourse, ranging from
the embryo to the family. Even as it promises a more appealing alternative to
individualistic neoliberal logics, the relational model of citizenship in Italy is predicated
on the privileging of heteronormative relationships and the exclusion of other family
forms. Justified in terms of the functionality of the family to social cohesion and
solidarity, particularly in the post-welfare moment, this revisioning of the social
contract threatens to engender new boundaries and logics of inclusion and exclusion.
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CHAPTER 5
DEMOGRAPHIC DISCOURSES & REPRODUCTIVE ENCOUNTERS
Introduction
In an article that has inspired and oriented a burgeoning feminist anthropological
literature on reproduction, anthropologists Faye Ginsburg and Rayna Rapp (1995:1)
called on researchers to bring reproduction “in both its biological and social
interpretations” to the forefront of social inquiry. Over the past decade it would be
difficult to ignore the centrality, relevance, and importance of reproduction to the
biological, moral, and social reproduction of Italian society. Statistical elaborations of
fertility rates regularly make headlines, often juxtaposing the fertility rates of Italian and
migrant women; politicians, experts, Vatican officials, and cultural commentators warn
of “disappearing Italians,” “demographic suicide,”1 and foretell of a graying nation
unable to sustain its social entitlements.
These discourses are not limited to Italy. Europe’s demographics cause concern
among commentators and institutions of governance across the Atlantic. From the
United Nations and the European Union, to the likes of Pat Buchanan and Orianna
Fallacci, news coverage and cultural commentaries warn of an apocalyptic scenario for
the future of a continent no longer reproducing itself. An editorial in the Wall Street
Journal asserts that “the greatest threat that Italians face is one of demographic selfimmolation,” a fate shared with other Europe countries as “Italy is not alone in
committing demographic suicide” in Europe (Meotti 2010). Anxieties over whether and
which children are being born echo across Europe. In national contexts as different as
1
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2010.
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Germany, France, and Poland they translate into discourses and practices that treat
women’s reproductive practices as a threat to the nation (Castañeda 2008; Sargeant
2006; Mishtal 2012). Nationalist demographies (Krause 2006) differentiate between the
fertility rates of citizen and migrant populations, but demographic discourses also
implicitly or explicitly identify other “internal” groups’ marked by class, race, religion,
or regional affiliation as a threat to the nation. Scholars of reproduction and critical
demography have documented these production of fertility panics directed toward
reproductive “Others,” like Latino women in the US (Chavez 2004), Palestinian women
in Israel (Kanaaneh 2002), Malay and Indian women in Singapore (Heng and Devan
1992), and poor and black women in Brazil (De Zordo 2012; Cardarello 2012). These
“political arithmetic” (Kanaaneh 2002: 27) articulate with global processes in which
people are increasingly mobile, but unlike capital, remain beholden to national
boundaries (Willen 2005).
In Italy demographers have been warning about the “problem” of low fertility
for two decades. In the 1990s, these expert warnings did not translate into explicit calls
and policies for more Italian babies. Constrained by the social memory of fascist
pronatalism, concerns over low fertility rates played out discursively as “demographic
alarmism,” a “sneaky” form of pronatalism (Krause 2001). In the 2000s, the issue of
low fertility gained legitimacy as a legitimate problem requiring intervention into the
family (Treves 2000; Krause and Marchesi 2007). Italians were scolded into
reproducing or accepting its consequences, as former Minister Giuliano Amato’s quip
for Italians to “either have children or accept immigrants” (Pugliese 2000) suggests.
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This chapter addresses the question that led me into the field for my dissertation
research: How do intensifying expert and political discourses on the population and
reproduction translate into experiences, subjectivities, and practices on the ground? I
draw on interviews with migrant advocates, cultural mediators, and feminist actors and
on participation in a conference on Italy’s “demographic winter” to examine the terms
and struggles around the politics of fertility over the past decade. I examine
demographic discourse in relation to the sphere of reproductive rights and health, a
framing that brings to light contradictions and even paradoxes. My findings suggest that
discourses that juxtapose fertile migrant women with un-reproductive Italian women do
not directly translate into systemic policies and practices aimed at reducing migrant
women’s fertility. Instead, demographic politics are distilled through other political
projects and commitments, often limiting intervention to the dimension of discourse and
governmentality. Unlike top-down demographic policies like those that linger in the
social memory of Italians from the fascist period, or the vitapolitics being brought to
bear in the politics of the embryo, pronatalist politics in Italy work through
governmental techniques of power which aim to influence “the conduct of conduct”
(Foucault 1982: 220-221) by shaping subjectivities and engendering desires. As
scholars of governmentality note governing through freedom and agency generates
inherently unpredictable effects (Dean 1999: 11).
Insights from critical demography, the anthropology of reproduction, and
Foucauldian theorizations of power and discourse inform my analysis. Migrant cultural
mediators, health care staff, and migrant advocates shared generally positive
assessments of reproductive, particularly obstetrical, health services for migrant women
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in Milan, including for those who are undocumented. This finding was doubly
surprising to me in light of intensifying alarmist demographic discourse that targets
migrant women’s reproduction and of the “erosion of reproductive services from
within” decried by Italian women’s health advocates. Moreover, these positive
assessments run counter not only to these trends in Italian society, but also to research
that finds significant reproductive health outcome differentials between Italian and
migrant women (see, for example, Bollini et al. 2009, cited in Severino and Bonati 2010:
57 and Lombardi and Carrillo 2011).

In this chapter I seek to tease out these contradictory findings by showing that
they reflect a complex and contradictory synergy of political and moral commitments
that include the ascendance of moral politics of life that award subjecthood and rights to
the moment of conception; the recognition, enshrined in Italy’s Constitution, of health
care as a universal human right and of pregnancy and motherhood as requiring special
“safeguarding,” even at the expense of women’s agency and rights;2 of the existence of
spaces and services, such as family planning clinics and cultural mediation, informed by
feminist commitments to reproductive rights; and finally, they reflect the limitations of
liberal democracies to explicitly intervene, and more so to intervene in differential
ways, in the fertility of their subjects (see King 2000). In addition to the sometimes
surprising effects of these institutional articulations, I also show that demographic
warnings over the future of the nation are amenable to reinterpretation. Both migrant

2

Article 32 of the Italian Constitution reads “The Republic safeguards health as a fundamental right of
the individual and as a collective interest, and guarantees free medical care to the indigent” (Senato della
Repubblica 1947, http://www.senato.it/documenti/repository/istituzione/costituzione_inglese.pdf).
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and Italian women reappropriate and redeploy warnings over their problematic fertility
into biopolitical claims for citizenship and a less precarious life.
These findings suggest that while demographic concerns are global in scope
they always play out over complex social and moral terrains. The relationship between
population politics and practices is dynamic, multifaceted, and unpredictable, especially
when population politics aim to shape reproductive practices through discourses,
incitements, and expertise. Despite criticism that Foucault’s theorization of power
leaves little room for agency, this approach in fact foregrounds the possibilities for
agency and resistance. However, while my focus is on highlighting the contradictions
and indeterminacies of demographic politics in Italy as they emerge in their
articulations with other political projects, I hope to avoid glossing over the inequalities
that structure the domain of reproduction (Colen 1995). Additionally, while my research
focused on the dimension of politics and discourses and not on the direct observation of
the micro-interactions that take place behind closed doors between health care providers
and their patients, I am cognizant of the disciplining and political divestment of
migrants that may occur under the guise of welfare or universal human rights (Fassin
2007; Ong 1995; Ticktin 2006).
My analysis is informed by Rhoda Kanaaneh’s notion of “political arithmetic,
often a highly racialized, classed, and gendered form of knowledge/power,” the effects
of which “can be overestimated” (Kanaaneh 2002: 27). Kanaaneh cautions that
population politics often do not produce the desired effects. I find Kanaaneh’s
application of Derek Sayer’s (1994) questions about state projects to demographic
issues very productive to think through the contradictions that emerge at the
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intersections of demographic discourse and reproductive health practices in Italy. Sayer
asks:
First, how cohesive historically are hegemonic projects? Second, even if they
are cohesive at some level – of intellectuality – how cohesive are they when
actually translated into practice? Third, even if these projects are successful at
both levels, how confining are they anyway? And fourth, who is the audience
for this performance? Or are we just dealing with stories that elites tell
themselves? (Sayer 1994:371, cited in Kanaaneh 2002: 27-28).
In this chapter I start by delineating the “stories that elites tell themselves” in
Italy about the threats posed by Italy’s demographics and the history that informs and
constrains them. I then turn my attention to the stories that migrant women told me
about their experiences with reproductive services in Italy and to projects and policies
that run counter to the “political arithmetic” of political and expert discourses. I show
that practices of reproductive health care and migrant advocacy suggest that
demographic discourses in Italy are in fact not “cohesive … when actually translated
into practice.”
Sarah Willen’s (2005) research on migrant women’s reproductive health care in
Israel provides another example of the contradictory effects of demographic alarmism
and immigration policies and advocacy. Willen frames her analysis of the demographic
context of selective pronatalism in Israel and the challenges that the global political
economy of migration poses to the social contract between a nation-state and its
citizens. Willen finds that despite Israel demographic politics, the institutional hold of
Israeli pronatalism comes to invest, in a weakened form, even natalism deemed a threat
to the nation, at least in the context of the leftist Tel Aviv. In this she identifies the
important role played by NGOs active in migrant advocacy in acting as a
“counterweight” to demographic state policies. In emphasizing the possibilities, if
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limited, for advocacy of migrant undocumented women enabled by policies seemingly
at odds with nationalist demographic concerns, her analysis sheds light on the
relationship between pronatalism, migration, reproduction.
The chapter is divided into three parts. In the first section I draw on literature on
the history of the discipline of demography and of population interventions in Italy as a
context for the political and expert discourses that have gained legitimacy over the past
two decades. Drawing on ethnographic data I show that this newfound legitimacy
enables respected demographers and conservative politicians to identify persistently low
fertility rates among Italians and a fast-growing immigrant population as a threat to the
integrity of the nation. In the next section I turn to the experiences of migrant cultural
mediators employed in health services who articulate a relatively positive assessment of
reproductive services for migrant women in Milan. In my analysis of these narratives I
bring to bear the institutional, legal, political, and moral contexts of these experiences. I
argue that even as these narratives run counter to other findings about health inequities
between migrant and Italian women that suggest that reproductive stratification is in
fact a problem in Italy, they do remind us to consider how demographic discourse
intersects and articulates with local political and moral contexts. I conclude this section
by showing how the urgency of demographic discourse is amenable to being reframed
and redeployed to assert the reproductive contributions of immigrants to the nation.
In the last section of this chapter I examine the way Italian feminists and
women’s health activists contest the discourse of demographic alarmism. Italian
feminists, especially women of reproductive age, were critical of the politics of life and
the population. I draw on participant observation in discussions of low fertility to show
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how feminist critiques of demographic discourse deflect discourses of low fertility by
attributing them to the failures of the social state. In contesting the terms of
demographic discourse, feminist counter-discourses made demands for a less precarious
economic and social situation. Finally, I point to the continued relevance of competing
demographic discourses by showing how concerns with overpopulation have not been
replaced by anxiety over low fertility. Whatever the framing of “population problems,”
women’s bodies and reproductive practices are centrally implicated. I conclude by
suggesting that while demographic alarmism has so far failed in its intended objective
of increasing the birth rates of Italian-born women, it has succeeded in legitimating
explicit political profamilist interventions, which I examine in the following chapter.
Demographic Discourse: A Brief History
The “problem” of the population
Political concerns over demographic statistics and attempts to intervene to alter
them are not new in Italy. The birth rate of Italians has been a ‘problem’ for the State
for at least a century, though the nature of the problem has varied. The fascist regime’s
support for the new science of demographic statistics paralleled its obsession with the
birth rates of Italians. The regime famously instituted pronatalist policies such as a tax
on bachelors and criminalized contraception and abortion, including the dissemination
of information about them, deeming them ‘crimes against the health and integrity of the
stock’ (Horn 1991: 585). In addition to punitive policies, financial and other incentives
were also introduced; these took the forms of “marriage loans” to be “repaid” in
children, payments for children born alive, train discounts for honeymoons, and
lactation rooms in factories (Ipsen 1997, 217-239). These measures were mostly
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symbolic as the requirements were hard to meet (Ipsen 2007).3 Neither coercion nor
incentives, however, ultimately succeeded in increasing birth rates; in fact, the
penetration of the fascist state into the family-making practices of Italians engendered
resistance (see de Grazia 1992; Passerini 1987; Wilson 1996).
Resistance to population politics continued for decades following the demise of
the fascist regime. What has been possible to say and do in the realm of population
politics in Italy has a lot to do with the legacy of fascist population politics (Krause
2001; Treves 2007). In the postwar period, pronatalist policies were delegitimized
because of their association with fascism even as policies on the family and
reproduction, such as the criminalization of contraception and abortion continued
through the 1970s (Caldwell 1978). When I described my project to an Italian feminist
sociologist using the term “population politics” she cautioned me that no one would use
those words in Italy because of their fascist connotations.4
A “long ‘demographic silence”’ followed the “demographic intoxication” of the
fascist regime (Treves 2007: 47). Historical geographer Anna Treves has traced the
evolution of demography and population politics in Italy, with a particular focus on a
period often ignored: the postwar era through the 1970s. She describes how the
prestigious status fascism accorded to the discipline of demography vanished in its
wake, the term “demography” became “almost unpronounceable and declaring oneself a
demographer almost impossible” (Treves 2007: 48). So intertwined was the discipline
of demography with the fascist regime that for a period of at least three decades after
3

It is these positive, incentivizing interventions in marriage, the family, and reproduction that most echo
the current politics of fertility in Italy, with its “baby bonuses” and proposals for “baby bonds,” an
account for each child born that would combine state financial supports with family contributions (see,
for example, Livi Bacci 2003).
4
Fieldnote, “Conference on the Family,” May 25, 2007.
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the end of World War Two “to speak of ‘demographic policy’” was equivalent to
uttering “one of the names of fascism” (Treves 2007: 47). This silence lingered in the
postwar period, not just among the political classes but also among the very
demographic experts who had founded a number of demographic journals during
fascism (Treves 2007: 47). In the postwar period, articles on Italian demography
“disappeared” from the pages of these journals, replaced by other kinds of “social and
economic statistics” and articles on methodology (Treves 2007: 47). Demographers
became statisticians and avoided demography to such an extent that detailed data on
postwar demography in Italy are lacking (Treves 2007: 48).
The disappearance of demography did not mean that there was no discourse on
population in the postwar period. Population issues still mattered, but were researched
and discussed indirectly. In the 1950s and 1960s, demographic discourse became the
invert of that espoused by fascist demographers: the problem was no longer defined by
a deficiency of population but rather by an excess, particularly as it concerned the south
(Treves 2007: 48-49). In fact, Italy’s overall TFR in the postwar period reached its
highest level at 2.702 in 1964 (Istat 2011d: 109). These arguments recapitulated at the
national level the global overpopulation concerns of the times. Yet, when one looks at
the statistics available for the decades following the war, the rise in birth rates is not that
drastic, and not beyond what would be expected. Not much had changed since fascist
time and yet the undisputed notion that Italy’s population was deficient was replaced
with the equally undisputed fact that Italy had a dangerous excess of population (Treves
2007: 50).
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The post-fascist period was marked by significant continuity in family and
reproductive policy (Caldwell 1989: 170-2). The criminalization of abortion and
contraception, for example lasted until the 1970s.5 No longer justified by a pronatalism
at the service of national military power, the continuation of fascist population policies
reflected instead the powerful influence in postwar Italy of the Christian Democratic
Party and the Vatican (Caldwell 1978). In the 1960s and 1970s feminist campaigns to
legalize abortion, contraception, and divorce, to reform patriarchal family legislation,
and to found family planning clinics, known as consultori familiari, challenged leftover
fascist policies and Catholic ideologies of reproduction and the family. This period
marks the beginning of a new phase in the politics of population in Italy where the
nature of “the problem” reverses once again to population decline and low birth rates
(Krause 2001; Treves 2007: 55). Demography begins to come out of its postwar silence
and to shed its fascist associations as a new generation of demographers “timidly”
returns to the study of the Italian population (Treves 2007: 55). In the decades to follow,
demographers become increasingly emboldened in their research and warnings over the
low fertility rates of Italians, helped by emerging critiques of coercive Malthusian
family planning policies around the world (Treves 2007: 56; see Hartmann 1995).
These expert discourses make their way into the media and prepare the terrain for a
mostly successful overcoming of a “giant taboo” toward a “natalist renewal” (Treves
2007: 57).
Alarmism over Italy’s population underwent a third inversion in the 1990s,
coming back full circle to concerns over population decline (Krause 2001). However,
5

Contraception was legalized in1971, divorce in 1970, and abortion in 1978. In what came to signal a
significant loss in the social influence of the Vatican, the legalization of divorce and abortion were
confirmed by popular referenda in 1974 and 1981 respectively.
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until the 2000s, politicians remained cautious to suggest any intervention that could be
construed as pronatalist and could trigger comparisons with fascism. As the Italian left,
the undisputed heir of anti-fascism, took on the problem of low fertility in the mid2000s, the “natalist renewal” was fully legitimated (Krause and Marchesi 2007; Treves
2007: 57). The “natalist taboo” is successfully overcome, pronatalism became once
again politically feasible, and “the State declared itself newly ready to penetrate the
intimacy of the bedroom to encourage couples to make babies, or to make more babies”
(Treves 2007: 58). By the late 2000s politicians across the political spectrum had
embraced the problem of Italy’s low fertility, often framing interventions in terms of
family policy (Krause and Marchesi 2007).
Population Arithmetic
Unlike the postwar period, for which detailed demographic data is lacking, fertility
rates in Italy today are constantly monitored and demographic statistics regarding births
and migration are published multiple times a year by various institutes and reported in
newspaper and newscasts. Those statistics show that in the mid-1990s total fertility
rates (TFR)6 dipped below 1.2 children per woman (Caltabiano et al 2009, 681), well
below the 2.1 children per woman considered replacement level for an industrialized
population. Today, even with rates that have increased to 1.4 children per woman (Istat
2009 in Caltabiano et al 2009, 681), Italy continues to be described as “a country with
persistent very low fertility levels” (Caltabiano et al 2009, 681). An important
dimension of the discourse on fertility decline among Italians is its coincidence with a
significant increase in the migrant population, which constituted 7% of the total
6

TFR refers to total fertility rates, “the number of children that a woman would bear if she survived
through the ages of childbearing and gave birth at the age-specific rates of the time period” (JohnsonHanks 2008: 302).
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population in 2010 (Istat 2010: 1), and with the higher fertility rates of migrants
reported regularly in demographic statistics, which in the same year totaled 13.6% of
total births (Istat 2010: 2).7 According to a 2010 report by the Italian Ministry of Health,
the majority of immigrant women having children in Italy originate from other
European Union countries (about 40%), followed by 26% originating from Africa, 17%
from Asia, and 9.5% from South America (Ministero della Salute 2010: 20-21).
The “problem” of low fertility among Italian women is often juxtaposed with the
growth of the immigrant population, both through immigration and births. Anxieties
over the racial and cultural reproduction of the nation, which anthropologist Elizabeth
Krause has described as “demographic nationalism” (2006), are articulated by
politicians as well as by some demographers. In a 2008 hearing on low birth rates in
Parliament, for example, the Undersecretary of the Family, Carlo Giovinardi, warned
that:
This is a country that is dying from low birth rates, from the aging of the population,
from a migratory flow so massive that it renders integration difficult since there is
no longer an Italian society into which non-EU immigrants can integrate. … If this
is the trend, in two or three generations, Italians will disappear.8
Demographic issues are extensively covered in the media, explored in books, and
featured as prominent topics in the discourses of politicians and cultural commentators.
Newspaper headlines warn of a looming crisis. Three consecutive years of headlines
describing Italy’s statistical institution’s report on the population in the leftist la
7

In 1995, children born of foreign parents represented 1.7% of the births (Istat 2009, 3). The increase in
births by migrant parents between 2009 and 2010 was of 10.4% (Istat 2010, 3). Regional differences in
immigration patterns are reflected in the birth rates as well: 19% of the total births in the North are
classified as “foreign children,” in the Center the percentage of foreign children to total births is 14%,
while in the South it drops to 3.4% (Istat 2009: 3).
8
Undersecretary of the Family, Parliamentary Testimony, July 2008 Commission XII Affari
Sociali, Audizione del sottosegretario di Stato alla Presidenza del Consiglio, Carlo Giovanardi, sugli
orientamenti programmatici del Governo in materia di famiglia e di droga, Seduta di giovedi 3 luglio
2008, http://new.camera.it/_dati/lavori/stencomm/12/audiz2/2008/0703/s000r.htm, 8-9.
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Repubblica daily show an increasing alarmism: “Istat, in Italy more residents and
children. Decisive the presence of immigrants”9 (2007); “Italians are almost 60 million,
growing thanks to immigrants. 564, 000 newborns, of which 60,000 are foreigners. But
demographic growth is near zero”10 (2008); “Istat: ‘We have gone beyond 60 millions,
record-breaking births from foreign parents. The children of immigrants fill 19% of the
cradles of northern Italy”11 (2009). La Padania, the daily published by the far right
Lega Nord party, also covered the publication of Istat’s report on the population,
writing “We are the grandfathers of Europe and the fathers of Islam: Many elderly and
few youths, more divorces and less marriages” (Pesante 2006).12 In early 2007, La
Padania used demographic statistics to warn of an “invasion” of the “cradles”: “And
now ‘the invasion’ comes from the cradle. According to demographic projections, 10%
of the children that will be born this year will be children of immigrants.” The
“problem” of Italy’s low birth rates is not one of absolute population numbers, but
rather a racialized and nationalist discourse about who is filling Italy’s cradles.
In the mid-2000s, the conservative coalition led by Silvio Berlusconi instituted
the ‘baby-bonus,’ a financial reward for mothers having a second child or beyond.
Significantly, only European Union citizens were eligible for the 1000€ one-time bonus
(Krause and Marchesi 2007). In 2007, the Ministry for Policies on the Family, a
9

“Istat, in Italia più residenti e bambini. Decisiva la presenza degli stranieri L'istituto di statistica
evidenzia il ruolo degli immigrati. Ritorna l'emigrazione dal Sud al Nord, culle di nuovo ‘piene,’” la
Repubblica.it, July 5 2007.
10
“Gli italiani sono quasi 60 milioni in crescita grazie agli immigrati 564 mila i nuovi nati di cui 60 mila
stranieri. Ma crescita demografica vicina allo zero.” La Repubblica.it, July 3, 2008,
http://www.repubblica.it/2008/05/sezioni/cronaca/istat/istat/istat.html, last accessed August 21, 2009.
11
“Istat: ‘Siamo oltre 60 milioni,’ record di nascite da genitori stranieri. Superato il traguardo grazie agli
stranieri. I figli degli immigrati riempiono il 19% delle culle del nord Italia” la Repubblica.it, 23 June
2009, http://www.repubblica.it/2009/04/ sezioni/cronaca/istat-popolazione/istat-poplazione2/istatpoplazione2.html, last accessed August 21, 2009.
12
Despite its title, the article does not actually mention Islam, but rather focuses on Italy’s aging, fertility
rates, highlighting the higher fertility of immigrants, and the crowding of prisons, which the article
attributes in large part to immigrants.
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ministry established for the first time by the center-left Prodi government, organized the
first National Conference on the Family. The conference, with its slogan “The Family
Grows, Italy Grows” (Cresce la famiglia, cresce l’Italia), marks the legitimacy obtained
by pronatalist discourses and policy-making in Italy, a shift enthusiastically described
by Minister of Health Livia Turco as a “cultural leap” for Italy.13 Over the past decade,
the period of demographic “abstinence” that followed fascism has undeniably given
way to “demographic intoxication” (2007: 47).
Of Demographic Winter and a False Spring
With demographic discourse rehabilitated and the “problem” of low fertility
rates elevated to the level of national threat, explicitly pronatalist projects and
discourses proliferated in Italy, often targeting women. In warnings about missing
Italian babies the politics of life and demographic anxieties converge. These
convergences were evident at a conference titled, “Inverno Demografico” 14
(“Demographic Winter”) co-sponsored by the city of Milan and the Italian Movement
for Life. The poster for this conference caught my eye as I was walking near the
University of Milan, in the city’s downtown. Written in large letters over a landscape
painting of icebergs, “Demographic Winter” evoked a natural disaster. The poster
identifies the artwork as Friedrich’s “Sea of Ice,” a painting also known as “The Wreck
of Hope,” probably in reference to the shipwrecked remains buried under the jutting
icebergs. The imagery warns of a disaster foretold, of death without the hope of

13

Digital recording, May 24, 2007.
The full title of the conference reads: “Inverno Demografico: dinamiche demografiche e crescita zero
in Europa, Italia e Lombardia” (Demographic Winter: Demographic Dynamics and Zero Growth in
Europe, Italy and Lombardy). A PDF of the conference flyer is available at:
http://www.to.chiesadimilano.it/or/ADMI/esy/objects/docs/685466/Volantino_Inverno_demografico.pdf.
14
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renewal. Below this catastrophic imagery was the slogan of the Lombard Movement for
Life: “defending life to defend our future.”15
The featured speaker was Gian Carlo Blangiardo, a leading demographer of
migration with Lombardy’s respected institute on migration research and statistics,
Iniziative e studi sulla multietnicità (ISMU). I had seen professor Blangiardo give
papers at numerous conferences on immigration. This was a different kind of
conference. Instead of the free statistical and qualitative research on immigration
provided to participants at conferences of the migration institute, volunteers with the
Milanese Movement for Life hawked pamphlets about conception and the beginning of
life, abortion, and the traditional family. The audience consisted of about 50 middleaged or older men and women, many of them members of the pro-life movement.
After speeches by conservative journalists and by Milanese officials, the
President of Milan’s Movement for Life, Paolo Sorbi, introduced the demographer.
Sorbi celebrated the “new centrality of demography” in the wake of “sociocultural
changes and family dynamics” and of shifts in “geopolitical conditions” “over the past 5
or 6 years”. “The heart of demographic dynamics,” argued the pro-life activist, “is the
issue of the family. It’s not just a sociological problem, it’s a human problem of nonreplacement: children are not born!”16
In his speech the demographer made the case for a lingering demographic winter
without true renewal in Italy. He argued that interventions were necessary because
Italy’s demographic situation was comparable to that of a cold and barren country: “the
setting is of winter, not of spring, which renews itself giving fruit.” The demographer
15

“Difendere la vita per difendere il nostro futuro.”
http://www.to.chiesadimilano.it/or/ADMI/esy/objects/docs/685466/Volantino_Inverno_demografico.pdf.
16
Fieldnote and digital recording, “Demographic Winter,” April 14, 2007.
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was particularly interested in dismissing recent increases in Italian birth rates:
“demographic winter exists, it’s a rigid, heavy winter.” The promise of a thaw in the
uptick in birth rates was due to higher immigrant fertility and not to an increase in
Italian women’s birth rates, which would produce the “right” kinds of fruit. With “10%
of children born in Italy being from immigration,” the demographer did acknowledge
that migrants contribute “an injection of vitality.” However, he cautioned that increased
immigrant births, along with a growing population due to immigration, threatened to
overwhelm the national body. The demographer warned that “where immigration
assumes excessive speed, uncontrollable reactions are released. Time is needed to
immunize ourselves.”
Despite acknowledging that demographers could not find any causal links
between the legalization of abortion and Italy’s fertility decline, “we looked,” he said,17
the demographer still noted that “the over 5 million children who are not here” because
of abortion represent a sizeable “missing population.” Its absence is further
compounded by the fact that by now these missing Italians (ostensibly) would be
reproducing too. With Italy’s immigrant population in 2007 estimated to be around 5
million in 2007, the implication that the “missing population” of aborted Italians18 has
been replaced by immigrants is hard to miss. The demographer proposed that low birth
rates were “linked to vast cultural changes, the debate on abortion, divorce” and
changes in women’s roles. Also to blame were “hedonistic tendencies,” epitomized by
the “need” for that “trip to the Caribbean.” This cultural orientation to hedonism was
17

Blangiardo suggested that low birth rates were “linked to vast cultural changes, the debate on abortion,
divorce” and changes in women’s roles (Blangiardo, fieldnote 4/14/07).
18
This calculation doesn’t acknowledge the fact that a portion of these “missing children” would have
been born to migrant women who have higher abortion rates than Italian women (Ministero della Salute
2010; Spinelli et al. 2006). For the purposes of this talk the unborn became uniformly Italian.
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responsible for generating a situation in which the “missing” Italians have to be
replaced by immigrants. “We can import them,” he concluded, “but it’s not the same
thing.”
The “Demographic Winter” conference presented Italy’s “problem” of low
fertility in moral and cultural terms, as a problem of the weakening of the traditional
family, as an outcome of hedonistic consumerism, tinged with Islamophobic references
to “geopolitical” concerns. The demographer highlighted differences in fertility rates
between migrant and Italian women, and dismissed the notion that immigrant fertility is
a solution to Italy’s demographic issues, citing threat posed by un-integrable and
inassimilable differences centered on the family. In this framing, the low fertility of
Italian women is juxtaposed with a threatening “excess” of immigrants, “an enormous
demographic pressure at the borders, which will continue for decades,” as well as an
internal pressure from the higher fertility rates of migrant women.
The Limits of Population Arithmetic
The “Demographic Winter” conference showcased the urgency of some expert
and political demographic discourses that warn that the survival of the nation is at stake.
Pro-natalist and pro-life aims converge in demographic alarmism and in incentives such
as the baby-bonus. Less visible policies, such as the defunding of public reproductive
services in favor of Catholic clinics described in the previous chapters,19 or a moral
politics of the family are interventions through which pronatalist discourse can
materializes into practice.

19

These interventions affect migrant women disproportionality, since migrant women access public
family planning clinic at significantly higher rates than Italian women (Lombardi and Corrillo 2011).
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The politics of life and exhortations to Italian women to have more babies,
however, are not always aligned. In 2004, the Italian Parliament approved legislation
strongly supported by the Vatican that restricted access to assisted reproductive
technologies (ARTs). The law disciplined ARTs in the name of protecting embryos and
the “natural” family, marking a new, if seemingly paradoxical, era of moral
intervention in reproduction. The debate over the ART legislation hinged over the
subjectivity of the embryo and the superiority of the traditional family as the site of
reproduction.20 This paradoxical restriction in access to fertility treatment in Italy in the
time of demographic anxiety reminds that demographic discourse is not simply a matter
of numbers. In addition to the desire to encourage the birth of more Italian babies,
demographic concerns intersect intensifying moral commitments to life and family.
Catholic politicians supported the restriction of assisted reproduction in the name of the
right of the embryo not just to life, but to a heteronormative, biologically related family.
Pronatalism and pro-familism are tightly coupled in Italian demographic policies, as the
comments of an Italian parliamentarian well-known for her Catholic orientation,
illustrate: “We don’t want, however, to do as France has done. We want children born
within marriage, and thus, we also need politics that contribute to stabilize familial ties.
We are talking about a vast cultural work (si tratta di un grande lavoro culturale).”21 In
the rest of the paper I examine how the cultural work of demographic discourse and

20

Of course, the assertion of embryo subjecthood ultimately could translate into a direct intervention in
fertility as it could erode contraception and abortion services.
21
Binetti’s comments are all the more striking because they came in response to the testimony cited
above that warned of disappearing Italians replaced by immigrants,
http://new.camera.it/_dati/lavori/stencomm/12/audiz2/2008/0703/s000r.htm.
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moral pronatalism is experienced by women differentially targeted by it and how it is
enacted in policies and practices related to reproductive health.
Migrant Women & Reproductive Health
How do these discourses of demographic alarmism, “replacement anxiety,” and
moral pronatalism translate into practices at the point of access of reproductive
services? One way of assessing the effect of demographic discourse is through the very
fertility statistics that fuel demographic alarmism. Statistical data suggest that pronatalist interventions, both discursive and material, have not succeeded in changing
fertility rates among Italian-origin women. This lack of translation of pronatalism into
more of the “right” kinds of babies is not an exception. Fascist pronatalism was
famously unsuccessful in boosting fertility. Working in the context of Israeli and
Palestinian demographic politics, Rhoda Kanaaneh notes that ‘population policies are
frequently unsuccessful, at least by their stated goals … The desired production of
‘manageable’ subjects often seems to remain elusive.” (Kanaaneh 2002: 27).
Demographic policies and discourses, however, may have other, unintended and
unstated consequences as they intersect with the broader context in which they are
deployed.
In this section I draw on the experiences of migrant women with health services,
both as patients and as cultural and linguistic mediators. I examine a women’s health
program for migrant women, and a policy that grants pregnant undocumented migrant
women temporary residency permits. These experiences, policies, and health care
projects reveal the limits of demographic discourses that warn of the dearth of Italianorigin babies and of the surplus of “foreign” babies as it encounters other political,
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moral, and social commitments. Because I was unable to obtain access to systematic,
direct observation of interactions between health providers and migrant women, my
data cannot speak to the nature of those interactions and the assumptions and
disciplining technologies that may structure them (see for example Ong 1995; Rapp
1999; Salih 2002).
My data do speak to the perception among some migrant cultural mediators and
advocates that reproductive services represent a bright spot relative to other institutional
settings. In conjunction with another finding, that migrant women, advocates, and
activists appropriate demographic discourse to assert their contributions to the nation
and to demand citizenship for migrants’ children, these data highlight the limits of
discourses to shape reproductive practices and subjectivities toward particular aims (see
Dean 1999). I argue that a combination of feminist commitments to women’s health, the
presence and work of cultural mediators, and policies such as a residency permit for
pregnancy converge to provide avenues for advocacy and support for women whose
reproduction is marked as a threat to the nation. Conversely, I show that the universalist
orientation of anti-abortion politics target migrant women’s abortion rights as they do
Italian women, though the consequences and implications may differ. These findings
are limited to the city of Milan; in regions of Italy where feminist and public
reproductive services and cultural mediation are weaker, the entanglement of
demographic concerns and universalist politics of life and solidarity may produce
different outcomes.
Research on migrant women’s reproductive health shows continuing inequalities
in health outcomes relative to Italian women (Bollini et al. 2009, cited in Severino and
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Bonati 2010: 57; Lombardi and Carrillo 2011). A meta-analysis on literature concerning
reproductive health outcomes in twelve European states found significant indicators of
inequality between Italian citizen and migrant women; these differences include lower
frequency and delayed prenatal care appointments, higher rates of premature births, and
fetal and neonatal deaths among migrant women, among other indicators (Bollini et al.
2009, cited in Severino and Bonati 2010: 57). A review of the statistics on health access
of Italians and migrant women also shows significant gaps between women who are
Italian citizens and migrant women in the rates of utilization of preventative health
services like pap tests and mammograms (Lombardi and Carrillo 2011).22 Despite these
differentials in health access, however, Italian sociologist Lia Lombardi finds that
migrant women’s access to reproductive services seems “overall adequate,” a more
positive assessment compared to Lombardi’s research in the early 2000s (Lombardi
2004). A quantitative and qualitative research project conducted by the National
Institute of Health on migrant women and abortion (Spinelli et al. 2006) found that
generally migrant women generally expressed satisfaction with abortion services in
Italy (48). Studies also quantify what is obvious to anyone involved in public health
services: migrant women access public reproductive health services at much higher
rates than Italian women (Lombardi and Carrillo 2011: 19).23 This difference point to
the implications of the disproportionate effects that the erosion of public reproductive
services is likely to visit upon migrant women’s reproductive health.
22

According to data elaborated by Istat, 51.6% of migrant women of appropriate age obtain pap smears
and 42.9% receive mammograms, as opposed to 71.8% and 73.1% respectively among Italian women
(Lombardi and Carrillo 2011: 18).
23
Lombardi reports that over 50% of migrant women see a gynecologist in a public health setting as
opposed to only 16.5% of Italian women, who tend to see a private provider. Similarly, migrant women’s
use of public family clinics, at about 38.3.3% is about three times higher than that of Italian women
(13.7% of Italian respondent reported accessing a public consultorio familiare) (Lombardi and Carrillo
2011: 19).
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Statistical differences in health care utilization, however, reflect more than
inequities related to health care, especially in a context like Italy where both
undocumented and documented pregnant migrant women have a right, at least on paper,
to equivalent prenatal services as Italian women. Some of the differences in health
outcome may reflect the discrimination that structure migrant women’s lives and
limited access to preventative and primary health care for undocumented migrants in
general. Other gaps in outcome may be due to structural obstacles outside the scope of
health care services. Some differences may reflect culturally inflected practices and
understandings of prenatal testing, such as differences in rates of utilization of
ultrasound scans during pregnancy (see Rapp 1999, Gammeloft 2007).24
Mediating Reproductive Health
Nina, a cultural mediator originally from Peru, was a participant in the cultural
mediation course I attended. Like many of the other students in this course, Nina had
been working as a mediator for years and was taking the course to obtain the certificate
of completion that would make her eligible for more mediation opportunities. Nina
invited me to meet her in the rundown office of the renters’ union where she worked a
couple of afternoons a week helping immigrants to navigate the bureaucracy of
obtaining public housing and providing advocacy for renters. After I helped with some
of the paperwork, we sat down in the bare office to talk. Nina described the dire
situations of the immigrants she came across in her work at the union, and was highly
critical of the lack of social services and limited public housing options. Nina was
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While migrant women have fewer ultrasound scans than Italian women—4.4 scans per pregnancy
among Italian women versus 5.6 scans per pregnancy among migrant women (Lombardi and Carrillo
2011: 20)—they still have twice the rate of 2.7 ultrasounds per pregnancy found among US women in
2005-2006 (Siddique et. al 2009).
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particularly upset by the process of family reunification; on paper migrants were
eligible to bring certain members of their family to Italy, but in practice the process was
a “via crucis,” the long suffering path of Jesus on his way to crucifixion. Accessing that
right is made difficult by minimum income, housing, and other paperwork
requirements, which sometimes delays the process for years. Nina discussed the pain of
having been separated from her children for four years after migrating to Italy and the
psychological consequences she attributed to that separation. Her dreams of returning to
Peru to participate in a project with an indigenous group in the Andes had to be
scrapped because of her oldest son’s problem. Nina told me that she had decided to put
her life on hold in order to go back and “finish this work of being mother” with her
grown son. She recounted telling him: “I want to finish this work, and then we’ll see,
you’ll see that it will be better for you too.”
Despite these difficulties and her experiences with the daily discriminations and
inequities experienced by immigrants, Nina responded to my question about her work
mediating for Latin American women in family planning clinics and hospitals with a
very uncharacteristic positive assessment:
Nina: I mean, I can tell you that within this, this, of this field, in this health
service, it’s positive. Immigrant women experience it this way too, I can tell you
as a migrant woman.
Milena: at least there is something [positive]!
Nina: yes, luckily, luckily, those who started to offer this type of service, or who
offer it are people who have a higher social and political conscience of those
who are in the government… they are the ones, they are always the ones who
have created this type of service because they have seen the need.
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Nina invoked a kind of universal sisterhood, a feminine orientation toward care,
to further explain why she thought women’s health services for migrant women
were good:
I mean, we who are women can also understand other women, for the fact of
gender, we are women, we don't see the race, I’m sorry, not the race, we don’t
see the country of origin, we don’t see these things, we only see the need of us
women. For that reason, um, I think that, um, within this area, it is great, the
service is good.
In contrast, Nina described other health services for migrants as being terrible:
if we have to speak in general about immigrant health, here in Italy, or at least
here in Milan, I can tell you that the service is awful… I can guarantee you, I
have experienced myself personally, with the death of my father, and it’s not a
unique case. … I can tell you that the things that I saw in the month that I lived
in the hospital, the care for immigrants is awful.
In our interview she described seeing migrant patients having to be operated multiple
times for appendicitis and implied that her father’s death was caused by malpractice
fueled by discrimination. Despite recent painful experiences with Italian health care
providers, Nina spoke positively of migrant women’s access to reproductive health
services.
I met Carolina, a cultural mediator who worked in women’s health and who had
migrated from Ecuador in the mid 1990s, through her involvement with the women’s
health association Donne, Diritti, Salute. Carolina worked in a migrant women’s health
center located in a Milanese hospital and in public family planning clinics. One day a
week she provided support to migrant women undergoing abortions in the hospital.
During an interview in a noisy McDonald’s in Milan’s galleria, she described positive
experiences in navigating Italian reproductive health care services on behalf of Latin
American women. She acknowledged that these positive experiences may have
something to do with the presence of cultural mediators:
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in the consultori I don’t see that a professional says ‘no, I won’t put in a request
for an abortion or for these tests.’ This has never happened, and I don’t think
that it will ever happen either. I don’t know, this, our presence has also helped a
lot at looking differently at the Other. I can’t say how it was before, I can’t say
how it would be, how it went, I really don’t think that they don’t do them, they
know their duty.
The real issue, she told me, was not the treatment of migrant women by health service
providers; it was the laws that governed migrants’ rights: “in terms of services, what a
pregnant woman has a right to is something that comes from above that doesn’t depend
on the family planning clinics or the centers [in the hospitals], that is to say, the laws
which are applied each time in a harsher manner.” Carolina’s concern was with the
recent tightening of the requirements for obtaining a residency permit for reasons of
pregnancy for undocumented pregnant women.
Since Italy’s 1998 Turco-Napolitano immigration law, undocumented migrant
women who are pregnant are legally “undeportable” and become eligible for a
temporary residency permit for the duration of the pregnancy and for six months
postpartum.25 A 2000 ruling by Italy’s Constitutional Court extended the nondeportability of an undocumented pregnant woman to her cohabiting husband.26
Obtaining the residency permit for pregnancy temporarily legalizes an undocumented
woman’s status and grants her access to free health care. Copays for diagnostic tests and
for any expenses related to birth are waved, as they are for Italian women. The
residency permit for reasons of pregnancy protects women from deportation, however,
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This right is established by Article 19 of the 1998 Turco-Napolitano immigration law: “Divieti di
espulsione e di respingimento. Disposizioni in materia di categorie vulnerabili” (“Prohibition of
expulsion and refusal of entry. Dispositions in matters of vulnerable categories”).
http://www.altalex.com/index.php?idnot=51626.
26
The Constitutional Court ruling, number 376, July 27, amends the text of the 1998 Turco-Napolitano
Immigration Law. http://www.altalex.com/index.php?idnot=51626. Unmarried fathers are not eligible for
the residency permit until the baby is born and they claim paternity, and are thus eligible for a permit due
to “family cohesion” reasons.
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it does not permit employment and it is not renewable after the six months postpartum
period. Additionally, the permit is not granted for the maximum length of pregnancy
and six months postpartum, but requires multiple renewals. The paperwork necessary
for each renewal includes certification of the pregnancy by a doctor. This medical
surveillance of pregnant women enables authorities to rescind a permit if the woman is
no longer pregnant, though she remains eligible in cases of a still-birth.
Residency permits for undocumented pregnant women are not unique to Italy.
Germany, for example, also grants temporary permits on the basis of pregnancy, though
with more limited benefits (Castaneda 2008). The act of applying for the permit makes
an undocumented migrant woman visible to authorities; its temporary nature makes that
visibility doubly problematic. However, unlike what Castaneda found in Germany,
where being undocumented is a crime, I did not hear this concern expressed by migrant
advocates or mediators in Italy during my fieldwork.27 From legal advocates, to doctors,
to migrant cultural mediators, the permit for pregnancy was described to me as an
important, if flawed, means to access health care, and even as a potential foothold
toward legal status for migrant women. The permit, however, cannot be converted into
permanent status, a point that was stressed to me by Irma, a migrant legal advocate who
had migrated to Italy in the 1980s from Albania. Irma noted: “the legislator thought of a
temporary protection, but not to go beyond the immigration laws.” Voicing the
perspective of the legislator she argued that they didn’t want immigrants to come to
Italy and have children in order to obtain legal residency.

27

This vulnerability became much more significant with the approval of the 2009 “Security Act,” which
criminalized undocumented migrants and opened up the possibility that health care providers could
inform the police about the immigration status of their patients. Previous immigration law in Italy forbade
health care providers from notifying authorities.
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Irma saw the permit as being deeply contradictory and her narrative reflected
this assessment as she wove back and forth between its benefits and restrictions “luckily
it exists, to give the possibility of protection, also for letting women birth in the
hospital, for example there was a period that women gave birth at home.” Yet, the
restrictions are significant, from not being able to work during pregnancy, to the
problem of what to do once the six months are over, to the paradoxical paperwork
requirements, which included documenting a stable residence: “this is a major
contradiction of this permit. I mean, on the one hand there is a safeguarding that should
exist regardless of the fact that you have housing or not, on the contrary, the less you
have housing the more you should be safeguarded.” On the other hand, as Carolina
noted, the requirement for the declaration of residency becomes the biggest obstacle to
obtaining the permit. A 1978 law requires notification to the police within 48 hours of
hosting a foreigner on one’s property.28 In order to legalize her status a woman needed
her landlord or host to admit to be housing her illegally.29 Carolina’s interpretation was
that officials at the questura, the police station then in charge of accepting and
reviewing documentation for residency permits, had decided that residency permits on
the basis of pregnancy were too easy to obtain. As a result, as Carolina complained,
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Article 12, law 191/78. The law actually requires this notification for any subjects, including Italians,
with the difference that for Italians the notification within 48 hours is required for guests who plan a stay
of over 30 days, while for foreigners it is required for any length of stay
(http://www.stranieriinitalia.it/anagrafe_e_autocertificazioni-dichiarazione_di_ospitalita_5841.html).
29
The approval under the Berlusconi government in 2009 of the “Pacchetto Sicurezza,” (“Security Packet
or Security Law) have resulted in further paradoxical requirements for undocumented women seeking a
residency permit on the basis of pregnancy. The Security Laws introduced the criminalization of
undocumented migration. Thus, undocumented women requesting a temporary residency permit on the
basis of pregnancy are in fact declaring their criminal status (undocumented migration) for which they
could be persecuted and fined between 5000 – 10,000 euros (Severino and Bonati 2010: 58).
Additionally, renting to an undocumented migrant was also criminalized under the “Security Law” of
2009, thus making the declaration of residency required to apply for the permit a very tricky process. The
Security Law also introduced the provision that a legal residency permit was required in order to be
recognized as the parent of a newborn child.
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these requirements put migrant women in a bind and put cultural mediators like herself
who worked in institutional settings into the difficult position of indirectly pointing out
loopholes without outright telling women to lie about the length of their residence on an
official form:
So, we have them read, we point it out that there is this thing [the 48-hour
requirement]. When they ask I usually answer that the police doesn’t go to the
home to check. Hmm, that’s my answer, what they do… so she makes it up, she
understands also because I don’t say anything, she knows I can’t say anything,
so she makes it up and we know that she makes it up, but we don’t check up on
it.30
Similarly, Irma described other loopholes in this requirement. She reported that such
migrant women who live in a situation where declaring their housing could risk
exposing other undocumented residents use friends or even nonprofits and associations
as their official residence.
The Health and Support Center for Migrant Women and their Children
Carolina and Nina’s experiences with reproductive health services for migrant
women were at least partly informed by working at two highly respected migrant
women’s health centers Centro salute e ascolto donne straniere ed i loro bambini (The
Health and Support Center for Migrant Women and their Children) located within two
of Milan’s largest hospitals, Ospedale San Paolo and San Carlo. The history,
philosophy, advocacy and funding associated with this project provides a broader and
institutional context to the experiences of cultural mediators. In an interview with the
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This requirement became even more difficult in the wake of the 2009 “Security Act,” which in addition
to criminalizing housing an undocumented person and the status of being undocumented itself, it also
allowed, in contravention of Italy’s immigration law, for health care providers to notify authorities about
the immigration status of a patient. The security laws also raised the possibility that undocumented
migrant women might lose custody of their children at birth by introducing the requirement of
documented status in order to officially recognize a child. A coalition of health care associations, nongovernmental and religious groups united in the successful “Noi non segnialiamo!” (We don’t inform!)
campaign (Severino and Bonati 2010: 51).
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center’s medical director, conducted in the small room where a social worker and
cultural mediator conduct intakes of new patients, the director of the center, doctor
Graziella Sacchetti, described its history. Sacchetti traced the origins of the center back
to the mid-to-late 1990s when health providers like herself began to be confronted with
increasing numbers of migrant women accessing reproductive and obstetrical care. The
impetus to do something, she said, was a combination of wanting to do the right thing
for these patients and to help health providers.
The original project put together in the late 1990s was a 900-hour course to train
migrant women as cultural mediators. The course was funded by a grant from the
Region of Lombardy, with monies set aside in the national immigration law. The course
included an internship component that placed cultural mediators in training in the
network of family planning clinics and hospitals. The explicit decision to tie cultural
mediation together into the network of family planning clinics reflects the feminist
political history and orientation of providers who, like Sacchetti, were involved in the
project.
During the three months of the internship of the first cultural mediation course,
health providers started reporting that migrant women were “self-selecting” their
appointments for the days in which cultural mediators were present. Sacchetti
remembered one provider complaining “hey, this is becoming a clinic just for migrant
women!” With the need for cultural mediators in reproductive health setting becoming
increasingly obvious, a need that Sacchetti described in terms of “all the problems
related to lack of knowledge about health services, the lack of knowledge of the
language, the lack of knowledge of many institutional paths,” she and her collaborators
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decided to propose a project for “a dedicated space that facilitated the overcoming of
these barriers.” Thus was born the Health and Support Center for Migrant Women and
their Children. From its inception, the orientation of the center and its providers
transcended a strictly medical approach. Sacchetti explained that while the first need at
access was related to health this need
immediately broadened, at the moment of first contact with the institution these
people would bring, simultaneously, other problems related to their lives, which
however were linked to health. There was the problem, obviously, of economic
difficulty, of work, of their precariousness, their irregularity on the Italian
territory.
Mindful of these problematics, the center proposed a project that would bring
together cultural mediators, social workers, and doctors to provide an integrated
approach to migrant women’s health. Sacchetti described an interest in balancing the
needs of migrant women, including through providing an option for drop-in
appointments, a very unusual model of access in Italy’s highly bureaucratized hospital
services. Yet, in setting up of a dedicated space for migrant women, Sacchetti was
concerned with avoiding the “ghettoization” of migrant women’s health. The center’s
ultimate goal was for integration into the wider hospital and its bureaucratic
expectations for accessing services, and ultimately, into Italian society as a whole.
The center’s funding, however, is dependent on grants, originally from the
Region of Lombardy from money set aside in Italy’s immigration law for integration
projects. Increasingly, the burden has shifted to the other source of institutional support,
the hospitals in which the clinics are located. The project partnered the hospital, which
provides the space, some personnel and equipment, with the cultural association-turnedcooperative Crinali. Crinali, with its roots in one of Milan’s feminist associations, the
Libera Università delle Donne, began as a place for bringing together “women of the
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global north and south” and is now deeply involved in providing cultural mediation in
health care settings. The cooperative was regularly awarded the contract to provide
cultural mediation to the hospital, to the frustration of other mediation associations.
However, as Sacchetti complained, the grant-based model put the project in
a situation of great precariousness, especially for these figures that we were
proposing, migrant cultural and linguistic mediators, who, since they needed to
live off of this work, in reality, we lost many, including good ones, because in
the meantime they found more secure employment.
The history and funding of the center are relevant to understanding the project’s
orientation toward women’s reproductive health and rights. The feminist commitment
of the doctors involved in developing the project and in providing health care is
completely orthogonal to any demographic discourse concerned with the effects of
women’s reproductive practices on the nation. A different logic and moral orientation
governs the health care and advocacy of pregnant migrant women who are seen not just
as patients whose health care access and legal status matters only as long as they are
pregnant, but as women whose reproductive health and rights, and integration, depends
on obtaining legal residency. As such, providers and cultural mediators use the permit
in their advocacy for migrant women, even while recognizing its limitations.
The center offered a rotating schedule of cultural mediators from Latin America,
Africa, the Middle East, and Eastern Europe, and Asia. Also on staff were a
psychologist and a social worker, as well as medical professionals. I met with Anna, a
social worker and Maria, a cultural mediator from Romania, for an interview centered
on the kinds of advocacy that the center provides. Like the center’s medical director,
Anna emphasized the importance of recognizing the relevance of the patient’s social
context to her medical concerns. Both described this broader approach as encompassing
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the woman’s legal, employment, and housing situation. This information was collected
in an intake interview, enabling the center’s staff to connect the patient with available
resources to address social vulnerabilities, primarily undocumented status and unsafe
housing. Sometimes the social worker or the cultural mediator accompanied pregnant
women to the police station to sort out problems with paperwork needed for the
pregnancy permit or to a different part of the hospital, outside of the center, to obtain
care unrelated to pregnancy or pediatric issues.
The advocacy with which the center’s staff was most involved concerned the
residency permit for reasons of pregnancy. While they encouraged and provided
information and support to undocumented migrant pregnant women to obtain the
permit, Anna and Maria also pointed to the permit’s limitations, particularly the
expiration at six months postpartum. Anna explained: “we can say that the big concern
for women is what to do after the baby has turned six months old and the residency
permit for pregnancy expires. And in fact the solutions are very difficult, because they
are the ones provided by the law.” Short of having a documented partner to marry, the
only other basis for obtaining a residency permit is to have an employer willing to
sponsor, which would then enable the issuing of a work-based permit.31 Yet, as the
permit does not allow migrant pregnant women to work legally, it also makes it difficult
to secure an official employment relationship that would allow for residency
sponsorship upon the expiration of the pregnancy permit. Nonetheless, the social
worker told me that she advises pregnant undocumented women to “utilize as best as
you can this time that you are in Italy for the pregnancy to weave a network that could
31

Even in cases when women could secure an official position with an employer willing to sponsor them,
the pregnancy permit’s non-renewability required them to return to their country of origin in order to be
eligible to re-enter legally in Italy, a requirement that posed serious financial and logistical hurdles.
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be useful for afterward, let’s say substantially to obtain an employment contract.”32
Despite these limitations, cultural mediators, social workers and others use this legal
tool to advocate for their clients and patients, with an eye also on turning this temporary
foothold in the country into something more permanent.
The residency permit reflects the moral politics of pregnancy and life: it
recognizes pregnancy as a special status automatically deserving of full health care. The
rights awarded on the basis of pregnancy are revoked if a woman chooses to end the
pregnancy for any reason, but still apply for the maximum amount of time in cases of
stillbirth. These distinctions in eligibility reflect the moral politics of reproduction,
which penalize women’s reproductive agency at the same time that they afford needed
protections and rights.
(Non)Reproductive Health
The limitations of the permit are illustrated by Rose Marie’s story of a serious
reproductive health issue unrelated to pregnancy. Her experience sheds light on some of
the difficulties in obtaining needed health care faced by undocumented migrants who
are not pregnant. Rose Marie migrated to Italy from Peru in 2000, joining her sister and
brother. Despite her psychology university degree and work experience in Peru, Rose
Marie became undocumented after her tourist visa expired. The only employment she
was able to secure work as an unregistered careworker for an elderly woman and then
as a nanny for a family. In an interview conducted in the living room of the small
apartment she shared with her Italian husband and two-year-old daughter, Rose Marie
described having had a very positive experience with reproductive health services in
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This would, however, require leaving the country and returning under the new residency permit, a step
that the social worker also acknowledged.
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Italy. Premising that she would have to describe something “intimate,” she talked about
having suffered from very severe menstrual bleeding at the time she was
undocumented. When she sought help from a clinic that served undocumented migrants,
she was referred to another, well-known clinic for migrants in Milan staffed by
volunteer doctors. The doctor who examined her in turn referred her to “his own private
studio,” which was full of “so many young immigrant guys and immigrant women,
almost the entire ambulatory was full immigrant women. Everything, including the
ultrasound, was free.” Rose Marie recounted how the ultrasound revealed “three
gigantic and three small fibroids, so painful.” She was told that the situation was
“urgent, I needed surgery, I couldn’t have children, or I could lose my uterus. But I
didn’t have documents.” Lacking a residency permit, Rose Marie was only eligible for
emergency room treatment, not for a surgery that was subject to scheduling ahead of
time.
The doctor asked if there was no one she knew who could hire her, thus enabling
her to obtain a residency permit and a national health care card. There wasn’t. The
doctor then told Rose Marie: “don’t worry, wait for my phone call.” When he called,
having arranged a way for Rose Marie to obtain the treatment she needed, she was
ultimately forced to decline the arrangement because of her inability to afford the time
off for the lengthy recovery the surgery required. Eventually, with the help of her Italian
boyfriend, who would later become her husband, Rose Marie was able to take a month
off from work. The doctor arranged for her surgery at a hospital outside of Milan where,
as he explained to Rose Marie, there were “less controls.” At that hospital they could do
the surgery under the pretext that she had an accident and needed emergency treatment
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to save her life:33 “In September I did the surgery, I did it in September 2001, I
remember it very well because it was the week after the Twin Towers, the next week, I
did the surgery with my passport alone, … they were very good… he is still my doctor,
he followed my entire pregnancy and my daughter.” Rose Marie was in the hospital for
a month recovering from the surgery. She was very grateful to the doctors who
preserved her health and her fertility, remarking “I was able to have this surgery thanks
to these doctors that, if you see, take immigrants to heart, help immigrants. They don’t
care, ‘we are doctors, I am a doctor, my job is to save lives, not to expect money.’”
Rose Marie’s story illustrates the inequities in women’s health care that separate
not just migrant and Italian women, but also migrant pregnant women from women who
have other health problems, including reproductive health problems. If her health crisis
had been related to pregnancy, Rose Marie would have qualified for the temporary
permit for pregnancy and thus for full, free health care access. However, her medical
problem, which ironically was located within her uterus, did not afford her such
coverage. Instead, Rose Marie’s health and fertility were dependent on a network of
volunteer health care providers and on a doctor’s willingness to skirt the law. The
positive outcome of her health crisis also hinged on a supportive relationship with an
Italian boyfriend and with his family, which enabled her to afford taking time off of
work to get needed treatment.
The Politics of Life & Migration
Individual acts of advocacy, volunteer doctors treating migrant patients, cultural
mediation associations and projects, such as the center for migrant women have a
33

Rose Marie claimed to know others migrants who also were able to have free surgeries by going
outside of Milan and avoiding the more stringent controls.
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complex relationship to broader, institutional change. On the one hand, they are a
manifestation of the Italian left’s commitment to solidarity that anthropologist
Muehlebach describes as being both oppositional and enabling of neoliberalism.
“Loophole advocacy” (Willen 2005) that enables individual migrants to access rights by
skirting institutional and legal restrictions obviously does not constitute a structural
solution to the problem. It is an approach that is of a piece with the relational solidarity
that undergirds moral neoliberalism (Muehlebach 2009) at a time in which the
universalist guarantees of the state, always fragile and inadequate in Italy, are being
eroded even further. On the other hand, the very existence of migrant advocacy
associations and of projects and spaces that intervene in institutional barriers to political
and social rights are supported by the redistribution of public funds enabled by
subsidiarity. Projects like the migrant women’s health clinic change practices within
institutions like hospitals at the same time that practitioners work at the “loophole
advocacy” level. These projects are not necessarily mutually exclusive of structural
change. Along with a network of other volunteer migrant providers, Sacchetti is
politically engaged in efforts to force the administration of the Region of Lombardy to
meet its health care obligations toward migrants.
These narratives suggest that the involvement of feminist providers and migrant
cultural mediators, in combination with the limited rights afforded by the permit for
pregnancy, provide a buffer against any direct translation of nationalist demographic
concerns into practice. Reproductive health and rights are governed by moralized and
political discourses that escape and supersede the logics of demographic alarmism. The
privileged moral status of pregnancy, which arguably has only intensified under the
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moral pronatalism and pro-familism of the past decade, may in fact contribute to the
continued existence of policies like the residency permit for reasons of pregnancy, a
provision that survived even the “draconian” and right-wing Bossi-Fini immigration law
in 2002.
The influence of the politics of life is evident in the way migrant women’s
significantly higher abortion rates elicit a convergence of expert, feminist and moral
concerns. This convergence is informed and motivated by different concerns ranging
from the moral opposition to abortion by the Church to the concern that these rates
reflect social inequities. Migrant women accessing abortion services need to navigate
significant obstacles, which include long waits due to skyrocketing rates of
conscientious objection34 and volunteers from the Italian Movement for Life who have
become embedded in hospitals. The experience of Dimah, a woman from Morocco who
worked as a nursing assistant and was active in migrant integration issues, highlights the
universalism of anti-abortion interventions. Dimah recounted having to meet with prolife volunteers prior to being able to schedule her abortion. The volunteers tried to
convince her that she could keep the pregnancy and that financial help would be
available to her. Dimah remembered the anger and shame she experienced in response
to this meeting. Dimah felt that she had no choice but to have an abortion because her
monthly salary of 900 euros would not be enough to provide for a child on her own. She
told me she returned to the volunteers with her paycheck to make her point. While she
went ahead with the abortion and was certain that she had no other choice, she
concluded her narrative by saying that she hoped god would forgive her, suggesting that
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The most recent report by the Italian Ministry of Health shows average national rates of conscientious
objection around 70% for gynecologists and 50% for anesthesiologists (Ministero della Salute 2012).
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while the meeting with the anti-abortion volunteers had not changed her actions, it may
have contributed a sense of shame that compelled Dimah to justify her actions to me.
Carolina also reported emotional reactions among migrant women seeking
abortions because of the paperwork introduced by the fetal burial legislation that
required them to choose how to dispose of the fetal remains. Even as migrant and Italian
women are differently interpellated by moral and expert demographic and pronatalist
discourses, the moral politics of life impacts the agency and subjectivities of both Italian
and migrant women. This impact, however, is not simply an outcome of demographic
discourse that calls for more Italian and less foreign babies. Reproductive access and
women’s subjective experiences of the social value of their reproductive choices
reflects the unpredictable effects that emerge as demographic alarmism encounters other
social, moral, and political commitments.
Turning Demographic Alarmism on its Head
The Right to Citizenship
Among the unexpected effects of intensifying demographic alarmism is the way
concerns about the future of the nation can be redeployed to make claims for the
recognition of immigrants’ contributions. Here I highlight three examples of how the
politics of fertility are amenable to reframing. The first is from Rose Marie’s assertion
in our interview that migrant women contribute to increasing Italy’s population not only
through their own reproduction, but through their carework, which enables Italian
women to have more children. She referred to her experience at her daughter’s daycare
where most of the other women were Italian and said that there had been a baby boom
among Italian women that year, and that she had heard about this in the news (Marchesi
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2012). In this characterization, migrants, particularly migrant women, play a literally
vital role in the reproduction of the nation.
The second is the very public articulation of this discourse of migrant
contribution to reproducing the nation at the 2007 May first parade in Milan. Paula, a
woman originally from Peru who was a full-time activist for migrant causes had
participated in organizing the first “migrant float” for the parade as part of a new
migrant network called “Cittadini di fatto” (“De facto citizens”). As the parade wound
through central Milan she yelled through the megaphone: “we are the ones who take
care of your children, we are the ones who take care of your parents, we are the ones
who are increasing the birth rate, if we weren’t here, there would be no one to keep this
country going”35 (Marchesi 2012). Because of these contributions, she continued, the
children of migrants deserved citizenship.36
Marybel, a nursing assistant from Peru in her forties, also made this point to me
at a party organized by a grassroots group seeking dialogue between migrant and Italian
women. Sitting in the basement community room of a Catholic oratory, Marybel, who
herself did not have children, argued that Italy only survived because of migrants’ work
and birth rates: “the children who are born here, immigrants have children and raise the
birth rate. If it weren’t for us, Italy would be in trouble.”37 In this casual conversation
and subsequently in an interview at a Milanese park, Marybel returned to the problem
and injustice of the fact that migrants’ children did not receive citizenship, but rather
lived without guarantees about their future status.38 A Syrian woman in her early forties
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Digital recording, May 1, 2007.
Fieldnote, “Primo Maggio,” May 1, 2007.
37
Fieldnote, “Festa Incontriamoci’,” June 24, 2007.
38
Interview, digital recording, July 9, 2007.
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also pointed to the problem of the lack of citizenship at birth for children of migrants in
Italy and the discriminatory nature of the baby bonus for which non-EU immigrants
were not eligible. Saja also suggested that Italian women “envied” migrant women for
the fact of having children. Saja’s interpretation flips the script that views migrant
women as envying the freedoms of “modern” Italian women at the same time that it
reproduced one thread of the dominant discourse, which views Italian women as
beholden to careerism at the expense of family.39
These reinterpretations and protests of demographic anxiety highlight the
contribution of immigrants to the national body. They do not carry the reach and power
of expert, political, and religious discourses that regularly get prime real estate in the
news. The harnessing of demographic alarmism in the name of citizenship does
underscore, however, the paradoxical effects of the politics of demographic alarmism in
Italy whereby migrant women’s higher fertility may function as a biopolitical claim for
belonging and for citizenship in Italy rather than as a cause for shame. Demographic
incitement to reproduce also elicits protest and a demand for more social and economic
rights among Italian women. The governing of fertility that calls on women in Italy to
conduct their reproductive lives according to the needs of the nation also engenders
counter-demands on the state to make life less precarious, both for migrant and Italianorigin women.

Khadim, a Senegalese migrant employed in social work and very active in the Senegalese community,
provided a different perspective on the issue. He argued that immigrants in Italy were going to be at risk
when they retired because they did not have enough time to accrue benefits in Italy, due to the time that it
takes to emerge from the “black market” of employment: “another thing, a very interesting thing, these
families of immigrants that today allow Italy to maintain, grow the birth rate, but these families in 20-25
years are going to be the poorest families in Italy because the immigrants who arrived here, here in Italy,
they won’t have a pension in their countries of origin, nor will they have a pension in Italy” (Interview,
digital recording, 4/28/07).
39
Interview, digital recording, April 21, 2007.
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Precariousness = Contraception
The increasing penetration of the state in reproductive and family matters
elicited resistance and contestation among feminist Italian women. Singled out for not
making babies, Italian women often point back to the state’s failure to provide adequate
social services and labor safeguards. In a preface to a book and documentary on Italy’s
birth rate titled Uno virgola due (One point two, in reference to Italy’s TFR at the time
the book was written), Miriam Mafai, a well-respected Italian journalist, acknowledges
the increasing anxiety over Italy’s birth rates. Mafai asks: “Is it due, as some argue, to
the fact that [Italian women] are too selfish? Too involved with themselves? Too busy
with work?” (2007: 10). Silvia Ferreri, the book’s author and director of the
documentary writes that “everyone is talking” about “the problem of the empty cradles”
which on International Woman’s Day in 2004 Italian President Azeglio Ciampi
identified as Italy’s number one problem.40 Ferreri gives voice to and contests the
assumptions that sustain demographic discourse and single out Italian women for
criticism:
the first who are considered responsible (not surprisingly) are women, in their
thirties. I feel implicated and for this reason the judgment weighs more heavily
on me. Women in their thirties are in fact, for the most part, lazy women,
concerned more with their hair than the future, they are mammone, they don’t
leave the home, are concerned with their careers (what career?), and not reliable
enough to pull up their sleeves, take on the responsibilities that a family calls
for, and raise some children (2007: 22).
Ferreri’s reading of demographic discourse is supported by interventions like the
one initiated by Italian Gynecological and Obstetrical Society (SIGO), which aimed at
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“Le culle vuote sono il primo problema italiano” (Empty cradles are the foremost Italian problem),
Marzio Breda, Corriere della Sera, 3, March 8, 2004,
http://archiviostorico.corriere.it/2004/marzo/08/culle_vuote_sono_primo_problema_co_9_040308027.sht
ml.
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making women aware of the biological decline in fertility over the life course. SIGO
produced a YouTube video41 in which the organization’s president, gynecologist
Giorgio Vittori, discusses the importance of “preserving one’s fertility.” The video
features the gynecologist walking the streets of Rome, Italians going on about their
normal lives around him as he cautions women not to prioritize careers ahead of
reproduction: “it’s important to know that at 37 years old you may very well have a
great job, a beautiful home, a great trousseau, but remember that the available oocytes
are very, very few, remember it, think ahead.” This warning is supported by statistical
“facts” of human reproductive biology: “Female fertility is at its maximum until age 20,
it halves around 35, comes down to 10% after 40. … it is important to remember, to
consider this aspect too in the planning of one’s family and professional life.”42
Additionally, the gynecologist warns that “it’s important to maintain one’s genital
apparatus in perfect conditions”43 for the purposes of maximum fertility. Armed with
this knowledge, Italian women44 would presumably prioritize having children over their
career. These arguments run counter to the concerns expressed by many women and
men of reproductive age over precarious employment and shrinking social services.
Seeking to challenge these narratives, Ferreri focuses on the difficulties faced by
women in Italy who do have children, particularly in terms of employment. The retreat
of the state from the provision of social services and the spread of precarietà
(precariousness), particularly in employment where young workers are hired on short41

Uploaded September 2008, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_Na6H7hlFKI
‘Scoperta la proteina della fertilità, September 14, 2008, ticinonews.ch
http://www.ticinonews.ch/articolo.aspx?id=91202&rubrica=29
43
In an interview, Professor Vittori explains: ‘we choose YouTube to speak to young women who often
don’t even consider the issue of a future maternity, on the contrary, they are often only concerned with
avoiding unwanted pregnancies, without realizing how delicate is the equilibrium that regulates feminine
biology.' http://italiasalute.leonardo.it/Copertina.asp?Articolo_ID=9361
44
Immigrant women are not explicitly addressed or featured in this video.
42
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term contracts without the labor safeguards enjoyed by previous generations (Molé
2010), provide plenty of fodder for this critique.
I attended a roundtable discussion of Ferreri’s book that included the author and
some prominent feminist figures. Participants included well-known Italian actress
Ottavia Piccoli and Susanna Camusso the General Secretary of CGIL-Lombardia, one
of Italy’s main unions.45 I was familiar with Camusso because she was one of the main
organizers of Usciamo dal Silenzio. The caliber of the roundtable participants speaks to
the relevance and importance afforded to this topic. Piccoli opened the discussion by
admitting she read the book with a “preconception” common among leftist Italians:
“what is the problem if we don’t grow? In Italy there are too many of us, there are
immigrants, they have more children than us. Where’s the problem?”46 The problem
presented by the book, however, was a sensitive one for this progressive panel: the
discrimination of pregnant women and of mothers in the workplace. Ferreri’s work
documents the lives of women dismissed after having a child, especially a second one,
via the infamous, and illegal, “blank resignation letter” some women report being asked
to sign alongside their employment contract. Ferreri noted that despite a “media
bombardment on culle vuote (empty cradles)” and “very long talk shows” discussing the
issue, “no one says anything about work.”47 Piccoli added: “they prefer to talk about the
problem of low fertility relative to the issue of our roots. The only talk is ‘we don’t have
45

Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro (CGIL) (Italian General Confederation of Work). In 2010
Camusso was elected president of the CGIL, the first time a woman has held this position.
46
Fieldnote, digital recording, “Uno virgola due,” July 4, 2007.
47
A sketch I saw on Italian TV just a couple of days prior to the roundtable makes a joke of this issue
(while also reproducing stereotypes about the masculinity of homosexual men): A woman employed in a
beauty salon is trying to take a pregnancy test, but she doesn’t know how it works. Her gay boss offers to
help her take it. He tells her: “I want to be the first one to know because I want to give you a beautiful gift
at your new place of employment because… here, nada, zilch!” To show her how to take the pregnancy
test he takes one himself, which turns out positive (fieldnote, July 1, 2007).
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children and then the problem will be in the future because we will not be able to
maintain” “our Christianity,” jumped in Camusso. These feminist critics dismissed the
cultural and moral discourse on low fertility in favor of a discourse about women’s
reproductive and economic rights.
The dominant discourse on low fertility in Italy was summarized by the panel as
follows: “they stay home until they are 35 years old, … cradles are empty, … Lombard
women have less children than others and … the increase [in birth rates] is due to
immigrants.” Camusso asked: “what is their imagined recipe” to address this? The baby
bonus.” In Italy, continued Camusso, “in every way we [women] are bodies and not
persons, including [when it comes to] motherhood. But we decide, not someone else.”
Slogans like ‘”precarietà” equals contraception’ employed by young feminist
activists48 talk back to this discourse, blaming neoliberal reforms for Italian women’s
low birth rates.
Feminist activists in their thirties and migrant women were the most concerned
with, and affected by, the issue of precarietà of work and the difficulty of
contemplating having a child under those conditions. For the younger generation of
Italian feminists the issue of reproductive choice included the experience of not being
able to choose to have a child under the state of precarietà that invested their lives.
Daniela, for example, argued at an Usciamo dal silenzio meetings:
I am so sick of these mummies on TV who say that they safeguard heterosexuals
because they reproduce. They reproduce what? They reproduce where? When an
apartment costs half-a-billion [liras]? Where do they reproduce, in the closet?
With a job contract that ends after a few months or doesn’t allow me to reach
1000 euros a month? But what reproduction? I would like to say this because
there’s this whole apology of procreation when women like me don’t reproduce,
48

Camusso, “Uno Virgola Due” fieldnote, 07/04/12

234

they don’t reproduce why? Because if they reproduce they don’t work, and if
we don’t work we don’t eat, it’s that simple.49
The responses of Italian women past their childbearing age, and thus no longer
the target of demographic discourse, to my research topic reflect a sense of being
implicated by their reproductive choices. On one of my afternoons helping out at the
feminist planning clinic, a middle-aged Italian woman sat on the couch of the reception
area, waiting for her teenage daughter to emerge from a counseling appointment. We
started talking and she told me she had two children; she added: “I made my
donation.”50 After asking about my research topic at the course’s Christmas holiday
gathering Cristina, the Italian head of a cultural mediation association immediately
asked me:
“Did you notice that they no longer have children?”
“Migrant women?” I asked.
“Yes, they come here and catch a drift of how things are here” and here she
touched underneath the tip of her nose and lifted her head a bit “and they stop
having children.” Then she pointed to Marta, a cultural mediator and instructor
originally from Argentina, and said
“Not her, though, but she had them before she came.”
“I had them for you too!” replied Marta
Cristina shot back: “Yes, you had three!”51
The comments by the patient’s mother and those of the head of the cultural mediation
association suggest, in different ways, an ironic engagement with demographic anxiety.
They acknowledge the fact that reproduction in Italy is not simply a private choice and
responsibility and bring into relief the social obligation and social meaning of having
children in the time of demographic anxiety over low fertility. These comments also
reveal a calculus of fertility in which women keep tally of their “contributions” or joke
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Digital recording, February 21, 2007.
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Fieldnote, “Cultural Mediation Course Christmas Aperitivo,” December 20, 2006
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about being offset by the fertility of other women, particularly immigrants. This
calculus is informed by demographic discourse, even as it voiced to highlight the
sacrifice of motherhood or to average out one’s lack of contribution, as it were.
Nationalist demographic discourse (Krause 2006) informs other ways of tallying
contributions to the reproduction of the nation, as the comment of a participant
following the “Demographic Winter” conference illustrates. In the question and answer
session following the demographer’s lecture on the differential fertility of migrants and
Italians an Italian woman elicited widespread laughter by saying: “immigrants in Milan,
the majority are Muslim,52 if each wife has one child or one and a half and they’ve got
four wives, people, we’ll make it.”53
Competing Demographic Anxieties
The limits of demographic alarmism are also evident in the continued relevance
of other, older, population panics. Despite dire warnings about cultural and social
decline, alarmism over the low fertility of Italian women coexists and articulates with
previous population alarms. Environmental concerns with overpopulation, for example,
are not an unusual critique of pronatalism among the left.54 At the 2006 Christmas party
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The 2011 statistical data presented by Caritas shows that the majority of the 4.5 million immigrants to
Italy are Christian (53.9%) followed by 32.9% Muslim (Caritas/Migrantes 2011
http://www.caritasitaliana.it/materiali/Pubblicazioni/libri_2011/dossier_immigrazione2011/scheda_religi
oni.pdf). In 2009, Muslim immigrants in Milan represent 28.4% of the immigrant population (down from
40.4% in 1996), while Christians make up 55.1% of the population
(http://speciali.espresso.repubblica.it/popup/milano/7.html). Interestingly, in a special on Milan’s
immigrant population by the daily Repubblica and the weekly news magazine L’Espresso, a bar graph
based on statistics elaborated by demographer Gian Carlo Blangiardo breaks up Christian religious
affiliation into “Catholic” and “Other Christian.” This distinction makes the Muslim proportion appear to
be more significant, especially for the 1996 statistics when Muslims appear to be the largest immigrant
group at 40.4% even though a single Christian category encompassing both “Catholic” and “Other
Christian” would actually have accounted for 51.1% of the population. The report does not indicate how
religious affiliation was determined.
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Fieldnote, “Inverno Demografico,” 4/14/07.
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In May of 2007 I attended a roundtable titled “Cronache Italiane della Procreazione Responsabile,”
(Italian Chronicles of Responsible Reproduction).54 The event commemorated the efforts of an influential
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held at the consultorio I met Nilde’s husband, Alberto. Alberto was also in his early
80s, with a head full of white hair, he always wore a corduroy blazer and a leather bag
slung around his shoulder. Like Nilde, Alberto had a life-long history of involvement
with the Communist Party. He was particularly proud of an unpublished novel he had
penned about a Soviet spy and of the fact that he was an avid and regular reader of
Scientific American. As a retired chemical engineer he enjoyed spending afternoons at
the museum of science in Milan, where he often attended lectures, and he seemed to
relish showing up at the family planning clinic once in a while, ostensibly to pick up
Nilde, but also to flirt with other women and to hold court on a variety of theories.
At the clinic’s Christmas party, Alberto engaged me in a conversation with
Daniela and Laura, two of the main members of Donne, Diritti, Salute. He complained
to Daniela that the Usciamo dal Silenzio group needed to take on global warming as an
issue and that women should stop having children as a protest until it was addressed. He
suggested that Donne, Diritti, Salute declare: “we women will not have children
anymore!” Laura replied “we’re not having them already anyway!” But Alberto
continued pushing Daniela on the topic and argued that women have more of a stake in
reproduction than men, that their stake in the environment is bigger than men’s.
Enjoying his role as provocateur, he then stated that he didn’t know why procreation
had been assigned to women; he wouldn’t have done it that way. Daniela replied, “yes,
reproductive activist in Milan (Giulia Filippetti) and traced the struggle for the legalization of
contraception and abortion beginning with the fascist criminalization and through the 1970s. One of the
roundtable speakers identified demographic warnings on Italy’s low birth rates as a continuation of
politics that sought to curtail reproductive rights. He argued that the real problem remains overpopulation
and its effect on the environment: “even today with the decline in birth rates, there is concern. Why is
everyone concerned? They invite us to have more children, but the planet’s problem is overpopulation. A
lack of awareness in sexuality can have grave repercussions, not just for the Milanese, but for the whole
planet” (Rusconi, fieldnote May 9, 2007).
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like menstruation, mamma mia, how annoying it is just about now!” Unfazed, Alberto
continued on with his theories, trying to convince Daniela and Laura to take on what he
described as an agenda more radical than their work for reproductive rights and health.
When Alberto remarked that women had been given the pains of labor and men the
pains of work, Daniela looked at me rolling her eyes. Laura retorted that since Minister
of Health Livia Turco intended to make epidurals more available in Italy, men could
now have children too, implying that men were not strong enough to give birth without
drugs.
This conversation points to the limits of demographic alarmism, which has not
succeeded in replacing other ways of thinking about reproduction and the population.
After a decade of warnings about the consequences of demographic “decline”
interpretations of population “problems” still reflect Italians’ different political
commitments. Additionally, the teasing between Alberto and Laura and Daniela
reminds of the fact that the politics of women’s bodies and of gender are central to
demographic discourse, which in its abstract terminology can often acquire a kind of
gender neutrality. Italian women are the privileged target of this discourse, whether they
are being chided for not reproducing, educated about fertility decline over the lifecourse, or called upon to refuse to reproduce as a political and ecological statement. In
such a discursive environment, women’s reproduction is both the target and, potentially,
a “weapon” to be redeployed to assert women’s strength. Thus, even committed
reproductive activists like Laura and Daniela, both of whom did not have children, can
appeal to menstruation and childbirth to gain the upper hand in a conversation with an
older man. Daniela spoke openly about the fact that she was menstruating to Alberto
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while Laura countered his provocation that men should have been given the pains of
labor by suggesting that they could only birth with the use of epidurals.
Conclusion
A contradictory picture of demographic discourse in Italy emerges through the
professional and personal experiences of cultural mediators and other migrant women in
reproductive health settings. Discourses of racial and cultural alarmism, of
“disappearing Italians,” of cradles filled with the “wrong” kinds of babies, and of trees
producing the “wrong” fruits do not exist in a social and moral vacuum. Anxiety over
the differential birth rates of migrant and Italian women articulate with Catholic politics
of life, the moral status of pregnancy and the universalist values of solidarity and
feminist involvement in reproductive health. These findings suggest, as Aiwha Ong has
argued, that the “ethnographic study of particular situations reveals that negotiations on
behalf of the politically excluded can produce indeterminate and ambiguous outcomes”
(2006: 9).
The question remains, however, as to how to make sense of those outcomes.
These contradictions do not resolve the issue of how migrant women experience
reproductive services everywhere in Italy. They are not meant to suggest that Italians
engaged in providing reproductive services are immune from racism or anti-immigrant
feelings, or from nationalist strains of demographic alarmism. What they do suggest is
that these discourses interact with a complex social and moral terrain, a terrain that
includes pronatalism and the moralization of family and life, as well as feminist
commitments to women’s reproductive health and rights. The discourse of demographic
alarmism is altered as it encounters these discourses and manifests into practices.
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The dire warnings of a national threat posed by low fertility have unpredictable
consequences. Unlike neighboring France, Italy’s fascist pronatalist past and political
and moral obstacles have prevented demographic incitement from translating into
concrete policies in support of births. This has left pronatalism to the realm of discourse
and incentives, a governmental approach to slow fertility. Because governmentality
governs through the agency of its subjects, its effects are not determined; they are
refracted through other, conflicting desires and aspirations, such as those for
reproductive and sexual autonomy, for economic security, and for political and
economic rights. As fertility rates continue to remain low among Italian women, these
incitements do not translate into changes in reproductive practices and behaviors among
Italians. Intensifying and alarmist demographic discourses are refracted and countered,
in discourse and practice, by Catholic universalist moral politics of reproduction and
leftist and feminist universalist commitments to solidarity and human rights.
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CHAPTER 6
INTEGRATING SUBJECTS, ENGENDERING COHERENCE: CULTURAL
CONTAMINATION & THE LIMITS OF INTEGRATION

Introduction
The “moral regulation” of reproduction and the family in the name of fostering
social cohesion through profound transformations in social citizenship in Italy extends
to debates over how to successfully integrate a substantial and diverse immigrant
population. How Italian society can integrate immigrants and on what terms is a
question intensely debated and rhetorically deployed in public and political discourse.
Always present is the specter of dis-integration. In a 2000 book aimed at a broad
audience political scientist Giovanni Sartori poses the question of what constitutes a
“good society” and identifies the
very concrete problem of the ‘Foreigners,’ of people that are not ‘like us.’ Here
the question becomes: up until what point can a pluralistic society accept,
without disintegrating, Others who refuse it? And conversely, how can the
Other, the immigrant of another culture, religion, or ethnicity, be integrated?
(2000: 10).
Sartori’s answer, implied by his questioning of integrating Others who “refuse” the
receiving society, is that multiculturalism, understood as the assertion of one’s ethnic or
cultural identity, is a problem, not the path to a “good” pluralistic society. Sartori favors
‘tolerance’1 instead of multiculturalism. Multiculturalism is viewed with suspicion
among Italians who work on immigration issues, as is assimilationism.

1

For a critique of the tolerance discourse see Wendy Brown (2006) Regulating Aversion: Tolerance in
the Age of Identity and Empire, Princeton University.
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In this chapter, I examine the Italian approach to integration, an attempt to forge
a “third way” between multiculturalism and assimilationism, through the theory and
practice of intercultura. Building on Douglas Holmes’s question: “what are terms and
conditions by which the individual is related to various renderings of collectivity in the
new Europe” (2000: 111) as a starting point for further inquiry on the terms and limits
of integration in Italy I ask: What are the expectations and practices of immigrantreceiving countries concerning the integration of Others? On what terms is integration
into Italian society being demarcated? What does the project of integration contribute to
our understanding of the redefinition of citizenship and social cohesion in Italy and
beyond? To answer these questions I examine the concept of integration in Europe and
in Italy, in particular on the Italian ideal of intercultura and cultural mediation, as it
emerges from a number of sites: scholarly literature, political pronouncements, the
Italian government’s official statement of the common values of integration, the
Charter of Values on Citizenship and Integration (Ministry of Interior 2007), and in the
orientation of practitioners engaged in integration work in the non-profit world. For the
latter perspective, I draw on ethnographic research in a cultural mediation course I
audited during my fieldwork. I contrast these ideals with the experiences of participants
in the course and in a separate project, a grassroots intercultura group, Incontriamoci
(Let’s Get Together) that aimed to build bridges between women, particularly Italian
and Muslim, in Italy.
Data is drawn from participation in a cultural mediation course that ran from
November 2006 to March 2007 meeting for three hours twice a week; from attendance
at numerous conferences and talks on immigration, integration, and intercultura over
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the course of 9 months of dissertation research; from participation in the meetings and
social activities of an intercultural and anti-racist association migrant’s rights
association, including a brief period of volunteering as an Italian language tutor for
undocumented migrants, and from participation in the activities of an immigrant
network, Cittadini di fatto. I interviewed nine cultural mediators and two founding
members of the grassroots Let’s Get Together project. My analysis is also informed by
conversations with actors and activists involved in immigration and integration projects
and issues. Drawing on these different sites affords a local perspective on the question
of how immigrants are expected to integrate into Italian society, and sheds light on the
experiences, subjectivities, and alternative politics of integration that play out on the
ground.
In tracing how integration is conceptualized and enacted through these different
sites I highlight the contradictions and gaps between the ideal of mutual
“contamination” that characterizes the intercultural approach and the struggles that
migrants face in Italy. I focus in particular on Islamophobia and on debates around the
question of how Italian society should address the question of the veil and of Muslim
women’s condition not only because these were issues that were particularly intensely
debated during my fieldwork in Milan, but also because they shed light on the way
gender and family-making emerge as key sites for the negotiation of the meaning of
integration and of the boundaries of inclusion/exclusion.
Integrating Difference
Italy’s shift from a country of emigration to one of immigration is relatively
recent. In the 19th century and through the middle of the 20th century millions emigrated
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from the Italian peninsula looking for better economic conditions abroad. This massive
migration was regional in character with the vast majority of emigrants originating from
the South. Between 1876 and 1976 twenty million Italians emigrated (Turco and
Tavella 2005: 10). In the 1950s Italy had the highest emigration rate in the world
(Sassen, in Turco and Tavella 2005: 10). The year 1974 marks the official inversion in
the balance of emigration and immigration; however significant immigration is a feature
of the past two decades, beginning in the early 1990s.2
The rate of increase in immigration in Italy over the past couple of decades is
striking as is the diversity of the immigrant population. Only 40 years ago, when
statistics on foreigners in Italy began to be kept in 1970, foreign residents amounted to
less than 145,000 (Caritas Italiana 2005: 1). That numbers stayed fairly stable through
the decade, reaching around 200,000 by decade’s end (Caritas Italiana 2005: 1). It is in
the 1980s that the first significant immigration to Italy took hold, with over 400,000
foreign resident permits being registered in 1984, over 527,000 in 1987, and over
780,000 in 1990 (Caritas Italiana 2005: 2).3 In the last decade of the millennium, the
number of foreign residents doubled from 649,000 in 1991 to 1,341,000 by the year
2000 (Caritas Italiana 2005: 2) and then tripled in the following decade (Istat 2012). By
2004, for example, due in part to a number of “sanatorie," or amnesties for

2

In 2008, Italy ranked fourth in Europe in terms of destination for immigrants; Spain was the number one
country of destination, receiving 726, 000 immigrants; Germany followed with 682, 000; the United
Kingdom, received 590,000 immigrants, and Italy 535,000 (Eurostat 2010).2 About 40% of Italy’s
migrants are EU citizens, while 53% are non-EU citizens (Eurostat 2010).
3
However, the Caritas document describes serious inconsistencies in how residency permits were
counted, making these numbers difficult to compare. According to Caritas, statistics become more
reliable beginning in 1991, when Istat began its surveys, while government numbers are more reliable
beginning in 1998 when a new system is introduced (Caritas Italiana 2005: 2).
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undocumented workers, the number of registered foreign residents in Italy jumped to
over 2,300,000 (Caritas Italiana: 2005: 2).
By 2007, the population of immigrants in Italy was close to 3 million (Istat
2007: 1)4 and over the course of that year the largest increase recorded to date occurs as
the immigrant population grows by almost half a million, mostly due to the entrance of
Romania in the EU (Istat 2008a). The most represented nationalities of immigrants were
European, with the vast majority of these (86.1%) originating in the new EU members
of Romania and Bulgaria (Istat 2007: 5). In fact, Istat reports that Eastern and Central
European migrants represent the largest contingent of immigrants: 39% of the total
immigrant population, followed by immigrants originating from Africa (26%) and Asia
(17%) and South and Central America (8.9%) (Istat 2007: 5-6). The most recent
statistics place the immigrant population in the country at 4,570.317 people (Istat
2011a) (7.5% of the total population of Italy) and its net growth rate at 6 per 1000 (Istat
2011b). Eastern Europeans continue to grow as the most numerous population of
immigrants, now constituting 49.3% of the total immigrant population (Istat 2010: 1).5
The population of migrants, however, remains very diverse, spanning four continents
(Istat 2010: 4). The first five nationalities represented, listed in descending order of
numbers of residents, are Romania, Albania, Morocco, China, and the Ukraine (Istat
2011a: 3). Altogether these five nationalities account for about half of the total resident
immigrant population (Istat 2011a: 4). Immigrant communities are also localized
differently in Italy’s various regions (see, for example Istat 2008a: 10).

4

According to Istat’s data, the population was 2.938.922.
http://www.istat.it/salastampa/comunicati/non_calendario/20071002_00/testointegrale20071002.pdf
5
http://www.istat.it/salastampa/comunicati/non_calendario/20101012_00/testointegrale20101012.pdf
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Italy’s legislation governing immigration provides two main legal channels:
residency permits based on work, which require an employer as a sponsor, and
residency permits based on family reunification. Over 50% of residency permits are
granted on the basis of work, with about 35% being awarded for family reunification
reasons (Caritas/Migrantes 2007: 5). Of the residency permit applications on the basis
of work submitted in 2006 49% were in the category of “family assistance,” or
carework, and most of those applications were filed by Romanians (Caritas/Migrantes
2007: 2). The second sector of employment by application was construction (18%)
(Caritas/Migrantes 2007: 2).
A latecomer to significant immigration, by 2012 Italy has a higher ratio of
immigrant to citizen population than the European average (8.2 versus 6.6 percent
respectively) (Caritas e Migrantes 2012: 4). Over 60% of those migrants are residents in
northern Italy, over 50% originate in Europe, about 22% in Africa, almost 19% in Asia,
and slightly over 8% in Latin America (Caritas e Migrantes 2012: 4). Of the 5.011.000
documented migrants in Italy, only 56,001 obtained citizenship in 2012, a symptom of
Italy’s long and difficult path to citizenship (see Zincone 2006), as well as a sense
shared by migrants who had become citizens by marriage, that citizenship is “just a
piece of paper.”6
How to manage immigration at the national and supra-national level has
received much attention in policy circles, in the media, and in scholarly works. The
ascendance of the term “integration” in Europe dates back to the 1990s and can be
traced in European documents like the Tampere Agreement of 1999 (Favell 2003: 4).
6

Fieldnote, cultural mediation course, “Inter-ethnic relations,” Ene, Khadim, and Alejandro, December
19, 2006.
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The discourse and policies for “what happens after” immigration (Favell 2003: 2), or
how newcomers are integrated into European societies, centers around the need to
maintain social and national cohesion (Favell 2003). “Integration” has replaced
previous terms that have gone out of favor, such as assimilation. It is not just politicians
and policy-makers who have adopted integration as the more politically correct term;
European academics have also uncritically adopted the concept as a way to counter
xenophobia and social “disintegration” (Favell 1999, 2003).7 Despite its currency at the
supra-national level of the EU, member states “have used issues of immigrant
integration precisely to actually underline and reproduce their existence as coherent,
bounded, nation-building societies” (Favell 2003: 11-12).8 The European model of
integration is declined differently in each member state, which retain significant control
over matters of immigration and integration (Gruber 2007).9 The lack of harmonization
on integration is perceived as an impediment at the level of the EU. A 2007 European
Parliament working document on immigration calls for members states to work toward
a more unified and “genuine legal migration policy”(Gruber 2007). Thus, despite the
ascendance of approaches to migration that conceptually push beyond the nation-state
to attend to global flows and transnational processes (Appadurai 1996; Glick-Schiller et
al. 1995; Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002), the nation-state remains an important frame
of analysis of immigration and integration policies and discourses.
7

EU discourses on integration, which include progressive concerns with social solidarity, coexist with the
securitization of Europe’s borders and even their extension beyond the walls of “Fortress Europe”
(Mandel 1994; King et al. 2000) into the countries of origin of some migrants, particularly in north Africa
(Sossi 2006).
8
For a review of European research project foci and their funding sources see Penninx, Spencer, and Van
Hear, 2008, Migration and Integration in Europe: The State of Research.
http://www.norface.org/files/migration-COMPAS-report.pdf.
9
See the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) site for analysis and comparison of European nation
states in immigration and integration policies http://www.mipex.eu/.
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Under the umbrella of integration can coexist very distinct ideas about cultural
differences and citizenship. Bruebaker contends that “integration” may just be the
European term for assimilation (2001: 540), a project that has merely shifted from
“making” someone similar to “becoming similar” (2001: 534). In Italy, a theoretical and
practical orientation toward intercultura emphasizes integration through dialogue,
mutual change and even “mutual contamination.” Some progressive Italians reject the
term “integrazione” (integration) altogether in favor of the more mutual “interazione”
(interaction). The lexical closeness of integrazione/interazione belies the difference in
these approaches, with integration implying something done to, or demanded of the
outsider, while interaction implicates both sides.
The Italian discourse on integration represents another key dimension of the
project of reconceptualization of the ties holding Italian society together and of the
foundations of its social cohesion and reproduction. The bases of social solidarity and
cohesion are explicitly up for grabs as ideas about what it means to be Italian are
challenged by changing demographics and by the reorganization of the rights and
responsibilities of citizenship along neoliberal logics. Immigration issues feature
regularly in political discourse and provide the rationale for emergency security
measures. At the same time, migrant labor increasingly sustains Italy’s familial welfare
system as migrants, especially women, are employed in carework, providing individual
welfare services to families.
Cultural Mediation
Beginning in the 1990s, faced by a growing culturally and linguistically diverse
population Italians employed in the health sector and involved nel sociale (in the
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provision of social services),10 but also academics and politicians, started to think about
the issue of integration by looking at already established models in Europe. Lacking a
systematic approach to immigration and policies of integration, the needs of the
immigrant population and the struggles of social and medical service providers were
met by non-governmental actors, associations, and by the Catholic Church.
The poles of assimilation and multiculturalism, epitomized by France and the
United Kingdom respectively, functioned as guideposts and foils for Italian scholars and
educators involved in cultural mediation. These two prevailing models of integration in
Europe have come to be seen as inadequate: the French Republican model of
integration, which emphasizes political citizenship through institutional and especially
educational assimilation (van Zanten 1997) and downplays cultural, and especially
racial, differences, was undermined by the youth protests that took over French banlieus
in the fall of 2005. More recently, the Prime Ministers of Germany and the UK have
strongly criticized the multicultural approach as detrimental to the nation. In Germany,
Angela Merkel claimed that multiculturalism has “utterly failed” and called upon
immigrants to do more to integrate themselves into German society.11 UK Prime
Minister David Cameron has blamed multiculturalism for the radicalization of young
Muslims and claimed that it has “encouraged different cultures to live separate lives,
apart from each other and the mainstream.”12

10

Most of the impetus and interventions of cultural mediation have originated in the so-called “privato
sociale,” which broadly covers non-governmental organizations, whether non-profit, hybrid, or for-profit.
http://www.edscuola.it/archivio/handicap/mediazione_culturale.htm
11
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/oct/17/angela-merkel-german-multiculturalism-failed
http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Global-News/2010/1017/Germany-s-Angela-Merkel-Multiculturalismhas-utterly-failed
12
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2011/02/05/uk-britain-radicalisation-idUKTRE71401G20110205
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Various actors, including instructors involved in the course I audited, began to
organize information sessions and informal networks and eventually to offer courses to
train immigrants to work as mediators, drawing on the models of countries like France,
where cultural mediation was already an established field. However, the progressive
Italian model of integration sought to distinguish itself from the French and British
models. Italian educators and practitioners delineated an alternative model of
integration that seeks to avoid what they see as the pitfalls of multiculturalism and
assimilation (Favaro 2006: 37, Favaro and Luatti 2004): lack of social cohesion, in the
case of the former, and loss of cultural identity, in the latter. A progressive answer to
the question of how to integrate a very diverse population of immigrants, cultural
mediation embraces the intercultura approach, which calls for reciprocal exchange and
change in the receiving and immigrant population. Like other mediation and conflictresolution models, cultural mediation is understood to bring about mutual change and
understanding and to reduce the possibility of intercultural conflict (CISP 2003).13
Unlike the French model, immigrants are not expected to assimilate and lose their
cultural identity; unlike the British model, immigrants are expected to engage with the
receiving society and to be changed by it, to “contaminate” Italian society and be
“contaminated” by it.
Cultural mediation sits at the intersections of the discourses and practices of
integration and the new welfare system in Italy. The first cultural mediation course in
Italy was offered in 1989-1990, an endeavor in which one of the instructors of the

13

http://www.sviluppodeipopoli.org/English/Analysis/goodpractices/Frameset.html
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course I audited was centrally involved.14 The course was financed by the European
Social Fund, with support from the Region of Lombardy (Castiglioni, in Cattaneo and
Petronio 1995: 26). Since then, the practice of cultural mediation, still formally
unrecognized as a profession, has nonetheless emerged as the way to manage the needs
of a diverse migrant population. According to estimates by Caritas/Migrantes, in 2008
there were 4000 cultural mediators in Italy (Caritas Diocesiana di Roma 2008). The
course I audited was organized by a non-profit cooperative that has been engaged in
immigration issues since the early 1990s, making it one of the first non-profit
associations in Milan in the emerging field of integration. The cooperative ran a
helpline for immigrants with legal questions, conducted research on immigration and
integration, provided training for cultural mediators, and collaborated on integration
projects with institutional entities.
In November 2006 I joined a diverse group of students for a three-month-long
cultural mediation course that met twice a week for three hours. We alternated using
classrooms in the space of an association for the disabled, which was attached to a
church. The bells rang on the hour; because of their proximity, depending on the
classroom we occupied on a given day, they could drown out the instructors. The
intrusion of the Catholic Church into lectures on immigration, integration, and
interethnic relations seems appropriate in retrospect as the Church has been heavily
involved in providing services to migrants, but also because it was only two decades
prior, in 1985, that its hold as the state religion, enshrined in the Lateran Pacts signed by
Mussolini in 1929 was loosened.

14

Fieldnote, November 28, 2006.

251

The more than twenty men and women who had enrolled in the course (for a fee
of 400 euros) originated from all over the world: Nigeria, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Peru,
Pakistan, Morocco, Algeria, Egypt, and China. Most of them had been living in Italy for
years. Five instructors, all women, alternated teaching. Three of the instructors were
Italian, one of them the head of the cooperative, while the other two instructors had
migrated to Italy well over a decade prior, one from Argentina and the other from
Albania.
On the second lecture of the course, on the theory and history of cultural
mediation,15 the head of the cooperative asked rhetorically: “Why did Italy choose the
route of mediation?” In her answer she contrasted the assimilationist approach of
France, which she described as a “dissociative process” that leads a person to feel
“divided, dissociated.” The in-between state of people originally from the Maghreb who
are neither Maghrebi nor French leads to a state of being “né carne, né pesce” (neither
meat, nor fish). A second process, that of multiculturalism, was characterized as
“polarization-opposition” whereby “my identity is reaffirmed” but “one folds into
oneself.” In contrast, the Italian model was described as a process of “reciprocal
implication”: “the change, it’s a relationship that we establish. I give up something of
my identity, but you change too.” This, the instructor emphasized, is the “strong idea of
mediation”: “both the client and the service provider come out changed.” To illustrate
the model, the instructor even voiced the appropriate approach to integration an
immigrant engaged in the Italian way of integration should take:
I adapt in an active way to the new context, I assimilate elements of this while
conserving nonetheless the peculiarity of my original identity. In this way I
15

The following is drawn from fieldnotes, November 28, 2006.
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allow myself to be contaminated, but at the same time I contaminate the
receiving society with my cultural characteristics.16
The recurring language of contamination is striking because of the negative
connotations of a term being used to describe a supposedly positive and desirable
outcome. Its use may well be a reappropriation of the terms of xenophobic discourses of
migration, making what is cast as problematic, namely the disruption of an imagined
cultural homogeneity, into something to strive for. Yet, contamination presupposes a
preceding state of purity, a homogeneity that is altered and disrupted by immigration.
To an anthropologist it evokes Mary Douglas’ notion of “matter out of place” (1966), of
uncleanliness, pollution, and disease.
In asserting the subjectivity of a properly integrated migrant the instructor was
also speaking to expectations for the integration of the students in the course. Cultural
mediators are expected to facilitate the integration of members of their communities of
origin by acting as cultural and not just linguistic “bridges” between Italians and
immigrants. The process of cultural mediation is theorized in neutral terms, with the
mediator acting as a bridge, interpreting but not generating communication between
migrant clients and Italian social service providers, neither the advocate of the migrant
person seeking the service, nor the enforcer of institutional or other knowledges and
practices. The cultural mediator, according to the instructor, “helps to produce
reciprocal recognition and change between immigrant clients and Italian social service
providers.”17

16
17

Fieldnote, November 28, 2006
Fieldnote, November 28, 2006.
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To integrate is “to come together” (“metterci insieme”) not just physically, but
also culturally. At stake in this process is the cohesion of Italian society: “Entities that
are not integrated” can threaten social cohesion by leading to conflict, according to the
head of the cooperative. The answer to the question of “why should a state integrate a
foreigner, and what does it mean?” highlights the importance of integration not just for
the migrant, but for the receiving society, which needs to retain social cohesion and
avoid social conflict:
If it’s not a project that can be eliminated, it’s not just for solidarity, but also
because of a practical principle. … I cannot allow that in a State there not be that
which is called social cohesion. Conflict has to be kept as low as possible,
especially in a democratic government, you have to find other systems for social
cohesion, [thus] are born social policies.18
Other instructors emphasized different aspects of integration, focusing less on the
cultural and more on the rights of social citizenship. This difference within one cultural
mediation training course highlights the coexistence of multiple interpretations of
integration.
By virtue of being located in cooperatives and associations, cultural mediation
privileges health and social services as the sites of “coming together.” As immigrants
seek out services, cultural mediation “helps to produce a reciprocal recognition and a
change … between immigrant clients and Italians.” Cultural mediation has taken hold
as the funding and organization of Italy’s social and health services has been shifting
from the State to public-private entities under the model of subsidiarity. Despite this
erosion of the “public” in social services, one of the instructors in the course, long
involved in theorizing cultural mediation and intercultura, emphatically framed

18

Fieldnote, December 19, 2006.
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integration and citizenship in terms of the right to access public services. One of the
most important roles of cultural mediators, according to Castiglioni, is “the function of
welcoming (accoglienza)” and of orientation of new immigrants to the receiving
society.19 The reason why this function is so important, according to Castiglioni, is that
the Italian government fails to provide these services to immigrants. For Castiglioni,
cultural mediation is an activist intervention that redresses the failure of the Italian state,
particularly in the context of health care. The role of the cultural mediator is to fill the
gap by providing information and orienting immigrants who are unfamiliar with the
Italian bureaucracy so that they can obtain services. This orienting role of cultural
mediators to available social services and networks enables newcomers to exercise their
rights as citizens. The very notion of what it means to be foreign, according to
Castiglioni, is tied up with not knowing how and where to access social services:
What does it mean to be a foreigner? It’s not having a family network, as social
network, a network of services, a network of friends. The more foreign I am, the
more I lack this… If the foreigner is foreign it’s exactly because the network is
missing, thus the network of services has to cover what is missing.
It is by becoming oriented to the city and its services that a foreigner becomes a
full member of the community and a citizen:
Facilitating the use of services, the use of the resources of the community is a
citizenship right, citizen understood as inhabitant of the city. It’s our right to use
the services that are available, otherwise we use it in a wrong way. This is the
right to citizenship. We become citizens of this city, in the meantime we are
paying taxes, when we have a right to use the resources of the community.20
Yet, even as cultural mediators are tasked with facilitating the use of services, migrants,
especially migrant women, are implicated in the provision of welfare services as the foot
19
20

Fieldnote, November 28, 2006.
Fieldnote, November 28, 2006.
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soldiers of the “do-it-yourself” welfare model. Regardless of educational and
professional experience, many migrant women in Italy find themselves channeled into
domestic/carework by immigration laws that set aside quotas for it (Campani 2007) by
employment offices that automatically direct women to it, by the high demand for
domestic and care-workers in the absence of adequate social services, and by the lack of
other opportunities due to the non-transferability of foreign education, lack of contacts,
and discrimination. This was a profound source of frustration voiced by many of the
participants in the course. For the students in the group, a number of whom had college
degrees and professional work experience, cultural mediation represented one of the few
professional opportunities available outside of domestic work.21
The head of the cooperative harshly reminded the students of this reality. She
warned the participants that cultural mediation is not something they should be pursuing
if what they are looking for is to improve their earnings:
Why are you here, wanting to be mediators? If you think you will earn more as a
mediator than you would as a badante22 [domestic worker] for women, or for
men by working in a factory, you are wrong. If one decides to be a domestic she
can manage her own hours, it’s possible to work on Sunday too, 15 Euros an
hour net, you lose your job, a family, and you find two others. There is no

21

In 2011, the percentage of migrant women who are employed was slightly higher than Italian women,
46.3% versus 45.7%, much of it attributable to domestic work (Parente 2012: 138). A significant portion
of domestic work is conducted “under the table.” A government report estimates that 62% of domestic
work falls under that category (Parente 2012: 141). Women make up 80% of domestic workers and the
countries of origin most represented among domestic workers, according to a 2010 survey are, in
descending order, Romania, Ukraine, Philippines, Polonia, Moldavia, and Peru (Censis 2010 cited in
Parente 2012: 142). Women from different countries of origin show widely different rates of
employment. Women from the Philippines, who have been in Italy for long periods of time, have wellestablished associations representing them, and are highly sought after in domestic work; their rates of
employment as high as 88%. Moroccan women’s employment rates, on the other hand, fall on the
opposite end of the spectrum at 26.4% (Istat 2008b: 46-47).
22
The term “badante” has its roots in the word “badare” “to mind.” Thus a badante is a “minder” a term
that is considered by many to be pejorative. The preferred term is collaboratrice domestica or “domestic
collaborator.” However, this term elides the structural inequalities and vulnerabilities of this work (see
Andall 2000).
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problem. If you don’t want to [be] a domestic, throw yourself into working with
the elderly, there is no problem.”23
In public discourse, including by the former Minister of Welfare, the care work
provided by migrant women is even celebrated as a “warm gift” that is preferable to the
cold bureaucracy of the state, a gift that is enabled by the reorganization of welfare
according to the logics of subsidiarity (Sacconi 2010: 44).24
In interviews and conversations with migrants, including participants in the
course, many described a number of problems with carework, not least of which the
vulnerability, including sexual, to employers, a sense of isolation and even
“imprisonment,” and the disjuncture between educational attainment in the country of
origin and domestic work.25 In these discussions the ideals of cultural “mutual
contamination” run against the reality of structural limitations in employment for
migrants, which leads the most educated, well-established and culturally “integrated” to
the field of cultural mediation searching for “professional” work. Marybel, a Peruvianorigin woman employed as a nursing assistant in a Milanese hospital and a participant in
the grassroots Let’s Get Together project described below recounted the stories she
heard from friends and acquaintances who were abused, including sexually, within the
confines of Italian homes, underscoring the vulnerability and lack of labor protection of
domestic work. Paula, an immigrant activist, also originally from Peru, described her
struggles to overcome the idea of being only “good enough to be a servant,” which she
23

Fieldnote, December 5, 2006.
See Bimbi 1993 for the historical resonance of this discourse.
25
A government report on employment problems associated with care work, which by virtue of being
delimited within individual households can lead to isolation as well as power imbalances between
employer and employee (Parente 2012: 142). The report cites findings from the Ukrainian Parliamentary
Commission on Foreign Affairs on the development among Ukrainian women employed as care workers
in Italy of an “’Italian syndrome’ characterized by agoraphobia, aggression, and other disturbed
psychological states” (Tolstokorova 2007, cited in Parente 2012: 144).
24
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explained as a combination of the limited opportunities for migrant women in Italy and
from her subordinate social standing in Peru as woman of indios identity.26
Rose Marie, described her first few years in Italy, when she worked as a
careworker, which she called being a “baby-sitter.” She found the work isolating,
describing feeling almost like a prisoner. Rose Marie described the difficulty of this
experience vividly in an interview in the one-bedroom apartment she shared with her
Italian husband and their 2-year-old daughter. She had earned a psychology degree in
Peru where she had practiced before moving to Italy looking for a living wage that
would support her parents as her father had lost his teaching job and pension through the
economic restructuring of the 1990s. Without a legal residency permit, and with her
university degree not recognized by the Italian system, the only work she could find was
as a “baby-sitter” for an Italian family:
the first year I was illegal and worked as a baby-sitter, and sometimes they told
me that I even had to clean and I didn’t like this, this I didn’t like at all.
Sometimes I thought: “God, what did I do to earn this punishment? Tell me
what I did, if I did something. Let this punishment end!” I used to ask for this, I
worked and thought: “Rose Marie, it won’t be for your whole life, this was my,
my motivation, my incentive that I gave myself, because it won’t be [….], not
my whole life doing this work. For me it was hard, the first year I cried a lot, a
lot, Milena! Madonna! I was sad, because sometimes I had two hours, maybe
Saturday or Sunday I … with the child and I used to see young women like me
who went out on their motorcycles, Italian girls, and I used to say “darn!” What
am I doing? Did I do the right thing coming here? […] In the meantime I met
my husband. This changed my life, understand? … I didn’t have any rest, I tell
you that they had, some of the time they didn’t give me the day off. Closed
inside there, and some of the time they humiliate you, no? And you feel bad. No,
I went through it, thank God that it was a year and a half and not longer.27
The structural limitations in employment for migrant women highlights the way the
ideal of mutual contamination remains just that, a symbolic and cultural model that is
26
27

Digitally recorded interview, July 19 2007.
Digitally recorded interview, April 27 2007.
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not reflected in structural opportunities for migrants. The contradictions between
expectations of integration that foreground gender equity and participation of women in
the public sphere and the reality of domestic work underscore the rhetorical use of
gender ideologies in the assertion of Italy’s modernity and in the definition of Italian
identity vis-à-vis migrants, particularly those from Muslim communities.
Asserting Coherence: The Charter of Values of Citizenship & Integration
Immigration in Italy is often framed by the context of demographic anxieties, of
“disappearing Italians” and a dwindling welfare state and is thus simultaneously a threat
to, and a potential resource for, social and biological reproduction. In the rhetoric of the
right, immigration is a threat to the imagined homogeneity of the Italian nation and to
its security. Integration from this perspective requires the adoption of Italian moral
values and respect for law and order. On the left, the “threat” posed by immigration to
social cohesion is understood not as an inherent problem with heterogeneity and cultural
diversity, but rather as a potential problem that could arise from unmanaged
immigration and inequality. Despite these differences, however, politicians across the
spectrum increasingly identify certain values as Italian, European, and Western and
expect immigrants to adopt them. Central in this assertion of what are non-negotiable
values of Italianness are the adoption of monogamous marriage and “egalitarian”
gender relations, which are seen by some, but not all, as incompatible with veiling,
access to education and employment, and the presence of women in the public sphere.
The approach to integration as a strategy of emancipation of women is a running thread
through institutional and expert discourses on immigration, integration, and
nonnegotiable cultural values. The contradictions between the embrace of gender
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equality as an Italian core value and the actual experiences of women, both migrant and
Italian, however, opens up spaces for contestation.
The flourishing of discourses on immigration and integration finds its first
institutional articulation in a 2007 document produced under the auspices of the centerleft government led by Romano Prodi. Following consultation with representatives of
various immigrant and religious communities, a panel of experts drafted an initially
non-binding28 document titled, Carta dei valori della cittadinanza e dell’integrazione
(The Charter of Values of Citizenship and Integration). The state, as Donald Carter
notes, “is envisioned through official documents” (1994: 73) and the Charter of Values
(Ministry of Interior) crystallizes an important dimension of Italy’s ongoing process of
“state formation as cultural revolution” (Corrigan and Sayer 1991: 199). The Charter is
a statement of the non-negotiable values of Italian society, common values that all
citizens are expected to embrace.29 The Charter reflects traditional leftist concerns by
affirming immigrants’ rights related to work, access to health care, protection from
discrimination, housing, and education, the latter being identified “as an indispensable
instrument for personal growth and social integration” (2007: 1). In return, immigrants
are expected to abide by Italian laws and values. Issues championed by the right are also
28

While the Charter lays out the parameters of integration in official terms, it was not originally a
binding document. In 2010, however, the center-right government of Silvio Berlusconi introduced the
Accordo di integrazione (Integration Agreement), which new immigrants will have to sign. The
Agreement includes a requirement that immigrants sign the Charter of Values and Citizenship. The
“Integration Agreement” is a point-based assessment. Points are acquired through the acquisition of
knowledge about Italian society, the Italian language and through attendance of required civic education
classes. Practices that lead to the acquisition of points include the establishment of a business, the
purchase of a home, and the selection of a primary care physician. Conversely, points are lost for any
kind of criminal activity leading to even “provisional” sentencing. The official text of the Accordo di
Integrazione (Integration Agreement) is available at
http://www.governo.it/GovernoInforma/Dossier/integrazione_sicurezza/accordo_integrazione.pdf
29
The official English translation of the Charter is available online at:
http://www.interno.it/mininterno/export/sites/default/it/assets/files/14/0919_charter_of_values_of_citizen
ship_and_integration.pdf
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represented. The Charter defines Italy in terms of its Greek and Roman history and
Judeo-Christian roots, identifying these as the sources of the country’s modernity.
In its role as a document aimed at guiding the integration of immigrants, the
Charter articulates the requirements and parameters of integration and citizenship. It
highlights civic as well as cultural values, and identifies the adoption of shared values
as an important step towards citizenship. An integrated immigrant:
shows a good command of the Italian language, knows the essential elements of
Italian history and culture and shares the principles regulating the Italian society.
Living in the same territory means to be full-fledged citizens of that land and
acquire, with loyalty and coherence, common values and share responsibilities
(2007: 2).
Yet, deep cultural, political, linguistic, and economic rifts have been a feature of
Italian history. In the postwar period the divide between Catholics and Communists
has been particularly intense. The 1970s marked a period of political and cultural
struggles over the family, reproduction, and the bases of solidarity, all issues that have
gained new relevance in the past decade. Nonetheless, in the Charter of Values, the
political and cultural struggles playing out in Italy have been neatly subsumed under
the notion of “common values.” Included among these values is gender equality,
presented as an established and non-negotiable characteristic of Italian society:
Men and women have equal dignity and enjoy the same rights inside and outside
their own family. Italy offers to every female, male and young immigrant the
possibility to integrate while respecting one’s own identity. This path can lead
those who decide to settle in our country to participate actively in the social life
(2007: 2).
Yet, these values have had a fragile toehold in Italy, certainly compared to other parts of
Europe. Writing about women’s rights in Italy in the mid 1980s, Paul Ginsborg observes
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that despite important changes, “overall … Italy occupied a distinctly retrograde place in
the diverse world of European patriarchy” (2001: 105).
In addition to the affirmation of gender equality as a quintessential Italian value,
an entire section of the Charter is devoted to articulating the Italian definition of the
family, to which immigrants are to abide to be considered integrated. The Charter draws
upon the definition of the family in article 29 of the Italian Constitution, which states
that “Italy recognises the rights of the family as a natural society based on marriage”
(2007: 3). Yet, at the very time that this document was being drafted and published, the
definition of the family was being questioned and challenged by attempts to obtain the
recognition of civil unions in Italy. An intense debate swirled around the constitutional
meaning of “the natural family” and the configuration of family that could and should be
recognized by the Italian state (see chapter 4). The definition of marriage presented in
the document neither acknowledges nor reflects these social and political tensions within
Italian society. Instead, the drafters of the Charter defined marriage as heterosexual,
reproductive, and monogamous:
Marriage is based on equal rights and responsibilities of husband and wife and it
is, therefore, monogamic. Monogamy unites the lives of two persons thus
making them both responsible for what they realize together, starting from the
bringing up of their children. Italy forbids polygamy, it being adverse to
women’s rights. This is also in line with the principles affirmed by European
institutions (2007: 3).
The exclusions inherent in this definition of marriage are elided in the same
moment that “the freedom to choose whom to marry” is enshrined in the Charter as an
Italian value, but only as it concerns heterosexual relationships. At the very same time
that the terms of marriage and the family were under intense debate in Italy, particularly
as it concerns the recognition of same-sex marriages and civil unions, the Charter
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presents as unproblematic the heteronormative definition of marriage. The Charter also
addresses the issue of veiling, taking a different stance from the French in recognizing it
as an expression of identity and as compatible with Italian values as long as worn by
choice: “In Italy there are no restrictions on people’s attire, as long as it is chosen freely
and it is not detrimental to his/her dignity. It is not accepted to cover the face because
this impedes the person’s recognition and hinders establishing relations with the others”
(2007: 4). The terms by which the veil is recognized reaffirm the potential for the veil to
be “detrimental to dignity,” the importance of “free choice,” as well as the Italian
emphasis on sociality in matters of integration.
The Charter of Values of Citizenship and Integration presents integration as a
project of emancipation and modernization that addresses immigrant women differently
than men. The drafters of the document single out migrant women (alongside children)
as being particularly “needy” of state protection (2007: 1). Immigrant men, on the other
hand, are implicitly presented as potential oppressors of women in need of adopting
Italian values of gender equality and monogamy. Additionally, the presentation of the
values of integration glosses over the actual cultural, political and moral heterogeneity
of Italian society. The elision of the contested and un-cohesive nature of Italian society
is made possible by the projection of difference onto immigrants, Muslim immigrants in
particular. Against the specter of practices like polygamy and arranged marriages
otherwise contested ideas of family and gender relations in Italy are subsumed into
shared commitments to gender equality and self-determination.
Anthropologists have long rejected the notion that cultural coherence is
automatic (Wolf 1999: 66-67). Instead, as Wolf eloquently asserts in his final work,
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cultural coherence is the outcome of active social processes. The “organization of
diversity” into cultural coherence is always an exercise in power. The task of the
ethnographer is to make those processes visible:
Whenever possible we should try to identify the social agents who install and
defend institutions and who organize coherence, for whom and against whom.
And if culture was conceived originally as an entity with fixed boundaries
marking off insiders against outsiders, we need to ask who set those boundaries
and who now guards those ramparts (1999: 67).
“Moral regulation” as Philip Corrigan and Derek Sayer define it, is a cultural
project that is characteristic of the capitalist and patriarchal state, “a project of
normalizing, rendering natural, taken for granted, in a word, ‘obvious,’ what are in fact
ontological and epistemological premises of a particular and historical form of social
order” (1991: 4). Through the Charter the Italian State declares “acceptable forms of
social activity and individual and collective identity” (Corrigan and Sayer 1991:3) that
are aimed both at migrants and Italians, making it hard at times to sort out “for whom
and against whom” this coherence is being organized. However, one category of
immigrants, Muslims, is uniquely interpellated in official articulations of the Italian
values of integration and citizenship.
Integrability and Integralism: Islamophobia in Europe
Islamophobia has been on the rise in the New Europe since the 1990s. Scholars
have examined the contours of the emergence and solidification of the Muslim as the
ultimate Other to European values of universalism, tolerance, and modernity (Bunzl
2007). Anthropologist Douglas Holmes examines the link between the reconfiguring of
social solidarity under “fast capitalism” and the rise of right-wing integralism and of
racism across Europe (2000) The discourse on the essential foreignness and otherness of
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Muslims in Europe is a form of racism legitimated by cultural, rather, than biological
premises. In the 1990s, scholars of European racism noted the shift away from
biological grounds and toward cultural arguments, which in their assertion of essential
and immutable differences came to serve the same ideological purposes (see Stolcke
1995; Barker 1982; Miles 1993). Right-wing political figure, such as Jean-Marie Le Pen
in France, Pim Fortuyn in the Netherlands, Umberto Bossi and Roberto Calderoli in
Italy (and the list goes on) have solidified a right-wing movement around the “threat”
posed by Muslim migrants (Bunzl 2007: 37). Public intellectuals and commentators
argue that Muslims threaten Western civilization through their values, terrorist
violence, and hyper-fertility. Formerly leftist Italian journalist Orianna Fallaci has
warned that Europe is turning into ‘Eurabia’ (2006).
One of Italy’s most noted political scientist, Giovanni Sartori argues in a 2009
newspaper editorial that as far as citizenship and “Italianness” are concerned, “the issue
is not between white, black, or yellow, it’s not about skin color, but rather about
the ‘integra-bility’ of the Muslim” (emphasis in original).30 The question of the
“integrability” of Muslims is a question of essential difference and of the terms of new
and profound political exclusions. Sartori’s concern with the refusal of the Other to
integrate (2000: 10) reflects his suspicion of multiculturalism and his preference instead
for ‘tolerance.’31 Following the events of 9/11, of the attacks in London and Spain, and
in the context of the US-led war in Iraq and Afghanistan, the position of Muslims in
Europe and Italy is complicated by the geopolitical relevance of Islam and by the global
30
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threat of terrorism. The “clash of civilizations” (Huntington 1993) gains traction beyond
the symbolic and cultural level.32
Tensions around Muslim migrants and an intense focus on the issue of veiling in
Milan were inescapable during my fieldwork. In 2006, around 40% of migrants in
Lombardy were Muslims (Blangiardo et al. 2006: 71).33 Some neighborhoods were
particularly associated with Muslim residents. The most notorious was via Padova. In
April of 2007, as I made my way to a small café in via Padova for an interview with
Saja, a Syrian woman who had lived in Italy for two decades, I walked past multiple
posters by the xenophobic Lega Nord party exhorting Italians to be “Padroni a casa
nostra” (“In Charge in Our Own Home).” As I waited for Saja to join me in the bar I
could not avoid the loud conversation of the Italian family seated next to me. One of
them had ordered a marocchino, a drink similar to a “moka,” but also the term for a
Moroccan man and, for many Italians, the catch-all term for all North-African
immigrants. The family started to joke that there were “marocchini” everywhere now
and pointed as if in confirmation to the street. Saja, who wore a veil, was just then
walking in front of the window on her way to meet me. The family fell silent when she
walked in and joined me at the table.34
Shopkeepers in my neighborhood warned me about immigrants and spoke
particularly negatively of Muslim ones, “they can’t be trusted” cautioned the owner of a
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pet shop, “they smile at you but they always have ulterior motives.”35 Even at
multicultural events, such as the celebration of the Chinese New Year in via Paolo
Sarpi, a neighborhood noted for its high density of Chinese migrants and businesses,
discussions among Italians about the merits of different immigrant groups were loud
and unselfconscious. As we waited for the dragon to make its wind its way from Piazza
Gramsci, an Italian man and woman standing next to me conversed about the
neighborhood. The woman asserted: “This area is theirs now. But I prefer this
neighborhood ... Here it’s just them and they are not bothersome.” Her companion
responded, “there are Chinese in the other neighborhood too.” “Yes, but not just them,
there are others, like the Muslims, and you have to walk a kilometer to find a panetteria
(a bakery). No, the Chinese are not bothersome, I have a lot of friends…”36
In fact, the Italian residents of the Sarpi neighborhood did find the Chinese
“bothersome” enough to seek restrictions of loading and unloading in the street, a
practice central to the wholesale clothing business so prevalent in the community. These
restrictions, approved by Milan’s conservative administration, led to a riot on April 12,
2007. On that day, instead of the bustling street I was used to catching a glimpse of as
the tram I took to the consultorio crossed via Sarpi, I saw a large number of police vans
and of agents in riot gear. Cars were overturned. The event was at the top of the news
for a few days, raising once again questions of integration and social cohesion.37
Tensions around the ownership, symbolic and actual, of urban spaces were
never more heightened than around the issue of the building of mosques. Struggles over
35
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mosques have played out in Italy for many years and have involved cities like Florence,
Bologna, and Milan. Proposals for building a mosque in Milan has been opposed by the
Lega Nord and Milan’s conservative administration for years. Italian Senator and
former minister, Roberto Carderoli, a member of the xenophobic Lega Nord party, took
a pig for a walk on the grounds under consideration for a mosque in Milan. In 2007 he
called for a reprisal in Bologna, where a mosque was also being debated. He noted that
the event could be called “Maiale-Day” (“Pig Day”), a reference to the recent success
of the “Family Day” protest,38 underscoring how the resurgent conservative politics of
the traditional family and Christian values could slide into anti-Muslim sentiments.
The lack of a mosque in Milan has led to the proliferation of cultural
organizations that act as places of worship. Probably the most famous in Milan is the
“mosque” of viale Jenner, which was not far from the apartment where I lived and
where for part of my fieldwork I was joined by my partner Jeff. The viale Jenner
cultural center was on the ground floor of an apartment building and on Friday it
overflowed with worshippers. Jeff was invited to services there by friends he met at an
Egyptian food store near our apartment. He had visited the store in search of his beloved
tahini, which was nowhere to be found in Italian supermarkets. Because of the lack of
space, the faithful spilled over the allotted space, praying in the entranceway and out on
the sidewalk. Accusations of terrorism swirled around Abu Imad, the imam of the
mosque. When Jeff attended, the imam welcomed him warmly and gave him a Koran.
Yet, I wondered about what he and others thought of this white, blue-eyed American in
38
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this contested space. The thought that he might be working for the CIA must have
crossed some minds, including the imam’s, since it was only four years earlier, right
before the beginning of the Iraq war, that his predecessor, imam Abu Omar, was
kidnapped on a street nearby. Omar was walking home from the mosque in broad
daylight when he was seized by a group of CIA officers under the policy of
“extraordinary rendition.” Omar, who had been granted asylum from Egypt in 2001 by
the Italian government, was then flown to the US military base of Aviano and then to
Egypt, where he was tortured for 7 months.39 The question of whether Muslims
belonged in Milan, in Italy, and in Europe, then, was also caught up in broader
geopolitical concerns. The politics of the war on terror, while not the focus of this
chapter, raised the stakes of being Muslim on the streets of Milan, of being marked as a
potential threat rather than a potential citizen.
Integration as Emancipation?
Teasing out the question of gender and integration reveals a complex political
issue. After many years of neglect of issues of race and immigration (see Andall 2000),
Italian feminists were beginning to address the relationship between feminism and
migration in 2007, spurred by the appropriation of feminism in anti-immigrant and antiMuslim discourse. In February 2007 I attended a conference hosted by the association
Libera Università’ delle donne (Women’s Free University) and organized by Members
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of Parliament and other politically active women associated with the Rifondazione
Comunista party. The conference, titled Culture, Cittadinanze, Identità (Cultures,
Citizenships, Identities) brought together politicians, scholars, writers, activists, the
head of a cultural mediation association, feminist family lawyers, the Italian principal of
the Egyptian school in Milan, and even an anthropologist. The conference aimed to
grapple with the recognition that feminism and gender issues were being hijacked to
legitimize racist discourses and policies. In introductory remarks, Senator Giovanna
Capelli explained the choice of addressing these issues: “They say Milan is the
laboratory of what globalization brings to Europe,” yet, as she noted, racism against
Muslims and the Roma population had intensified over the past year.40 Capelli reported
on developments in the Italian Parliament: The Senate held hearings on “the status of
immigrant women in Italy,” which was really about Muslim women, and how “they are
all subjected to the authority of their husbands,” and are in need of “emancipation.” In
the Chamber of Deputies, a legislative proposal had been introduced by Daniela
Santanchè, then an MP with the post-fascist party Alleanza Nazionale. The proposal
was to ban the veil in Italy. For Capelli, this represented a “dangerous trend”: “they are
trying to use feminist words, words that belong to the left, they are decontextualized,
even turned upside down, to reach an opposite goal.”41
Santanchè had in fact been one of the motivations for the conference because of
her recently published book on Muslim women and her newly found role as their
protector. Santanchè’s book, titled La donna negata: dall’infibulazione alla liberazione
(Woman Denied: from Infibulation to Liberation), was published in 2006 with a preface
40
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by Umberto Veronesi, a well-known Italian scientist.42 The book’s argument is that
Muslim women are brutally oppressed by Muslim men43 and that European
governments should intervene to emancipate them through policies such as the banning
of the veil. According to Santanchè: “To veil a woman means to spread a vision of the
most fundamentalist Islam in European cities. It underscores the will to not integrate,
the rejection of western values, the condemnation of female emancipation and of the
equality of the sexes” (2006: 67).44 In these arguments the veil functions as a symbol of
un-integrability into Italian society.
In fact, the overlap of feminist discourse and anti-Muslim rhetoric is not the
prerogative of the right. The critical approach of the Cittadinanze conference was
highly unusual. Throughout my fieldwork I was confronted with conversations about
the oppression of Muslim women, including from women involved in feminist work.
The assumption that Muslim women were always oppressed, that the veil was
inherently a symbol of that oppression, and that Muslim women were in need of
liberation, was widespread.
In the rest of this chapter I examine the issue of veiling as it emerged in the
cultural mediation course, in the Let’s Get Together group, and in the broader public
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and political discourse. I document how veiling in Italy articulates with Italy’s selfconsciousness about its modernity, including in terms of progress related to women’s
issues, and its secularism, and yet still represents for many Italians across the political
spectrum, a limit to the ideal of the “cultural contamination” model of integration.
“Not With the Veil”
In a lecture on ethnic relations, the head of the cooperative described various
types of employment discrimination, highlighting the discrimination of women above
all. Hafa, an Egyptian woman in her mid-thirties who was widowed and raising three
children, shared her experience of employment discrimination which was related to the
fact that she wore a veil. Just a few weeks earlier, Alima, a 40 year-old-woman from
Morocco, had complained to me about the same issue while we sipped our bitter
vending machine coffee from small plastic cups during a break in the course. Even
though Alima spoke three languages fluently and would be called for an interview
based on her résumé, once potential employers saw she veiled, they would turn her
away. Hafa’s experience echoed what Alima (and others) had described.
The instructor, however, was not willing to include this as examples of
discrimination. Instead she devoted a significant amount of class time trying to put that
interpretation into question. She introduced a hypothetical situation in which both she
and Hafa would show up for a job interview: Hafa with her veil and the instructor
wearing such a short miniskirt that one could see “thong underwear so skimpy that it
could be mistaken for dental floss.” The instructor suggested that both of them would be
turned away: one for being too covered, the other for being too uncovered. Both are
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sending messages, she argued: one that she is not going to play the part of the good girl,
and the other… she trailed off:
So, the reason why she is excluded is because she is too covered up. I am
excluded because I’m not covered up enough. So my question is, she perceives
this as an act of discrimination by virtue of of of her experience, of the fact that
she is sending a very clear message, or at least this is how they are interpreted,
dressing in that fashion. I am also sending a very clear message, I mean, for sure
I want to get attention, I want to seem more or less sexy, for sure I don’t want to
play the part of the good girl. … The issue in this case can be that behind the
refusal of “not you because you have the veil” might not be an outright act of,
how do you say, discrimination because you are Muslim, it could be, I don’t
know, like in my case, “I don’t want you because, excuse the expression, you
give the impression of a whore.” Because either you present yourself in another
way, or like this I cannot accept you. … did you ever ask: “excuse me, I have
the veil, but I can also work without” and then in a lower tone of voice, “if you
are willing”.
Hafa’s response was to restate her experience: “When she saw me at the door she
stopped me at the door and told me that the cooperative does not accept women with the
veil.”
Still unwilling to concede this as a case of discrimination, the instructor turned it
into a teaching moment on the importance of dress for (female) cultural mediators:
I am talking to you about this because the topic of clothing is very important, it
affects the life of the mediator much more than you would think. So, let’s think
through this together. The agency says “not with the veil.” Why not with the
veil? Because you with the veil point to a particular image. However, I need to
put you to work with the public; the public can have a lot of different opinions. I
need people who are not marked.. who are not too marked in one way or another
because they need to have a good relationship with whomever they have in front
of them. Likewise, it’s not ok to have the short skirt, it’s not ok if you have a
very low-cut top.
Part of the making of cultural mediators for this instructor (who employs cultural
mediators through her cooperative), lies in producing subjects who are “not too
marked” in their gender presentation and religious affiliation. In this narrative the
appropriate presentation of self indexes cultural integration at the same time that it
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functions as a gatekeeper of social and economic integration. As a potential and
acceptable requirement of employment, cultural mediators need to conform to the “rules
of the place” in terms of the gendered presentation of self. Although integration and
hybridity are celebrated in theory, in practice, the amorphous boundaries of what counts
as integration are set by those who have the power to make decisions, including whom
to hire as a cultural mediator. And despite the progressive theory of intercultura and
cultural mediation, veiling, which marks the subject as Muslim, religious, and
oppressed because of her gender, challenges the ideal of mutual contamination and
represents a limit to integration.
While progressive Italians involved in projects of integration and cultural
mediation and institutional figures involved in making policy or policy
recommendations highlight gender equality as manifested in not covering, choosing
one’s spouse, monogamy, and engagement in public sphere as non-negotiable markers
of integration, migrant women and men identified other sources of oppression. Being a
properly hybrid and integrated mediating subject requires the performance of “modern”
and unmarked femininity. Yet, the difficulty that women migrants face in finding work
outside of the private, domestic sphere, for example, contradicts one of the key markers
and expectations of integration: that immigrants embrace modern gender roles and
participation in the public sphere. The women taking the cultural mediation course did
not describe feeling oppressed by their culture, but rather by the discrimination and
narrowing of opportunities they encountered in Italy.
Aziz, a cultural mediator originally from Morocco married to an Italian woman,
joined the course a few days late. Over time I got to know him and asked whether I
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could interview him and his wife. They lived outside of Milan and they invited me for
Moroccan tea at their small apartment decorated with Moroccan art. Aziz and his wife
Simona made a very attractive couple; they had been married for a few years and the
more I spoke to them, the more it seemed to me that they embodied the ideal of
“contamination” and hybridity embraced by the intercultura mediation model. Aziz was
a practicing Muslim while Simona, who had grown up Catholic, was not particularly
religious. They explained to me how they had “integrated” their lives: Aziz would pray
in the bedroom after work while Simona cooked the pasta and they had it timed so that
he would be done just in time to eat it al dente. She drank wine, while he drank water.
They respected and embraced each other’s differences. Their intimate balancing of
cultural “contamination,” however, clashed with discrimination in Italian society. After
driving me back to the train station and waiting with me, Aziz recounted the couple’s
struggles in securing a new apartment. They had found one they liked, two rooms, 750
euros. When Aziz called about renting, the realtors asked:
“How many people?”
“Two, my wife and I.”
“Can I inquire what nationality?”
“My wife is Milanese and I am… Moroccan.”
“Ah, I’m sorry, but the proprietor only wants Italians.”
Aziz protested to me, “but I live here, what if I had Italian citizenship? Fra and I joke
that if I had citizenship, I would respond ‘Italian’ and then we would show up, me with
a long beard and her all covered up!” For the time being, despite embodying the values
of intercultura within their relationship, Aziz and Simona could not seem to find a way
out of their cramped apartment in the periphery of Milan.45
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Getting Together
The demands of integration placed on Muslims, and on Muslim women in
particular, and the increasing sense of being targeted by anti-Muslim discourses and
practices, inspired a group of women to initiate an informal, grassroots intercultural
project. They named the group Incontriamoci (Let’s Get Together) to emphasize its
social nature, hoping to initiate a dialogue between Italian and Muslim women (some of
the participants were both). Most of the Muslim women who participated in the group
veiled, as did an Italian woman who had married an Egyptian and converted to Islam.
Marybel, a Peruvian woman, also participated in the group because of her interest in
immigrant rights issues. The first few meetings, which began in February of 2007, took
place in the controversial Italian-Egyptian school, where some of the participants sent
their children. At the second meeting, in March of 2007, about 20 women and a couple
of men sat around a large conference table talking about how Muslims are seen in Italy,
the meaning of the veil, the role of the woman in the family, integration, food, racism,
and even the evils of cigarette smoke. More informal conversations took place over
Egyptian and Moroccan sweets and mint tea.
The two principal figures behind the initiative were Federica, a divorced Italian
woman with a pre-adolescent daughter and a new partner, and Halima, an Egyptian
woman with three children, who veiled, and whose daughter, of around the same age as
Federica’s, also wore a hijab. Federica and Halima, and some of the other women who
participated in the group had found each other and become friends through their
children’s Italian school, prior to the opening of the Italian-Egyptian school. The
synergy between Federica’s anti-racist and progressive politics and Halima’s desire to
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do something to address what she experienced as an increasingly hostile society led to
the project. Federica’s friendliness and energy and Halima’s warmth and infectious
laughter and their very different lives and looks made them particularly well-suited to
open up a dialogue that they hoped would educate and bridge differences.
As in other settings in which immigration was a topic, discussions of
“integration” were common. In one of the early meetings, Luisa, a tall thin woman in
her early thirties with bright blue eyes and a silky headscarf that matched her clothes,
introduced herself to the group. Originally from Dagestan, she had been living in Italy
for seven years, was married, and had a child. The first thing she said after introducing
herself was: “I don’t feel integrated. I work, I read the newspaper, I watch TV, I
understand Italian, I make myself understood, but I don’t feel integrated. I don’t
understand, it’s as if I’m from another planet.” Marybel, a woman in her early 40s who
worked as a nursing assistant in a Milanese hospital echoed Luisa: “Picking up on what
Luisa said, ‘I don’t feel integrated,’ I don’t either, and in addition, I challenge the idea
of integration by the state that we are supposed to accept with our heads low. I am
Peruvian, I am trying to live a quiet life, on a humanistic basis, we are all human beings,
of the same species.”46
Two Italian women one of whom was a retired teacher in Pioltello Nuovo talked
about the similarities with the 1970s when the Milanese didn’t want their children in the
same classrooms as the children of the meridionali (southerners). Another participant
charged that to her the word “integrazione” was a swear word because it meant “the
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erasure of identity.” The discussion turned on whether the burden of integration is
placed on immigrants or as Federica argued it should be, “on the receiving society.”47
The topic of veiling and of the role of women within the Muslim family sparked
the most discussion and were ultimately the central issues that Federica and Halima
wanted to address. Halima was keen on Italians not assuming that Muslim women who
veiled did so because their husbands forced them to. She presented the veil as a choice,
one she had made independently and that she claimed her daughter had recently made
as well. Halima described the subtleties of veiling, the fabrics and colors that were in
fashion, and talked about wanting to hold a workshop on the topic. Gloria, an Italian
middle-aged psychologist with bright red hair, introduced herself as a “historical”
feminist, having been part of a feminist collective in the 1970s. She described
participating in the battle to establish the consultori and to decriminalize abortion,
marching in the streets and setting up barricades. “What amazing times, I am so happy
to have lived through them,” she remarked. When the discussion turned to veiling,
Gloria called on Italian women to look within before judging Muslim women or making
assumptions about them: “Ma chi non ha una donna velata dentro di sé?” (But who
doesn’t have a veiled woman inside her?),” she asked. “Catholic nuns veil without
causing a scandal!” interjected Halima, to which Gloria replied, “Yes, “but nonna too.”
Gloria offered a psychological explanation for the threat that the veiled woman seems to
pose for Italian women. She argued that this veiled figure was a projection: “she is
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dangerous, because she is inside.” In order to counter that sense of danger, everyone
needed to own their reactions.48
In an interview in the summer of 2007, Federica and Halima returned over and
over again to the issue of veiling.49 They took turns to describe the exaggerated
attention that Italians pay to the veil. They laughed about the way the group of them, a
handful of women all veiled except for Federica who met in the afternoons to have a
coffee in the bar of the Piola subway station, the same bar where we were holding the
interview, were stared at by Italian commuters. The owner was friendly and supportive,
but the commuters would cup their hands around their faces, as Halima demonstrated to
me, and put them on the glass window of the bar to gape at the group. Halima told me
“one day you should walk with me, hidden, because they look you wrong if you are
walking with a mussulmana, you’re crazy to walk around with a Muslim woman.”
Halima described the “courage” that it took to start wearing the veil in Italy and the
pride that she felt that her daughter had chosen to do so as well. However, she also
worried for her children. Her daughter had been shoved on the city bus on her way
home from school by an older woman and had fallen down the stairs of door. The
incident inspired her to speak with her friends about doing something, holding some
meetings, “speaking with people, because people, they have become mean, I am afraid,
I am always worried for my children, for myself.” Halima’s fears had recently been
confirmed by an incident that took place in front of the Italian-Egyptian school: One of
the mothers of the children enrolled there, an Italian woman married to an Egyptian
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man who had converted and wore the niqab, was attacked by an Italian man outside of
the school. The man pulled at her veil, then punched her, knocking her to the ground.50
Federica described the fact that even her friends, all of whom she described as
leftist, questioned her friendship with Muslim women: “they are curious, but not
suspicious, because from an intellectual perspective they think that we’re all equal, but
there is still a small obstacles, their judgment toward us, they look at me, ‘how do you
do it’?” Federica added, immediately after as if in answer to that rhetorical question: “I
am with them, my nonna (grandmother) walked around with the veil, in Sardegna, in
the little villages.” Halima described a common experience among her friends who
veiled, and something that had happened to her on numerous occasions, of being told by
Italian women: “it’s too hot, pull it off!” She recounted one interaction with some
amusement. On a hot summer day while she was looking through fabrics at one of the
stands at the weekly outdoor market, Halima was approached by an older Italian woman
who asked her:
“But do you not feel the heat like us?”
“Yes, signora, I assure you,”
“Pick me a color, but I don’t do it like you, I put it here,” pointing to her neck.
“Ok, it’s not a problem. Ok.”
Michelle Rosaldo’s quip that Third World Woman is “ourselves undressed” (1980: 392,
cited in Mohanty 1988: 65) gains new meaning in these heated encounters where veiled
women become “ourselves overdressed.” Halima reflected that “there’s a lot, there are
those who understand, there are those we still need to talk.” Federica returned to the fact
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that Italian women of two generations ago also used to veil: “People have forgotten that
our nonne too used to wear the veil. Ah, maybe they have forgotten?”
Through the recuperation of the veiled nonna Italian feminists can make
connections with Muslim women who veil that counter the notion of deep-seated and
unbridgeable cultural differences. These nonne of our memories, who covered their
heads to go out in public, which preceded the Muslim women who veil today,
undermine the notion of the inherent alienness of these practices and of veiled women
walking on Italian streets, riding the bus, shopping at the market. Other veiled figures
preceded them, still alive in the memory of their granddaughters, myself included.
Halima and Federica also sought to counter assumptions that Muslim women are
oppressed in the family. In meetings of Let’s Get Together and in our interview they
presented a family system and gender roles that they argued, while different, should not
be read as oppressive. Federica observed that “when they get married, it’s the man who
brings the dowry, not the woman, which I think is correct because the woman, she has
something too… A man who asks his wife for her money is not a decent man.” Halima
added, “because you don’t touch it, because she is the one available, it’s his
responsibility, it’s him who has to pay for everything for the household,” and Federica
jumped in: “While we, women in the West, instead also work.”
The discussion on “the Muslim family,” like the veil, served to counter the
stereotypes that mark Muslims as incompatible with western values by reasserting those
differences in western terms: as self-determined choices, in the case of the veil, or as
alternative organizations of gender and work within marriage and in the family, not
necessarily inferior or worse for women than the unequal division of labor in Italian
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families. Federica’s impetus for the dialogue that Halima had sought centered on
challenging the notion that Muslim women were oppressed while Italian women were
free in relationship to men:
We have to, because there is all that dimension of the relationship between men
and women, because all Italians think they wear the veil because the husband
forces them. This is the fundamental point. Which then, after all, there is the
other side of this issue, that many Italian men, they are jealous, they don’t let
women leave the house, they hit them, you understand? And then they are
against, you know, this thing.
In her research with Muslim women in Italy, Ruba Salih found that women who
embrace an Islamist discourse “are well-educated women who aspire to and embody a
modern project” (2002: 164), if an alternative one (149). This explicit presentation of
self as modern on the part of Muslim women in Italy exists against a background of
systematic representations of Muslims as backward “Others” to Italy’s (Salih 2002).
Halima’s desire to provide a counter and positive representation of the Muslim family,
of women’s roles within it, and of the reasons and practices of veiling is an assertion in
terms that is in many ways commensurable with Italian values. Halima asserts that the
Muslim family, even if the woman may not work, is not inherently oppressive of
women, but rather differently organized. The veil is defended both in terms of modesty
and self-determination, as a choice, not an imposition. The discursive focus on the
violence and oppression of “the Muslim family” is shifted onto Italians who pull on the
veil calling for it to be taken off, push young girls off the steps of the bus, and assault
women knocking them on the ground in front of their children’s schools. The violence
of the gaze is even more pervasive.
While racism and anti-immigrant sentiments and violence are not limited to
Muslims immigrants, the visibility of Muslim women and the perception of their
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inherent oppression as symbols of non-European values and practices make their
position particularly vulnerable and the debates around the veil particularly heated.
Embodying the markers of the limits of integration, Muslim women find
themselves at the intersections of complex politics of gender and the family in
contemporary Italy. The practice of veiling does not run counter to a shared
commitment to secularism the way that it does in France. Religious influence on
Italian politics and on women’s lives and bodies cannot be blamed on the concern
that acceptance of a public Islam will weaken secularism. The Catholic Church
looms large over Italian feminist and progressive politics.
A conversation between Nilde and her teen granddaughter, Raffaella,
whom Nilde was watching at the consultorio for the afternoon, reveals the way
being Muslim is seen as incompatible to being Italian, and draws links between
veiling and Catholicism. Raffaella’s boyfriend’s mother was in a relationship with
a Muslim man, which prompted Nilde to comment: “His mother prays all day
long”
Milena: “ all day long?”
Raffaella: “she became Muslim, she has a Muslim fiancé”
Raffaella: “she used to be Italian”
Milena: “she’s not anymore?”
Raffaella: “yes, she’s still Italian”
Nilde: “you meant to say that she was Catholic”
Raffaella “No, she wasn’t Catholic, she was normal”
Nilde: “she prays all day, there laying forward [mimicking putting her hands in
front of her face from the sitting position]. All day long”
Milena: “Five times a day?”
Nilde: “eh, all day long. Would you do it?”
Milena: “No, just like I wouldn’t do any organized religion”
Nilde: “I am already sick of the (cattoliche integraliste) fundamentalist Catholic
women, imagine those! One that converted, moreover, … she wasn't even born
into it, she converted! She must’ve had done the ‘taunber.’ Do you know that it
is?”
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Milena: “No, I don’t” 51
Nilde: “It’s what you do to change religion, you ask it to the Uffizi, the same
ones who used to burn the witches”
Raffaella: “But she is not a witch”
Nilde: “I didn’t say she was a witch, but the Uffizi used to burn witches. This is
why I didn’t baptize Paola (Raffaella’s mother).”52
The dialogue, which is in many ways comical, is also revealing of the way even
anti-clerical, communist feminists like Nilde conflate Italianness with
Catholicism. Nilde’s impatience with Catholic integralism is only compounded in
the case of her assumption of the woman’s fundamentalism because of her
“constant praying” and of the fact that she converted into Islam.
The terms of inclusion and integration underscore gender equality and the
family as markers of belonging to common, Western values. However, the values of
gender equality, freedom and choice in family-making remain incomplete projects of
modernity in Italy. The assertion of these values as common sheds light on the
opportunity that the “need” to manage cultural diversity offers for constructing moral
and cultural coherence out of difference and contestation. The limitations of this project
in a country widely and self-consciously identified as not fully modern opens up
discursive spaces of resistance and criticism to the nation-building project of integration
as emancipation.
Veils & Values
Writing in the 1990s, Angel-Ajani documented how the state sought to contain
the “dangerous” sexuality of African women: “in Italy today, the dangerous individual
is the African woman” (Angel-Ajani 2000: 343-344):
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much of the language about African women and prostitution is closely linked to
the state’s ability to control (or not control) the assumed levels of black female
sexuality. Thus the presence of the African women, as well as of undocumented
immigrants, brings to the surface a general anxiety over the contamination of the
nation’s moral value system, the very fabric of the nation (2000:344).
In the post 9/11 world, another kind of “dangerous woman” has taken center
stage in discourse and policy. Her foreignness is linked not from the threat of her
physical and sexual presence on the streets, seemingly out of the state’s control, but
from her assumed restriction within the family, the home, and the veil. This repressed
figure of “Muslim Woman” (after Chandra Mohanty’s discursively constructed
homogenous “Third World Woman” 1988: 61) is the opposite of the “Nigerian woman”
described by Angel-Ajani. “Muslim Woman” is threatening because she embodies
values deemed incompatible with Italian society, with modernity, and with the West.
Mohanty’s “juxtaposition between the “average third-world woman” who is represented
as living “an essentially truncated life based on her feminine gender (read: sexually
constrained) and being 'third world' (read: ignorant, poor, uneducated, tradition-bound,
religious, domesticated, family-oriented, victimized, etc.)” and “the (implicit) selfrepresentation of western women as educated, modern, as having control over their
bodies and sexualities, and the ‘freedom’ to make their own decisions” (1988: 65) holds
for the figure of “Muslim Woman.” These assumptions are at once commonsensical
among Italians and vulnerable to critique in the time of increasing moral regulation of
reproduction and the family. The association of veiling with oppression, a refusal to
integrate, and even with the threat of terrorism is widespread in Europe (Parvez 2011:
288). In France, the ban on headscarves in public schools articulates around Republican
values of laïcité as the basis of integration (Bowen 2007; Parvez 2011). In Italy, a self-
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conscious modernity and incomplete secularism engenders a different articulation of the
question of veiling and integration.53
Italy, unlike France, has not passed legislation banning the veil in public places.
Even the Charter of Values recognizes wearing the veil as an expression of identity.
However, attitudes toward veiling in Italian society are fairly negative and women who
veil report significant harassment from Italians as well as employment discrimination.
The gendered nature of the parameters of integration is not confined to Italy, but rather
tracks with broader trends. In Europe, as elsewhere, the discourse on the “’true clash of
civilizations’ concerns ‘gender equality and sexual liberalization’” (Inglehart and Norris
cited in Fassin 2010; Sweetapple n.d.). The struggles over the headscarf in France, for
example, point to the way gender is mobilized to (re)assert nationalist values, such as
laïcité’ and universalism in France (Bowen 2007). The debate over headscarves in
public spaces in France is a debate over pluralism and religion, but also, just as
importantly, about the responsibility of the Republican state to safeguard women’s
equality. The debate over headscarves articulates “deep-seated philosophical
assumptions about what French society ought to be and equally deep-seated fears about
53
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what it has become” (Bowen 2007: 5). For some (though not all) French feminists, the
veil is simply not compatible with French secularism and the values of gender equality
(Bowen 2007). The rejection of the headscarf in public schools is justified, even if in
practice it denies access to education to some young women who wear it, because it
represents the principled rejection of women’s subordination (2007: 217). The appeal
for the state to intervene in the name of laïcité and of women’s equality, as Bowen
insightfully notes, arises from a fear that the gains of French feminism against the
Catholic Church could come undone by “laxity toward women in headscarves” (2007:
220-221). Broadly shared concerns over headscarves in public spaces in France, then,
“go beyond racism or xenophobia (not that those are absent) to fears that the emergence
of a public Islam challenges the particular institutions that guarantee life together in the
Republic” (2007: 246). Wearing a headscarf threatens the values deemed to hold society
together justifying the intervention of the state in the form of a national law.
The rise to the status of “global icon” of Hirsi Ali, the Somali woman who
became a politician in an anti-immigrant Dutch party and built a career on her criticisms
of Islam for its treatment of women, speaks to the ascendance of gender as a legitimate
basis and justification for anti-Muslim sentiments and initiatives, and conversely, for
assertions of Western superiority and demands of cultural assimilation (Fassin 2010).
Hirsi Ali was symbolically offered citizenship by the French Human Rights’ Minister,
Rama Yade, on behalf of the Sarkozy administration (Fassin 2010: 508). Fassin asks:
Why should Hirsi Ali become French--although she did not announce she
intended to live in France, nor did she speak the language, especially at a time
when immigrants cannot resist expulsion by claiming long-term residence or
bring in their families unless these prove already “integrated,” in particular by
displaying a command of French? (2010: 508).
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Ali is considered French despite any actual connection to France by virtue of her
embrace of secularism (Fassin 2010). Despite specific integration requirements being
introduced by various countries, in which language proficiency figure prominently, the
embrace of Hirsi Ali as French highlights the centrality of the (supposed) fundamental
Western values of secularism as the basis for belonging in France, and by extension in
Europe.
Gender norms and sexual rights have become central sites on which the stakes
and morality of integration play out. In the Netherlands, the requirement of a film
showing female nudity and gay men kissing is one manifestation of this process, which
seeks to weed out immigrants whose values are not in line with those of the receiving
country. In Belgium, Ceuppens and Geschiere argue that the demands of integration of
Muslims are justified on the grounds that “the norms associated with Belgian society
(democracy, the separation of church and state, equality between men and women, etc.)
refer more to civic than to ethnic citizenship insofar that they are not considered Belgian
but Western” (2005: 399). The argument that these norms are culturally neutral,
however, glosses over their cultural and political assumptions: “both ethnic and civic
citizenship can imply a process of complete assimilation, either to a specific ethnic
culture or to a public, political culture that is represented as universal and, as such, is
oblivious of its own culturalness” (Ceuppens and Geschiere 2005: 399). By claiming
these values as civic and neutral they become non-negotiable and unimpeachable
requirements of belonging and legitimations of exclusion.
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Yet, Italian debates over veiling do not arise out of the same articulation of the
relationship between Church and State and Italy is not properly a secularist country.54
Italy is “un paese a laicità limitata” (“a country of limited secularism”), according to
Chiara Saraceno, one of Italy’s preeminent sociologist of the family (Saraceno 2011). I
attended numerous conferences and meetings in which laicità (secularism) was an
important if not central theme in discussions of reproductive and sexual rights. The
logics and terms by which the most public and visible presence of Islam is disciplined
in France, for example, are not the same in Italy, even as Islam occupies a similar
position at the margins of the nation-state as the symbolic limit of integration and
integrability. Italy’s “limited secularism,” combined with the memories and politics of
women’s positions in Italian society constitute a different terrain over which issues like
veiling are negotiated. The commonly shared notion that Muslims are not “integrable”
is countered by some with arguments that highlight cultural continuity, and thus
commensurability that center on women’s roles and on the family.
Opposition to the veil in Italy is not organized around a shared value of
secularism. If anything, the Italian right views the veil as a challenge to the primacy of
Italian Catholicism. Opposition to veil, however, harnesses diffused commitments to
women’s rights and modernity, sometimes quite strategically, into anti-Muslim
practices and proposals. The struggle over veiling as a symbol of the oppression of
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women in Islam centers on the issue of choice and of women’s roles within Muslim
families.
The stated intention in 2007 by a group of conservative female MPs to introduce
legislation similar to the French ban on veiling in public schools engendered a debate
best captured in the comments by Interior Minister Giuliano Amato. Amato’s comments
highlight the differences in how these debates are articulated in Italy compared to
France, for example, and the role that Catholicism plays in these discourses:
To ban the veil would mean to impose an imperialist western ideology in the
eyes of those who view differently from us… For example to prevent nuns who
attend university to continue to do so unless they go bare-headed. If we ban the
veil in a generalized manner I don’t think that there is a way. What do the nuns
have on their heads? … Should we ban the veil only for Muslim women? If you
make a law that prohibits wearing the veil in public places the first question that
arises is: why can a nun wear it and not an Islamic woman? There is only one
answer: because the nun does it in the name of your God while the Islamic
woman in the name of hers. And some have the courage to argue that a law such
as this should be made in the name of equality. 55
Supporters of a ban on the veil argued that the Islamic veil, unlike the veil worn by
nuns, is not a religious symbol. Member of Parliament Isabella Bertolini, a politician in
Berlusconi’s party, argued that the veil is instead
a symbol of the submission of Muslim women to the imposition of males, be
they husbands or heads of the family and this is why it should banned. The
vestments worn by Catholic nuns instead are the fruits of a free choice that leads
women to dedicate themselves voluntary and totally their lives to the good and
care of the other.
Bertolini accuses Amato of engaging in an “unacceptable equivalency between Muslim
and western customs leading to the diminishment and offense of our cultural and
national identity. This secularist and relativist drift will soon lead us to social chaos.”
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This response shows that Italy’s “imperfect secularism” can serve as a basis for
claiming or denying shared values with Islam.
This was not the first time that Minister Amato had waded into these issues
seeking to assert continuity between Italian culture and “Islam.” Just a couple months’
prior he had stirred controversy when he argued that the oppression of women was not a
foreign practice to Italians, specifically to Sicilians: “no God authorizes a man to beat a
woman. It’s a Sicilian-Pakistani tradition that wants to claim the opposite.”56 His
comments were met with condemnation from politicians claiming to have been
offended by Amato’s comparison of southern Italians and Muslims. Amato responded
that he had simply been trying to argue against the stereotyping of Muslims and to
suggest that these practices were not foreign to Italy. The centrality of the question of
women’s position in Islam and in Italy to the debate of whether Islam is compatible
with European and Italian values is striking. Yet, to assert integrability in terms of a
shared cultural tradition of women’s oppression is intrinsically problematic on a number
of levels. Amato’s assertions linking Sicily (his region of origin) to Pakistan contributes
to the long-standing orientalization of southern Italians (see Schneider 1998).
Additionally, just a year prior to these comments Amato had taken a different stance in
reference to the murder of a Pakistani young woman, Hina Saleem, at the hands of her
father who was said to disapprove of her “Western” life choices, and particularly of her
dating of an Italian boyfriend. In that context Amato argued that citizenship for
immigrants should require the belief in equal rights for women: “The case of the
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Pakistani girl murdered by her father teaches us a lot in terms of citizenship because it is
obvious that it is not enough to ask for adherence to the principles of the Constitution.”
According to Amato also important are “fundamental (rights) like the fact that women
should be respected according to rules that I consider universal … women have the right
to choose their lives and we abandoned arranged marriages some centuries ago.”57
The problem with countering Islamophobia by drawing comparison to Italian
culture and history is that much of that history is cast in the past, still positioning Italian
women as more modern, emancipated, and evolved than Muslim women. The implied
assumption is that Muslim migrants are integrabili Bowen 2007; Fassin 2010 Bowen
2007; Fassin 2010 (able to be integrated) into Italian society because they, like Italians,

have the potential to evolve. These arguments aimed at countering the politics of
incommensurability deployed by the right can easily slip into casting Muslim women as
Italian historical holdovers, as the cultural grandmothers of modern Italian women. In
the process, as Mohanty had noted for the discourse on “Third World Woman,” this
cultural othering constructs the modernity and progress of its opposite, “Italian
woman,” even as her self-determination and subjecthood is increasingly in question.
This attitude is exemplified by the notion, put forth by a sociological book on migration
in the 1990s, that migrant women in Italy represent “the women of tradition observing
the women of modernity” (Tognetti and Favaro 1991, cited in Campani 2007: 6). Ruba
Salih argues that “the day-to-day orientalist construction by newspapers, television and
politicians of the Muslim Other as illiberal, traditional and pre-modern, feeds on Italian
57
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society’s longing to represent itself as modern and progressive, acquitting itself from
the charges of being a traditional and religious society” (2002: 149, also cited in Krause
and Marchesi 2007). Yet, these same charges in Italy are also lobbed at the Catholic
Church and the conservative-right politicians, particularly in the context of the family
and reproduction, making for a fraught process of distinctions in modernity.
Minister Giulano Amato’s wavering between the poles of commensurability and
incommensurability of women’s oppression between Italian and Muslim societies
illustrates an unstable discourse in Italian society whereby sometimes Italy is cast as a
modern, European country that safeguards women’s rights. At other times and in other
contexts, such as the disciplining of assisted reproduction, other frames of reference
gain relevance, bringing into focus the country’s “backwardness.” One could say that
casting a gaze trained by Orientalist discourses toward the East and the South makes
Italians feel modern and Western, particularly as it concerns the position of women.
Conversely, casting the gaze West and North brings into relief the country’s uneasy
relationship to modernity (see Agnew 1997; Krause 2006; Salih 2002). I heard the latter
sense articulated often at feminist meetings on the topics of reproduction and civil
unions. A woman in her early thirties who was a member of a university-based feminist
collective powerfully articulated the deeply held sense of Italy’s lack of progress, its
literally unenlightened treatment of women compared, in this instance, to Spain:
For years I have felt some oppression. My existence is managed by politics I
don’t like, that don’t belong to me, that I’ve tried to avoid, but it’s difficult
because it enters your life, it chooses for you. A discomfort not heard, a life-time
passes without any changes… a trip to Spain, crossing the border [back into
Italy] and the light dims. Every day we live in a conditioning [environment], the
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church wants to manage our lives, the left. … We women, we will suffer again
and for more decades.58
By reminding of the recent history of the patriarchal family and the relative subordinate
roles of women within it, these discourses to a certain extent undermine the project of
safely locating Italy among the modern West. Yet, they do so without challenging the
very assumptions of modernity and backwardness that support the dichotomy of the
West and the Rest, and in fact reproduce the assertion of modernity as a gendered
civilizing project. In addition, these discourses work by denying immigrant populations
“coevalness” (Fabian 1983) with Italians and Europeans.
Gender equality discourses and requirements of integration attempt to position
Italy as a modern and Western European country in contrast to an oppressive and
backward Islam. Yet, this celebration of feminist values of gender equality does not
translate into feminist policies and practices. Instead, as I have argued in previous
chapters, it coincides with the restriction of reproductive rights and the denial of other
forms of family-making outside of the traditional, heteronormative, reproductive
configuration. This paradox is recognized by activists and enables criticism and
contestation of policies deemed as anti-feminist. In July 11 2007 a member of the
Donne, Diritti, Salute feminist network wrote an email in response to the coverage of
Muslim women in the media. The issue was hot because of the trial of a Pakistani man
accused of killing his daughter for being “too Western” and a related incident in which
Dounia Ettaib, the vice president of the Lombardy chapter of the Association of
Moroccan Women in Italy (Acmid) was threatened by a group of Moroccan men for her
involvement in supporting the trial. In her email, Clara expressed skepticism about
58
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political alliance between neo-Fascist Daniela Santanchè and the Moroccan women’s
group and pointed to the paradoxical location of feminism in contemporary Italy:
“Foreign feminists are welcomed if they carry on the models of our civilizations, while
local feminists are seen in a negative light if they dare criticize the incivility of our
civilization.” 59
On that same July evening of Pamela’s email, I attended a roundtable organized
by the local chapter of the Partito Radicale in Milan in support of Dounia Ettaib.
Dounia participated in the meeting, arriving with a police escort. During the discussion
the conversation turned to the language requirements introduced by the Netherlands as a
way to “protect” Muslim women from being controlled by their husbands in their
country of immigration. The participants in the roundtable celebrated this policy, a new
barrier to immigration, as a good idea.60 Policies that make immigration more difficult,
then, are embraced and legitimized in the name of protecting migrant women,
particularly Muslim women. As Pamela observes in her email, migrant women who
adopt Western values and are vocally critical of their culture are well-received. Dounia
Ettaib’s citizenship application, which had been languishing in the Italian bureaucracy,
was speeded up and approved following this incident. The trope of the Muslim woman
as victim on behalf of which outsiders need to intervene has global and geopolitical
purchase, ranging from the legitimation of exclusions from Europe to the consolidation
of support for the war in Afghanistan (see Abu-Lughod 2002).

59
60

Email, July 11, 2007.
Fieldnote, Dibattito Dounia, July 11, 2007.
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Conclusion
The project of integrating immigrants into Italian society is a nation-building
effort in which supposedly shared Italian values are explicitly articulated and contrasted
to practices and values deemed incompatible. This chapter has examined the ways in
which the project of integration represents another site for the articulation of social
cohesion in Italian society, in this case in relation to the threat of dis-integration posed
by unmanaged cultural differences. The Charter and the more diffused and pervasive
discourse on the question of Muslim integration is another facet of the project of “moral
regulation” that pervades family-making and reproduction and that redefines the terms
of social cohesion and solidarity in the moral neoliberal moment. The institutional
articulation of the terms of integration defines Italian society and reasserts its identity as
cohesive, bounded, western and modern.
Ethnographic research on the training of cultural mediators sheds light on the
contradictions and disjunctures of lived experiences and brings into relief what can
easily be glossed over in the intercultural integration model: the gendered nature and
implications of cultural mediation and the inequalities, discrimination, and racism that
structure the lives of immigrants in Italy. The project of integration is gendered not only
because successful integration is hitched to appropriate gender roles and family models,
but also because its foot soldiers, cultural mediators, are mostly women whose
employment opportunities are otherwise limited to domestic work.
While the centrality of gender and the family and of “sexual citizenship” tracks
with other cases in Europe (Bowen 2007; Fassin 2010), Italy’s self-consciousness about
its modernity undermines claims for a culturally unified nation and society into which
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migrants can integrate. While the terms of integration in Europe and in Italy are
coalescing around gender equality and monogamy as non-negotiable, shared European
principles, gender equality and the family have long been symbols of Italy’s imperfect
modernity and arenas of political and cultural struggle. The separation of Church and
State in Italian society is no more a given than the attainment of gender equality.
The grassroots integration project “Let’s Get Together” offers an example of
how a sense of Italy’s incomplete modernity and secularism, social memories of nonne
wearing headscarves, particularly in the south and islands, and the widespread sense of a
continued patriarchal and moral project limiting Italian women’s rights can serve as
critique to discourses that posit an inherent incompatibility of Muslims with Italian
society. Even as these counterarguments are problematic in that they can deny
coevalness to Muslim and migrant women by associating them with Italian women’s
grandmothers, they reflect the stakes of the limits of integration. These counterarguments also point to the centrality of gender and family-making to processes of
belonging and exclusions and to the ongoing moral project of the state.
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CONCLUSION
In this dissertation I have examined discourses, practices, and policies on the
“problem-solution” (Nadesan 2008) of social cohesion in Italy at the turn of the new
millennium. In locating my ethnographic inquiry at the intersections of reproduction,
the family, and integration in the post-welfare moment I sought to interrogate the terms
by which the “problem” of social cohesion, and conversely, of social dis-integration,
has been asserted and addressed.
The organizing principle of subsidiarity which has reshaped the Italian welfare
state, and especially the administration of social and health services in Lombardy, has
given a particular form to neoliberal restructuring in Italy. Subsidiarity holds together
neoliberal principles of devolution of state responsibility to the private and non-profit
sectors and the celebration of active citizenship, with a residual commitment to the role
of the state, now cast in a subsidiary role. Concerns with social solidarity and cohesion
loom large in this project. Rather than focus on empowering individuals abstracted from
social relations, however, the subsidiarity model of neoliberalization foregrounds the
family as the social formation mediating between state, market, and citizens.
The focus on the family as the source of social solidarity is not merely
rhetorical. The opening up of public funds for social and health services to non-state
entities has enabled a conservative Catholic administration to reshape reproductive
rights “from within.” Public family planning clinics established by law in 1975 in direct
response to the women’s movement have seen their funding erode, while Catholic
clinics that do not offer contraceptive or abortion-related services have increased. The
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remaking of health care combines neoliberal principles of active citizenship and choice
with a vitapolitics of life and family.
In 2008 the Region of Lombardy continued to target reproductive health
services, “eroding reproductive rights from within” by enacting legislation that requires
social service providers to protect motherhood and unborn life.1 Providers are tasked
with “safeguarding maternity and human life from the moment of conception and
guaranteeing interventions to support motherhood and fatherhood and the wellbeing of
the child, removing the causes, social, psychological, and economic that might hinder
responsible reproduction and lead to abortion.” Social service providers are also called
upon to support “the development of a healthy and responsible sexuality, conscious
reproduction, the prevention of abortion.”2
In 2010, the Region instituted a fund of 5 million euros to be directed at lowincome women who choose to have a child instead of an abortion. The fund, named
Nasko, onomatopoeic for “nasco,” or, “I am born,” will disburse a total of 4500 euros
per pregnancy over an 18 month period (250 euros a month). The governor commented
on the establishment of the fund by stating: “We want to help the family, motherhood,
and fertility rates, removing obstacles as much as possible, beginning with those of an
economic nature, which render more difficult to make a choice in favor of life”
(Regione Lombardia 2010). This provision was enabled by a regional decree oriented
toward “the experimentation of interventions aimed at safeguarding maternity and

1

Regional Law n.3/2008.
See, Franco Vitale, March 5, 2008,
http://www.mpv.org/mpv/s2magazine/AllegatiTools/131/Articolo%20di%20Franco%205.3.2008.pdf,
emphasis in original.
2
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favoring birthrates,”3 which imposes a collaboration between family planning clinics
and prolife organizations.4
The decentralization of the state and the opening up of funding streams have
weakened the reproductive and social rights that the women’s movement gained in the
1970s by enabling the moral restructuring of health and social services. The erosion of
public health services and its “domestication” through in-home care work is
documented in a 2012 study that shows an increase in 40% in copay costs and the
surpassing of health care staff employed in Italy’s health care sector by care workers
(774,000 care workers versus 646,000 health care providers).5 Caught between the
logics of choice and of the individual responsibilization of the market, on the one hand,
and the moral interventions of the church on the other, feminist activists historically
suspicious of an institutional politics of rights looked to the Italian state to protect
national reproductive laws and reassert public services at the same time that they
continued to contest the ART law.
The terms of the assertion of the embryo as a rights-bearing subject crystallizes
a number of contradictions in the politics of the population and at the intersection of
neoliberal reforms and the politics of solidarity in Italy. The approval of a restrictive
law at the very time that the future of the nation is widely presumed to hang in the
demographic balance is a paradox that highlights the importance of morally regulated

3

D.g.r. 31 maggio 2010 - n. 9/84 Determinazioni in ordine alla sperimentazione di interventi a tutela della
maternità e a favore della natalità, http://www.west-info.eu/wp-content/uploads/DGR-n.-84.pdf
4
Allegato A. Linee guida sperimentali per la collaborazione tra i consultori familiari pubblici e privati
accreditati ed i centri di aiuto alla vita. http://www.west-info.eu/wp-content/uploads/DGR-n.-84.pdf
5
“Ssn, sempre meno servizi per i cittadini "Nel 2012 ticket farmaci +40%,” la Repubblica.it, March 19,
2013, http://www.repubblica.it/salute/medicina/2013/03/19/news/sanit_ticket_sui_farmaci54900788/?ref=HREC1-7. The full report is available at,
http://blogpinali.wordpress.com/2012/12/01/rapporto-oasi-2012-laziendalizzazione-della-sanita-in-italia/
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family-making. Biopolitics in Italy is not just about birth rates and the size of the
population. It is also about the composition of the family, the biological and social
relationship of its members, and Catholic doctrine about the non-availability of life to
engineering and intervention. The safeguarding of “life,” in turn, resonates on multiple
levels, including in its assertion of an “exception to neoliberalism” (Ong 2006), a limit
to the reach of the market and corporations into our “DNA.” The embryo emerges as an
appropriate subject of solidarity, the “weakest” and “poorest” among “us.”
Attention to the politics of reproduction makes visible the ways in which the
State may be retreating from some areas of its former welfare responsibilities at the
same time that it is reaching into matters (of reproduction, the family, the “problem” of
low fertility) into which only a decade ago policy-makers could only thread “sneakily”
(Krause 2001). Attention to reproduction and the family foregrounds the salience of
gender in the transformations of welfare: while some of the literature on neoliberal and
biopolitical governmentality has emphasized the responsible, autonomous, empowered,
self-governing subject (see Rabinow and Rose 2003), women continue to be governed
as potentially irresponsible subjects vis-à-vis embryos and fetuses.
“Coming out of silence” is no easy task, especially when some of the language
of the left and of feminism (solidarity, an emphasis on the relational rather than
individual subject, even a distrust of reproductive technologies) has been reappropriated
for an altogether different kind of politics. The struggle to articulate an alternative
politics was particularly evident in debates over the family and its relations to the
“common good.” With the family having leapt into the center of politics, along with the
embryo, what are the implications of demands for a broader definition? The question,

301

“what do we think about the family?” elicited divergent answers, but also highlighted
the salience of commitments to the “common good” and social solidarity.
“Reasoning in terms of the family” carries a set of implications for social
citizenship that have become even clearer since my fieldwork. In 2012, the National
Observatory of the Family published the National Plan for the Family.6 The
introduction of the document claims that in view of Italy’s “social and demographic
imbalances,” of the lack of a unified family policy, and of the failures of previous
policies, an explicit policy of the family is required:
scholars underscore the need for a move from indirect and implicit policies to
direct and explicit policies that favor not only the juridical safeguarding of the
subjects of family life, but also favor the promotion of the family as a social
subject of primary public interest due to the relevance of the social functions
that it plays, particularly in terms of the humanization of persons and of social
cohesion (2012: 5).
The summary of the plan highlights four “guiding principles:” the notion of a
“citizenship of the family, meaning, the family as subject upon which to invest the
future of the country, supporting its function for social cohesion,”7 followed by “explicit
policies for the family nucleus,” “subsidiarity and development of human and social
capital,” and “solidarity.” The document calls for political recognition of the citizenship
of the family and for the integration of individual and family rights in recognition of the

6

The official website for the National Observatory on the Family (Osservatorio Nazionale sulla
Famiglia) lists Prof. Pierpaolo Donati as “scientific-technical director” of the Observatory and as
“president of the technical-scientific committee.” The committee, established in 2009 under the
Berlusconi government and selected by Undersecretary of the Family Giovinardi, includes other
conservative social scientists and demographers. Among them, Giancarlo Blangiardo, a demographer of
immigration who headlined the conference titled “Demographic Winter” described in the following
chapter
(http://www.osservatorionazionalefamiglie.it/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=480:ilcomitato-tecnico-scientifico&catid=14:presentazione&Itemid=114)
7

http://www.osservatorionazionalefamiglie.it/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=635&Ite
mid=102
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family’s “social function.” Moreover, social benefits are targeted to the “conjugal
family” because of the “ties and reciprocal obligations” upon which it is based and
because of the need to support and recognize the “social function of family
relationships” (2012: 7).
The Plan also includes a proposal to reconfigure consultori familiari (family
planning clinics). The reproductive services offered by the consultori, as I have shown
in previous chapters, have been eroded by the implementation of subsidiarity, leading
some among the feminist groups I participated in to describe a situation in which these
services, and the rights they were based on, are effectively being “emptied from
within.” The National Plan on the Family targets the consultori as sites to be
reorganized toward new priorities. The “individualistic” approach of the past is to be
replaced by a “relational” approach that includes the family (2012: 32): “we must learn
to read and respond to the need of the person in relational terms. The fragmented and
individualistic vision” of the past should be replaced by “reflexive and relational
perspectives able to support individuals in the context of their relationships. Only from
the welfare of relationships, and of familial ones in particular, can derive the full
welfare of the person” (2012: 32). In order to implement this vision, the Plan lays out
“fundamental directives;” these include “the promotion of the welfare of the family (and
not of just one member, such as for example, a woman, considered outside of her
relational context)” as well as the implementation of “subsidiarity” (2012: 32).8

8

The consultori have been the target of calls for reform on the center-left too. At the First Conference on
the Family, then Minister of the Family Bindi also proposed reforming them into “centers for families” as
part of a broader policy of the family (fieldnote, May 26, 2007).
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The proposal lays bare various dimensions of the moral politics of the family in
Italy and its articulation with the emergence of a moral neoliberal welfare society. This
project is at its most evident in the anti-abortion proposals and in the call, among the
many possible policy actions, for the moral “reorganization” (2012: 34) of institutions
that feminists constructed in the 1970s as spaces where women could exercise selfdetermination in matters of sexuality, reproduction, and the family. The policies
outlined in the National Plan for the Family make clear that the promised synthesis of
women’s rights and family rights is in fact the subsuming of the ideals of gender
equality to that of supporting the family.
Even as the Plan proclaims its European and modern “gender mainstreaming”
and parity commitments, in its policy proposals women cease to be individuals
accessing social services, particularly reproductive services, and return to being seen in
the relational (familial) context. The assertion of the “natural family” as the privileged
subject and object of welfare proposes a post-welfare society in which explicit
discrimination is legitimated in the name of the “common good.” In a different official
articulation of gender and the family (The Charter of Values and Citizenship), the state
asserted modern gender roles and the heteronormative family as shared Italian values
and as markers of integration for immigrants. Yet, the politics of gender, familymaking, and reproduction remain contested subjects. Tracing the policies and discourses
that seek to govern them in the name of social cohesion, integration, and of increasing
the birth rates sheds light on new citizenship projects and logics of inclusion/exclusion
in the post-welfare moment.
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